U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · decided 1905-02-07
<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant, tbe Treasurer of the United States, from an order overruling a demurrer to a bill of complaint, and appointing a receiver in a suit in equity to establish an equitable lien upon a fund in the Treasury of the United States.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is a suit in equity begun by Charles F. Consaul and Ida M. Moyers, administrators of the estate of Gilbert Moyers, against Ellis H. Eoberts, as Treasurer of the United States, and one John Holland, who resides in the State of California.</p> <p>The bill alleges that on June 25, 1886, one Pleasant W. Bar-bee, as administrator de bonis non of James Campbell, deceased, employed Gilbert Moyers as his attorney to prosecute a claim against the United States, and executed and delivered to him tbe following obligation:</p> <p>Know all men by these presents, that I, Pleasant W. Bar-bee, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of James Campbell, deceased, have employed Gilbert Moyers, of Washington, D. C., as my attorney, to prosecute this claim against the United States govermnent, and, in consideration of his professional services and expenses incurred by him in the prosecution of said claim, I agree to allow him the fee of 50 per cent of the amount which may be collected thereon; and said fee is hereby made a lien on any draft that may be issued in payment of said claim.</p> <p>Witness my hand and seal this 25th day of June, 1886.</p> <p>P. W. Barbee.</p> <p>Witnessed by L. C. Culson.</p> <p>It is further alleged that Moyers prosecuted said claim in the court of claims, which held that Campbell came within the terms of the act permitting recovery in such cases, but that the bulk of the property, the taking of which was the subject-matter of the suit, had been taken after his death, and that his next of kin were the proper parties to maintain the suit; that Moyers informed the latter of this decision, and they thereupon authorized him to appear for them and prosecute the claims on their behalf; that Moyers then prepared a petition on behalf of John Holland, who was a grandson of said Campbell, and sent it to him for execution; that said Holland executed and returned the same, authorizing Moyers to prosecute the suit on his behalf, and agreeing to the same terms and conditions as in the contract made with Barbee, administrator, before set out; that in the suit so prosecuted the court of claims awarded the sum of $403 to said Holland on April 10, 1899; that on May 27, 1902, Congress appropriated the sum of $403, out of any money in the Treasury, to be paid to said John Holland in satisfaction of said award; that the said Holland failed during the life of said Moyers, whose services had procured the establishment of the claim, to execute a power to him to receive said money from the Treasury, and since his death has refused to empower the administrators aforesaid to receive the same, and has not paid the fee due to said Moyers; that said Holland has not only refused to j>ay said fee, but is endeavoring to obtain possession of the draft for said appropriation, with the intent to defraud the plaintiffs as administrators; that said Holland has no other property of any kind -within the jurisdiction of the court, and, unless restrained, will procure the transmission of the draft to a place beyond the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>The prayers were that Holland be restrained from receiving the draft, and Eoberts, as Treasurer, from delivering the same to him; that a receiver be appointed to receive said draft and to collect the money thereon to be held subject to the further order of the court; and for a decree against Holland for $201.50 with costs of suit, to be established as a' lien upon said fund and paid out of the same, etc. *</p> <p>No service of process has been had upon Holland, and he has made no appearance. Defendant Roberts, having been served with process, appeared and entered a demurrer to the bill. Subsequently, by way of return to the rule to show cause, he objected to the jurisdiction of the court because of his relation to the fund as an officer of the United States, merely, in the discharge of an official duty, and set up the invalidity of the contract as an assignment of a claim against the United States.</p> <p>The demurrer was overruled, and an order was entered appointing one Christopher N. Wilson receiver, and directing him to demand and receive of defendant Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, the sum of $201.50 out of the $403 appropriated for the defendant John Holland.</p> <p>From this decree the defendant Roberts has. appealed.</p> <p>1. While an officer of the United States may, in regard to purely ministerial duties, be restrained by injunction or compelled by mandamus, yet these remedies may be invoked only when, in the one case (injunction), a plain official duty is threatened to be violated and some person will sustain personal injury thereby, for which adequate compensation cannot be had at law, and, in the second case (mandamus), where an officer refuses, to the injury of some person, to perform a plain official duty. Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D. C. 453, 458; Brad-field v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291, affirming last cited case; Noble v. Union River Log. R. Go. 147 U. S. 165, 172; Board Liquidation v. McGornb, 92 U. S. 531, 541. The defendant Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, has neither threatened to violate nor refused to perform a plain official duty.</p> <p>2. Furthermore, this suit, being one to restrain the United States from paying one of its debts, is substantially a suit against the United States, and the United States is a necessary party. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 512. See also Ee Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 154. But the United States cannot be sued without its consent. This doctrine is indisputable. See cases last above cited, and also United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 444.</p> <p>3. No injunction can be issued by the courts of the United States against officers of a State to restrain or control the use of property already in the possession of the State or money in its treasury when the suit is commenced; or to compel the State to perform its obligations; or where the State has otherwise such an interest in the subject of the suit as to be a necessary party. And the same rule applies to officers of the United States. Bellcnap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10. See also Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373; International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601, 606; United States v. Guthrie, 17 How. 284; Be Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 489, 502, 506, 507. The court below is, therefore, without jurisdiction or power to compjel the defendant Eoberts, as Treasurer, to pay over money of the United States. It is true the.order of the court below appointing the receiver does not, in so many words, command the Treasurer to pay the money to the receiver; but should the Treasurer refuse to pay out the money on demand of the receiver the nest step would necessarily.be a motion for an order compelling him to pay it. The Code of the District of Columbia provides, in sec. 113, for the enforcement of final decrees, and sec. 114 provides that “all interlocutory orders may be enforced by such process as might be had Upon a final judgment or decree to the like effect.” Now if the court below has no power to make an order compelling the Treasurer to pay out the money,— and it is submitted that it has been clearly shown that it has no such power, — then its action in appointing a receiver is abortive. The power to compel payment and the power to appoint a receiver necessarily stand or fall together.</p> <p>4. Passing now to the defendant Holland, how has the court below obtained jurisdiction of him ? It is alleged in the bill of complaint that he is a resident of the State of California. The record discloses the fact that all the process issued by the court below was returned not found as to him, and fails to disclose any attempt on the part of the complainants to secure service of process by publication, as provided by secs. 105 and 106 of the Code of the District of Columbia, even could service be secured in such manner on the ground that he has property located within the District of Columbia and within the jurisdiction of the court, which question will be discussed later. A final decree in equity, or an interlocutory decree, which, in a great measure, decides the merits of the cause, cannot be pronounced until all the parties to the bill, and all the parties in interest, are before the court. Conn v. Penn, 5 Wheat. 424; Marshall v. Beverly, 5 Wheat. 313; Traders’ Nat. Bank v. Campbell, 14 Wall 81.</p> <p>5. The court below has no jurisdiction of the-subject-matter of the suit. This fund has no separate entity as distinguished from the general funds of the United States, which are in the custody of the Treasurer and his assistants, not only in the Treasury in Washington, but in the various subtreasuries throughout the country, and cannot be segregated from this general fund except by regular proceedings governed by law, namely, by a warrant issued by the Secretary of the Treasury authorizing its separation and withdrawal from the general fund. This money is not set aside into a specific fund, but is to be paid out of the general fund of moneys belonging to the United States. See Wyman r. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654; Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 19, 20. See also The Siren, cited above. If there is any property of the defendant Holland within the District of Columbia and the jurisdiction of the court below, it consists of a debt due by the United States to said Holland. But it is well settled that debts due from the United States have no locality .at the seat of government. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1. See also Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100, 105; Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654, 656, 658; United States v. Borcherling, 185 U. S. 223, 233.</p> <p>6. If this claim or debt is property of the defendant Holland located in the District of Columbia, still it is not within the jurisdiction of the court below, for the bill prays for and the court granted what amounts to an equitable attachment of funds in the hands of the United States, or of a debt due from the United States. A debt due by the United States or by a State or municipal government cannot be reached by attachment or garnishment. Drake, Attachm. §§ 492-515; Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 19, 20.</p> <p>Y. There is no equity in the bill of the complainants because it seeks to enforce a void assignment. Section 34YY, U. S. Rev. Stat, provides that “all transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim, or of any part or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof. Such transfers, assignments, and powers of attorney must recite the warrant for payment, and must be acknowledged by the person making them, before an officer having authority to take acknowledgments of deeds, and shall be certified by the officer; and it must appear by the certificate that the officer, at the time of the acknowledgment, read and fully explained the transfer, assignment, or warrant of attorney to the person acknowledging the same.” This law has been sustained in a long line of cases, and a very clear distinction has been drawn between voluntary assignments made by individuals and transfers of title by operation of law. It prohibits assignments by individuals, but does not apply to the passing of claims to heirs, devisees, assignees in bankruptcy, copartners, and so forth. Erwin v. United States, 9Y U. S. 392, 39Y; Spofford v. Eirk, 9Y U. S. 484; Goodman v. Niblach, 102 U. S. 556, 560; Hobbs v. McLean, 11Y U. S. 56Y; Butler v. Goreley, 146 U. S. 303, 311-313; ILager v. Swagne, 149 TJ. S. 242; Ball v. Halsell, 161 U. S. 12; Howes v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 110; Owens v. Wilkinson, 20 App. D. C. 51. The contract set forth in the bill of complaint is, if a contract at all, merely a personal agreement between Holland and Moyers, and did not give Moyers a lien upon the claim of the defendant Holland. Tñst v. Child, 21 Wall: 441, 441. If Moyers had not such a lien, the bill is without equity, and must be dismissed. Spofford v. Kirk, 91 IT. S. 484, 481. Furthermore, if the contract did give Moyers a lien upon the claim of Holland against the United States, it could operate only as an equitable assignment of a portion of the claim, and if it is an equitable assignment it is absolutely void under sec. 3411, U. S. Eev. Stat. Spofford v. Kirk, 91 U. S. 488.</p> <p>8. There is no equity in the bill because it seeks, by virtue of a decree in equity, to create a lien in the nature of an assignment by operation of law; in other words, it seeks the aid of a court of equity to breathe life and validity into a void assignment. ;</p>