¶1The case may be divested of many of the difficulties, suggested by appellants’ counsel, by recurring to some facts, to our minds well established by the evidence.
¶2These defendants, nor either of them, ever owned or pretended to own, the south-east quarter of the northwest quarter of section 12, township 81, range 2. Nor was it ever owned by Everett Drake. The land sold by Kennedy to Drake and intended to be conveyed, was the south-vjfisi quarter, etc., and this same land Drake intended to convey to his daughter.
¶3The mistake was an innocent one, there being no intention to mislead or defraud any one. The deed from the husband to the wife was made for the purpose of correct*401ing these mistakes. Kennedy received a valuable consideration from Drake, for the conveyance of February 23, 1856, to wit, property of about the value named in the deed. The recital in the deed to the wife, of July 2T, 1861, refers correctly and with entire accuracy to the dates of the prior deeds, and the books and pages where each were recorded. The deed from Drake to his daughter was founded upon the consideration of “ natural love and affection” alone. He lived in this State at the time Kennedy conveyed to him — during the same year removed to Yirginia, and that fall, having determined not to return, he expressed his intention to give this land to his daughter, and accordingly in 1858, made the deed. The mistake was not discovered until in 1861, about the time the husband conveyed to the wife. When the debt was contracted, upon which the judgment was recovered, under which plaintiff claims, does not appear.
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¶6She asks to be relieved in her answer as against him on his pretended title, and this is the extent of the judgment in her favor. As equity would have compelled the husband to correct this mistake, it was perfectly competent for him to do voluntarily that which she could have enforced. She is not a mere volunteer asking a court of equity to enforce a voluntary gift from the father to her against the other children. Nor is she claiming under a parol gift. She is claiming under a deed — a deed, too, from the very party under whom plaintiff claims. What effect this deed had is another question to be hereafter considered. Plaintiff is not claiming under a deed from the other heirs, nor under one from the ancestor. The very basis of his claim — and this destroyed, he has no title — • is, that the defendant in execution, W. W. Kennedy, never parted with the title to this land, and that Drake never owned, and hence, of course, that his heirs never did. His claim is adverse to any possible right of these heirs in the land. The defendant, Angeline, is not, by a bill in equity, seeking a discovery and relief, as against a conveyance made by Drake or the other heirs, to plaintiff or the party under whom he claims. If she was, the ease would be analogous to Findly v. Hinde (1 Pet. 241); Simms v. Guthrie (9 Cranch. 25); Mallow v. Hinde (12 Wheaton, 193), relied upon by appellant. Nor is she, as already stated, asking to enforce a voluntary contract — one founded upon a merely good or meritorious consideration, and hence, too, the doctrine found in 2 Story’s Eq. Jur. (793a) and which we do not, by any *404means, controvert, is entirely inapplicable. And the same is true of Firnan, v. Firnan (13 Ind. 317), the correctness of which is not denied. That was a contest between heirs — one of them claiming under a voluntary deed, which he asked to have reformed. Here defendant no longer stands upon a voluntary deed founded upon a good consideration, but claims under, a deed which vests her with the absolute legal title, subject, as against plaintiff, to the lien of the judgment under which he claims. And thus we might, by a reference to all the authorities cited by appellants, show how entirely they are inapplicable to the case before us. The foregoing, however, must suffice.
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¶9‘Without recurring further to the fact, that defendant does not, by an original bill, seek discovery and relief— a fact which we now leave entirely out of view- — -we remark that appellants’ claim of want of parties, is based upon the idea, and indeed, beside this, has nothing upon which to stand; that plaintiff holds under Drake, and not under Kennedy, and that defendant (Angeline) holds adversely to such supposed claim. Than this, however, there could be no greater mistake. Both parties take from Kennedy — the one by judgment title, the other by the deed, which she claims in equity is prior in point of time to the lien of such judgment. Now, if Kennedy had made a deed, properly describing the land, to Drake, and the latter had conveyed to the wife by a wrong, description,' and if after this Drake had, by a good description, conveyed the land to plaintiff, in a contest as to their respective equities, these heirs might have been necessary, certainly would be proper parties. For then they would be interested at least to the extent of the covenants contained in the deed of their ancestor. But that is not this case, by any means. For how, by possibility, could these heirs be affected by this litigation, or what interest have they in it ? It is a contest as to whether plaint*406iffs’ apparent title should prevail over defendant’s equity. The judgment settles nothing as against these heirs. It in no manner concludes them. The deed from Kennedy to his wife can have no such effect. Their rights are just as indisputable, just as complete, as though that deed had never been made, as though this judgment had never been entered. The adding to the judgment, that the defendant’s title should be quieted as against plaintiff, does not make the case different. It has no other or further effect than the language implies. This would have been the legitimate effect of a simple judgment in her favor until set aside. Indeed it seems to us that these heirs were no more necessary parties than if the case had been heard alone upon a legal defense. They are not even consequentially interested or affected by this litigation. And without extending the argument, see upon this subject the following authorities, which place the matter beyond all doubt: Mitf. Eq. Pl. 170; Story’s Eq. Pl. §§ 228, 226a; Glyn v. Soares, 3 Mylne & Keen, 450.
¶10We have'only, then, to inquire, finally, what was the effect of the deed of July, 1861, from Kennedy to his wife % It will be remembered, that it was made and recorded after the lien of the judgment attached, as also after the levy, but before the sale. If it had been made before the lien attached, though filed for record after and before the sale, there can be no doubt, under our former decisions (and particularly Norton et. al. v. Williams [9 Iowa, 528], and see other cases before cited, as also Welton v. Tizzard [15 id. 495]), that it would give defendant the better title. It was made, however, and, of course, recorded, after the judgment lien attached. If before the sale-, the grantee therein, the present defendant Angeline, had filed her bill setting up these facts, and had established them, there can be no doubt, under the authority *407of Welton v. Tizzard (supra), that she would have succeeded in removing the cloud. In that case, however, there was nothing of record to affect the judgment creditor, with notice of the mistake in the deed, nor of the grantee’s or mortgagee’s equity, and hence the necessity of proceeding before sale. Here, according to defendant’s theory, there was notice, and, as plaintiff, or the party under whom he claims, took affected thereby, his title is entirely defeated. And just here is the turning point in the present inquiry. "Was plaintiff, by the indexing of this deed — or rather was Selden — bound to take notice of all that this deed contained, and does the fact that it was made after the judgment, place him in any better position than if it had been made before and recorded afterward?
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¶12Applying these rules, Selden was bound to know, and in legal contemplation did know, when he purchased at the sheriff’s sale, that Angeline Kennedy held the legal %itle to this land. Not only so, but he knew the contents *408óf tire deed tinder which she held, just as though the same information had been given to him orally at and before the purchase. Knowing this, there is no difficulty in determining the extent of information to which the proper inquiry would have led him. This deed advised him, necessarily, fairly and legitimately, that long prior to the filing of the judgment, this land had been sold, and that when the lien attached, though the title was in the debtor, all interest had passed from him and was vested in another. If he had been told at the sale, that the prior deeds were intended to convey this land, and that it was in fact sold, he would have been put upon inquiry, and if this had been subsequently established, the equity would have prevailed. He was told this in effect by this record. And having this notice, he ought not in conscience to take the title discharged of the equity. Nailor v. Fisk, 5 Cush. 256; Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354.
¶13We remark, in conclusion, that this deed was an instrument, the filing of which for record imparted to these persons notice of its contents, and that it is, therefore, in every respect unlike that referred to in Brown et al. v. Budd (2 Ind. 442), to which we are referred by counsel. So, too, the case of Lewis v. Baird (3 McLean, 56), holds that the record was not notice, because under the ordinance of 1787, the recordation of an equity is not included, but only conveyances of the legal title. And to the same effect are the other authorities cited to tin's point.
¶14Their correctness is not controverted. Their applicability, however, is not perceived. Errors overruled, and judgment below
¶15Affirmed.