Volume 239 — Minnesota Reports

<bold>Electricity — knowledge of danger of injury — assumption</bold>. <block_quote> 1. In determining whether an adult person reasonably ought to recognize that his conduct in exposing himself to electricity involves a danger of injury, he is assumed to be a reasonable man possessed of such knowledge of the dangers of electric energy as is common among laymen at the time and in the community.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that we are living in an age in which the use of electricity has become so general and widespread in practically every community that the danger of electric energy<page_number>Page 49</page_number> is a matter of common knowledge among persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.</block_quote> <bold>Negligence — contributory negligence — working in place of</bold> <bold>known danger — conduct in face of danger</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Contributory negligence on the part of the decedent is not established merely by showing that he worked in a place of known danger but it also must be shown that his conduct was negligent in the face of the danger.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 4. The basic test is whether the decedent acted as a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances.</block_quote>

<bold>Municipal corporations — duty to maintain sewers in safe</bold> <bold>condition — liability for damages</bold>. <block_quote> 1. A municipality, while not an insurer of the safe condition of its sewers, is liable for damages resulting from its failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to keep them in repair and free from obstructions.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Where a sewer as constructed is found after sufficient trial to cause a direct invasion of private property by casting upon it sewage water which would not otherwise have found its way there and the condition is likely to continue, a municipality is liable for the damages sustained after notice of the condition and a reasonable opportunity to remedy it.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 3. From the evidence taken as a whole the jury was justified in finding that the defendant's sanitary sewer system was inadequate, defective, and negligently maintained.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — notice of defect — sufficiency</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Where a municipality has actual or constructive notice of a defect in its sewers sufficiently long to enable it to remedy the condition prior to the act resulting in the damage complained of, that is sufficient notice. Here the evidence justifies a finding that defendant had sufficient actual and constructive notice.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — contributory negligence of property owner</bold>. <block_quote> 5. Whether plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence, under the evidence here, presented an issue for the jury.</block_quote>

<bold>Insurance — automobile indemnity — construction of contract</bold> <bold>— exclusionary clause — member of family</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Where a policy of automobile indemnity insurance exempted the insurer from liability for personal injuries to any member of the family of the insured, an adult brother of the insured living in the same household was within the exclusionary clause.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — co-operation of insured with insurer —</bold> <bold>question of fact</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Whether the insured under a policy of automobile indemnity insurance failed to co-operate with the insurer is a question of fact, and the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence to sustain the finding.</block_quote>

<bold>Negligence — contributory negligence — sufficiency of</bold> <bold>evidence</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Plaintiff's testimony as to appearance of rubber-like protrusion on platform between ramp and entrance to plane considered and <italic>held</italic> not to establish that plaintiff was aware that in stepping on protrusion he was stepping upon a rubber roller so as to establish his contributory negligence as a matter of law.</block_quote> <bold>Evidence — opinion of medical expert — sufficiency</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Testimony of medical expert, based upon examination, diagnosis, and tests, to the effect that in his opinion plaintiff suffered multiple sclerosis considered and <italic>held</italic> sufficient to support finding that plaintiff was suffering from such disease. Medical expert's opinion need not be free from doubt or capable of demonstration to entitle it to consideration by jury. It is only necessary that it be based upon proper foundation and that it be deemed true in his judgment.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — relationship between injury and disease</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Evidence considered and <italic>held</italic> sufficient to support finding as to the causal relationship between trauma to plaintiff resulting from accident and multiple sclerosis subsequently afflicting him. Absence of exact medical knowledge on cause of particular disease, which makes it impossible to say with absolute certainty whether a particular injury caused or aggravated it, does not eliminate, as a factor for consideration by jury, opinion of medical expert as to the relationship between injury and a particular disease with which injured party subsequently became afflicted.</block_quote> <bold>Damages — not excessive</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Where prior to accident plaintiff was young, healthy, and capable of earning a substantial living as an accountant and in operating a private enterprise and where as a result of accident he will be crippled for life, useless in an economic sense, and incapable of any extensive productive effort, <italic>held</italic> under all such circumstances award of $50,000 therefor not excessive.</block_quote><page_number>Page 299</page_number>