Peterson v. Lang’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"As applied to vehicles advancing on the highway, the word approaching must be given a reasonable construction. A vehicle on the highway is approaching within the meaning of the statute when such vehicle is so close that, if it continues in the same course at the same speed, there is a reasonable likelihood or danger of collision should the vehicle on the private road or driveway enter upon or cross the highway. If there is a reasonable likelihood of a collision, it is the duty of the driver of the vehicle on the private road to delay his entry on the highway until the other vehicle has passed. If, however, the approaching vehicle is so far away that a reasonably prudent person would have reason to believe that, if such vehicle maintains its course at the same rate of speed, there is no reasonable likelihood or imminent danger of collision, a driver upon a private road may enter upon the highway without violating the statute. Whether under the circumstances of a particular case the driver upon a private road has acted as a reasonably prudent person with respect to approaching vehicles in entering upon or crossing the highway is usually a question of fact for the jury." 58 N.W.2d at 612 to 613.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dwyer v. Christensen · Reed v. Green

2. “* * * and the only point made is that, at the time the truck emerged from the private road to the highway, the defendant Mary Horn, driving her car as aforesaid, had the right of way. This is based upon the provisions of subdivision b of section 131 of the California Vehicle Act of 1923 * * * which then read: `The driver of a vehicle entering a public highway from a private road or drive shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said public highway.' The argument is made that, irrespective of the distance between the approaching car driven by the defendant Mary Horn and the private highway on which the truck was emerging, it gave the defendant the right of way. The subdivision of the section, however, is not susceptible of any such interpretation. If interpreted literally as the subdivision reads, or as it then read, no one could ever drive from a private road upon a public highway if any one were approaching upon such highway, irrespective of the distance. The subdivision must be construed to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, which was to prevent automobile drivers on private roads from entering a public highway when a car was approaching upon such highway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard, and not that no one should enter upon a public highway from a private road or driveway so long as the public highway was in use.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reed v. Green