24 Md. App. 395 - Flood v. Flood’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Thus, Flanagan clearly concerned acts which caused or contributed to the separation of the parties, and which, therefore, were necessarily committed before the marriage’s demise. Courson concerned acts committed after the separation of the parties was a fait accompli. Under Flanagan , if it is the wife’s act which is the sole cause for the demise of the marriage, and that act is adultery, she is precluded from obtaining alimony 'except in rare instances where there exist extremely extenuating circumstances.’ Under Courson, if the wife commits adultery after the separation, she ipso facto loses all right to alimony; not even the mercy of 'extremely extenuating circumstances’ is indicated in Courson. So, to this point of comparison, it seems that an adulterous act causing the demise of a marriage is to be treated with somewhat more leniency than an adulterous act committed after the separation and not contributing to it. But in either event, the general rule is that the wife is not entitled to alimony. Flanagan leaves unanswered what happens in a nonculpable divorce suit when the actions of the wife seeking alimony do not constitute the sole cause for the demise of the marriage, but there is fault on both sides which caused the separation of the parties, and the fault of the wife is an act of adultery. We can only read Flanagan as holding that in such circumstances the chancellor should consider the degree of blame as well as the relative guilt of the parties, and, in conjunct”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 46 Md. App. 213 - Wallace v. Wallace

2. “"We would have no difficulty arriving at a resolution of the question along the path charted by Courson. Like Courson, here the fault of the husband caused the demise of the marriage. Like Courson, here the wife committed adultery after the fact of the separation of the parties. That in Courson the parties were legally separated by an a mensa divorce where here they were voluntarily separated, but not under legal aegis, is a distinction without a difference. If all we had to look to was Courson, we would be obliged to hold the Wife forfeited her right to Husband’s support and the payment of alimony. But we have Flanagan also, and its light casts shadows on Courson’s path. For reasons we have indicated, we are hard pressed to apply the strict rule of Courson in the light of Flanagan . We think that Flanagan tempers Courson’s rule, sub silentio, or by implication, or by practical necessity in the interest of justice, at least, as it may have been applicable in the factual posture of the case here reviewed.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 46 Md. App. 213 - Wallace v. Wallace

3. ““It is a general rule that a court, before determining the award of alimony, should consider the maintenance of the wife in accordance with the husband’s duty to support her suitably, together with the husband’s wealth and earning capacity. In addition to the financial circumstances of the parties, the court should also usually consider their station in life, their age and physical condition, ability to work, the length of time they lived together, the circumstances leading up to the separation, the fault which destroyed the home, and their respective responsibilities for the care and support of the children.” ( 178 Md. at 642 .)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 33 Md. App. 707 - Payne v. Payne