TEJWANI

Cite as 

 (BIA 2007)                                 Interim Decision #3553




              In re Mahesh Nenumal TEJWANI, Respondent
                             File A44 741 386 – Newark
                             Decided February 22, 2007
                            U.S. Department of Justice
                     Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

  The offense of money laundering in violation of section 470.10(1) of the New York Penal
Law is a crime involving moral turpitude.

FOR RESPONDENT: Thomas E. Moseley, Esquire, Newark, New Jersey
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Charles Parker, Jr., Chief
Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES, MILLER, and GRANT, Board Members.
GRANT, Board Member:

   This matter was last before us on September 13, 2004, when we affirmed
the decision of the Immigration Judge finding that the respondent had been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and ordering him removed to
India. The respondent filed a petition for review of that decision with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court granted the
petition for review, vacated our decision, and remanded the record for a
determination whether money laundering, as it is defined in the New York
statute under which the respondent was convicted, is a crime involving moral
turpitude. We now find that it is and will dismiss the respondent’s appeal.1
   The respondent is a native and citizen of India who was admitted to the
United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1995. On November 30,
2000, the respondent pled guilty in New York to two counts of money
laundering in the second degree, in violation of section 470.10(1) of the New
York Penal Law. That section provided in relevant part:
       A person is guilty of money laundering in the second degree when that person
       exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary
       instruments which are the proceeds of specified criminal conduct and have a total
       value exceeding ten thousand dollars for one or more other monetary instruments
       and/or equivalent property when that person knows that the monetary instrument or

1
    The respondent’s request for oral argument is denied.

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Cite as 

 (BIA 2007)                                 Interim Decision #3553



       instruments exchanged or received in exchange are the proceeds of any criminal
       conduct and that person:
       1. intentionally makes the exchange to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
            the source, the ownership, or the control of such proceeds . . . .

 (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added).2
  In determining whether an alien was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, we use the categorical approach, focusing on the statute and the
record of conviction, rather than on the specific act committed by the alien.
See De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 

, 635 (3d Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, we look to the elements of the respondent’s statutory offense in
order to determine whether the crime is one that necessarily involves moral
turpitude, without considering the circumstances under which it was
committed. See Matter of Torres-Varela, 

 (BIA 2001).
  Moral turpitude is conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to other
persons, either individually or to society in general. See Matter of Robles,

 (BIA 2006); Matter of Danesh, 

(BIA 1988). It generally involves conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty,
or morality. See De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, supra, at 636. A crime that
impairs and obstructs a function of a department of government by defeating
its efficiency or destroying the value of its lawful operations by deceit, graft,
trickery, or dishonest means is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter
of Jurado, 

 (BIA 2006) (citing Matter of Flores, 

 (BIA 1980)); see also Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 

 (2d Cir. 2006); Notash v. Gonzales, 

 (9th Cir. 2005).
Affirmative acts to conceal criminal activity and impede law enforcement
have been found to be crimes involving moral turpitude. See Matter of
Robles, supra, at 25-26; see also Padilla v. Gonzales, 

 (7th Cir.
2005); Itani v. Ashcroft, 

 (11th Cir. 2002).
  Crimes containing as an element a specific intent to defraud always involve
moral turpitude, but we have also determined that certain crimes are inherently
fraudulent and involve moral turpitude even though they can be committed
without proof of a specific intent to defraud. See Matter of Flores, supra, at
230 (finding that uttering or selling false or counterfeit papers relating to the
registry of aliens with knowledge of their counterfeit nature was a crime
involving moral turpitude because it inherently involved a deliberate
deception of the Federal Government and an impairment of its lawful
functions); see also Carty v. Ashcroft, 

 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
that tax evasion is a crime involving moral turpitude because an intent to
evade is tantamount to an intent to defraud).
  The crime of money laundering under section 470.10(1) of the New York
Penal Law involves the exchange of monetary instruments that are known to
2
    The statute under which the respondent was charged was subsequently amended.

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Cite as 

 (BIA 2007)                                 Interim Decision #3553



be the proceeds of “any criminal conduct” with the intent to conceal those
proceeds. As the respondent notes, the statute provides that the proceeds may
be from any criminal conduct, which, according to section 470.00(4) of the
New York Penal Law, includes any crime under New York law. The
respondent argues that the concealment of proceeds from a crime that does not
necessarily involve moral turpitude cannot itself be a crime involving moral
turpitude. He therefore asserts that the offense of money laundering under
New York law is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude.
  We are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument. A person who
deliberately takes affirmative steps to conceal or disguise the proceeds of
criminal conduct acts in an inherently deceptive manner and impairs
governmental function, specifically the ability to detect and combat criminal
activity. Such interference in governmental function is inherently dishonest
and contrary to accepted moral standards. As a number of courts have
observed, the “‘[c]oncealment of crime has been condemned throughout our
history.’” Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of Army, 

 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (quoting Roberts v. United States, 

 (1980)). This is
true regardless of whether the concealed offense is a crime involving moral
turpitude. See, e.g., Matter of Robles, supra.3
  We note that the respondent’s offense is distinguishable from the crime of
causing a financial institution to fail to file currency transaction reports and
structuring currency transactions to evade reporting requirements, which we
considered in Matter of L-V-C-, 

 (BIA 1999) (overruling
Matter of Goldeshtein, 

 (BIA 1991)). In that case, we
distinguished convictions for currency structuring that involved benign
nonreporting from those that involved deliberate attempts to deprive the
Federal Government of information that would be valuable in combating
criminal activity. We noted that a crime involving the deliberate cover-up of
illegal activity would be a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. at 603.
However, because not all the offenses under the statute involved such a
deliberate concealment, we concluded that structuring was not categorically
a crime involving moral turpitude.
  Unlike the statute in Matter of L-V-C-, supra, section 470.10(1) of the New
York Penal Law requires proof of a deliberate act to conceal illegal activity.
We therefore find that a violation of that statute is categorically a crime
involving moral turpitude. Because there are no other issues before us, we
will dismiss the respondent’s appeal.
  ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
3
   The proceeds that were the subject of the respondent’s money laundering were from
illegal drug sales, a fact that had been considered by the Immigration Judge in her
determination that the respondent’s crime involved moral turpitude. Given our decision that
the act of deliberately concealing illegal activity is categorically a crime involving moral
turpitude, the source of the proceeds concealed by the respondent is irrelevant.

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