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24 Nev. 389

57 P 839

Strozzi v. Wines

Nevada Supreme Court

Decided January 5, 1899

Nevada Supreme Court · decided 1899-01-05

F. Talbot, District Judge: Action by C. P. Strozzi against Ira D. Wines and Eugene Wines, for damages for false imprisonment. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. I. If this is an action for malicious prosecution, both malice and want of probable cause must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. If either malice or want of probable cause be not shown, a verdict for the plaintiff cannot be sustained.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1899-01-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently June 1986

1 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

201899190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court,

Belknap, J.:

¶2Plaintiff purchased a mortgage made by Len Wines and wife to the Elko-Tuscarora Mercantile Company upon premises known as the Len Wines place, in Ruby valley in Elko county. He ivas advised by the vice-president of the company to take possession of the property. Acting upon the advice, he and two others took peaceable possession. He remained so in the possession for two weeks, when he and his companions were arrested by the constable of Ruby Valley township upon a warrant charging them with the offense of trespass. The warrant was issued by the justice of the peace of South Ruby township in a cause entitled: “The State of Nevada, Plaintiff, v. C. P. Strozzi, et al., Defendants,” wherein defendants were charged with forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the above-mentioned mortgaged property. They were brought to the justice’s court, a distance of eight miles, when the case was continued, and finally dismissed without trial, at the instance of one of the defendants. Upon the return of plaintiff, after arrest, he was met by the other defendant at the gate of the premises, and forbidden to enter.

¶3Upon substantially thesedacts a jury in an action for false imprisonment returned a verdict for $200 damages.

¶4It must be conceded that in the action brought before the justice that magistrate had no jurisdiction of the action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which appellants seemed to have attempted to institute. The constitution confers jurisdiction upon the district courts of actions of this nature. Moreover, the warrant described an offense unknown to the criminal statutes of the state.

¶5It is unnecessary to cite authority to the effect that the proceedings before the justice were absolutely void, and that the warrant could not afford any justification for the arrest.

¶6*395Appellants assign as error the refusal of the court to give two certain instructions asked of and refused by the court, and also to the charge of the court.

¶7The first of these proceeds upon the assumption that the justice’s court had jurisdiction of the cause. This was contrary to the fact, and the instruction was therefore inapplicable. Without considering other objections to the second instruction, it is not the law that a complainant at whose instance an arrest has been made can justify under a void, process. (7 Am. & Eng. Ency. p. 679, and cases cited.)

¶8In the charge given by the court the jury were told, among other things, that the question whether plaintiff was a trespasser, or who owned the property, was immaterial; that the only question was: Did the defendants have plaintiff arrested maliciously and without probable cause? Appellants claim that the effect of this was to deprive them of the defense of probable cause. The question of probable cause did not depend upon the fact of Strozzi’s actual' guilt, but whether appellants, as reasonable men, had cause to believe him guilty. The rule announced by the court was more liberal to appellants than that contended for by themselves.

¶9It is claimed that the judgment for $200 damages is excessive. There was testimony tending to show bad faith upon the part of defendants in retaking possession of the property during the absence of plaintiff under arrest, and this, of itself, fully supports the verdict and judgment.

¶10The judgment and order denying a motion for new trial are affirmed.

Bonnifield, C. J.: I concur.Massey, J., did not participate in the decision.
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