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← 239 La. 338 - Youngblood v. Robison

Youngblood v. Robison’s Empirical Analysis

1960

Citation profile

172
cited by 172 later decisions
1
states following
October 1988
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 168 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 172 later decisions — most recently October 1988 · most notably Bourgeois v. Francois (1964), 135 So. 2d 494 - Faulkner v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc. (1961)

4 federal appellate · 168 state decisions

1150196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc. · Koob v. Cooperative Cab Co. · Henderson v. Central Mutual Insurance Company · Steele Ex Rel. Steele v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · Ryan v. Allstate Insurance Company of Chicago

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 172 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “But when a crossing is protected by an electric semaphore light it is not essential for the favored driver to look for violations by side-street traffic facing the red light for that traffic is not only required to stop but to remain stationary until the semaphore changes to green.”
    20 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"The law in this state is well settled that a motorist who is proceeding on a right-of-way street, upon approaching an intersection where traffic is required under a city ordinance, and is warned by stop signs, to come to a complete stop before entering the intersection, should not be held to the same degree of care and vigilance as if no ordinance existed or stop signs were erected. The danger at such an intersection is less than that at a corner where no stop signs have been erected, and therefore less care is required of the driver on a favored street. The motorist on the right-of-way street, with knowledge of the location of such a stop sign, has a right to assume that any driver approaching the intersection from the less favored street will observe the law and bring his car to a complete stop before entering the intersection, and such motorist can indulge in this assumption until he sees, or should see, that the other car has not observed, or is not going to observe, the law. See Termini v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. et al., La.App., 19 So.2d 286 ; Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 209 La. 144 , 24 So.2d 292 ; Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Copeland, La.App., 28 So.2d 145 . See also Mayfield v. Crowdus, 38 N.Mex. 471, 35 P.2d 291 ; 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., sec. 1032, pp. 216, 217."”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"`Since Adams was proceeding on a favorable light under a semaphore system, he was not held to the same degree of care and vigilance as if no such system prevailed. * * * He had the right to assume that the signals were understood and would be obeyed by the motorist driving on the unfavored light. Under such assumption, we do not find that Adams was negligent in not looking at the traffic which was presumed to be stopped for the red light.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.