Macklin v. Singletary’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In this post- McCleskey era, the abuse of the writ doctrine presents objective, threshold questions involving the application of law to facts. We review district court rulings on such issues not under an abuse of discretion standard, but de novo .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Edwin A. Towne, Jr. · Zayas v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

2. “"Under pre- McCleskey law, as the Court had stated in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 , 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1079 , 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963), the principles governing abuse of the writ[ [3] ] were `addressed to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges. Theirs is the major responsibility for the just and sound administration of the federal collateral remedies, and theirs must be the judgment as to whether a second or successive application shall be denied without consideration of the merits.' So it was three decades ago and up through the time of our own decision in the McCleskey case. McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342, 347 (11th Cir.1989) (`Whether a second or subsequent petition is to be dismissed on abuse of the writ grounds is left to the sound discretion of the district court.') All of that changed with the Supreme Court's McCleskey decision which materially altered the doctrinal landscape for abuse of the writ law and in doing so narrowed to the point of extinction the range of choice and the amount of discretion district courts have in ruling on abuse of the writ issues. ". . . . "A habeas court may reach the merits of a claim not raised in a previous petition only if the petitioner establishes both cause and prejudice, or shows that the fundamental miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence, exception applies. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 , 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 827 So. 2d 869 - Whitt v. State

3. “When a prisoner flies a second or subsequent application, the government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ. The government satisfies this burden if, with clarity and particularity, it notes petitioner’s prior writ history, identifies the claims that appear for the first time, and alleges that petitioner has abused the writ. The burden to disprove abuse then becomes petitioner’s. To excuse his failure to raise the claim earlier, he must show cause for failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom as those concepts have been defined in our procedural default decisions. The petitioner’s opportunity to meet the burden of cause and prejudice will not include an eviden-tiary hearing if the district court determines as a matter of law that petitioner cannot satisfy the standard. If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 551 F. Supp. 2d 379 - O'NEAL v. Levi