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24 Ala. App. 496

137 So 460

Russell v. State

Alabama Court of Appeals

Decided June 30, 1931

Alabama Court of Appeals · decided 1931-06-30

Relies on Mitchell v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1931-06-30

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently January 1951

5 state decisions

20193119401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1On Rehearing.

¶2A witness, Summers, was placed upon the stand by the state for the purpose of eliciting testimony in rebuttal of that which had been offered by appellant in support of his claimed alibi.

¶3Upon the cross-examination of this witness appellant brought from him testimony tending to show the good character, reputation, etc., of appellant. Whereupon the state, on redirect examination, asked the witness this question: “You have heard, though, that he killed two men before he killed this one, haven’t you, here in Birmingham?”

¶4Over the timely objection of appellant, one of the grounds of which was the question, “Didn’t State (ask) when he heard it?” the witness was allowed to answer the question; his answer being, “Yes, sir.”

¶5While there is apparent at least one other valid ground of objection to the question quoted, i. e., that it assumed that appellant had killed tho deceased, a fact stoutly denied by him, which ground, perhaps, though, is not presented to us, yet we are, upon reconsideration, of the opinion, and hold, that the ground set out, above, was a good one, and that the appellant’s objection, based thereon, should have been sustained.

¶6The rule in such matters seems to be that contained in the following quoted excerpts from the opinion by this court in the case of Mitchell v. State, 14 Ala. App. 46, 70 So. 991, 992, to wit:

“In criminal prosecutions, evidence of tho general good character of tho accused is admissible as original evidence tending to exculpate from the charge, and the weight of authority establishes what we consider tho better rule, that such evidence, when offered, should be directed to the particular traits of character involved , in the nature of the charge. The character of the accused in this respect can be made an issue only by the accused offering proof of his good character, and when he does, the state may on the cross-examination of the defendant’s witness, show reports or rumors current in the community of defendant’s residence before the alleged criminal act under investigation derogatory to his good character in the respect he has put it in -issue, for the purpose of showing that the witness was mistaken in his estimate.of defendant’s character. sucii evidence must be limited to repute affecting the defendant’s character current prior to the commission of the crime under investigation." (Italics ours.)

¶7In the instant case the answer to the question above quoted brought into the case a rumor, or report, heard by the witness, which, *499it was later developed, the witness had heard only since the commission of the offense under investigation. This, as so well pointed out in the opinion in the Mitchell Case, supra, is expressly prohibited.

¶8We think the prejudicial nature of the objectionable testimony under consideration is obvious.

¶9While adhering to our views as expressed in our original opinion in this ease, except as modified by what we have here written, we are now of the opinion that, for the error pointed out herein, the application for rehearing must be granted, the order of affirmance set aside, the judgment of conviction reversed, and the cause remanded. And it is so ordered.

¶10Application granted. Order of affirmance set aside. Judgment of conviction reversed, and cause remanded.

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