State v. Hartmann’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) he or she is absolutely prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, or (2) a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had counsel been permitted to pursue his or her proposed line of cross-examination.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 6 Neb. Ct. App. 309 - Burke v. Harman · State v. Privat

2. “The right to cross-examine a prosecution witness regarding bias or motive is an important interest. “A more particular attack on the witness’ credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.’ .. . We have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), citing 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 940 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970). In a more recent review of the confrontation clause, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 , 106 S. Ct. 1431 , 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986), quoting, in part, Davis v. Alaska, supra. “[T]he right to cross-examine ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Dyer

3. “Ú.S. Const, amend. VI and Neb. Const, art. I, § 11, guarantee an accused the right to confront witnesses. Implicit in the right of confrontation is the right to cross-examine all witnesses. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S. Ct. 1038 , 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368 , 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986). In holding that the confrontation clause is applicable to the states through U.S. Const, amend. XIV, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[t]here are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 , 85 S. Ct. 1065 , 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Trackwell