State v. Cooper’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““If the sweep of the Elizabeth case doctrine were followed it would enable the State to appropriate, for wholly unrelated public purposes and without any just compensation, various municipal properties such as town halls, and schoolhouses as well as lands donated by local residents for municipal parks.f This last result, so startling on its face, was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Town of Winchester v. Cox, supra. There, land had been conveyed to the Town of Winchester ‘to be forever used as a public park.’ [ 129 Conn. 106 , 26 A.2d 592, 594 .] It had been used as such until the State Highway Commissioner took it for the construction of a state highway. No claim was made that the land reverted to the heirs of the grantor, but the town claimed that it was entitled to just compensation. The court held that the state was under obligation to pay the town for the value of the land taken. Chief Justice Maltbie referred to the Elizabeth case doctrine but declined to apply it to land given to and accepted by a municipality as a public park, which he said should be treated as a charitable use immune from legislative expropriation unless compensated. See Smith v. Incorporated Village of Patchogue, 129 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup.Ct.1954), affirmed 285 App.Div. 1190 , 141 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App.Div.1955). We find it unnecessary to pursue the scope of the Elizabeth case doctrine for, even assuming the power of our Legislature to reclaim municipal property without c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State Ex Rel. State Highway Commission v. City of Albuquerque

2. ““We are in accord with the individual appellants’ position that the dedicated use of the area has not been continued by the State; it seems evident that the present use of the area as part of a limited access high-speed highway differs significantly from its former use as a local park. * * And we recognize, as they stress, that the judicial decisions have dealt generally with actual transfers by deed of defeasi-ble estates * * * rather than with dedication by map which in our State involves the creation of public rights along with the retention of bare legal title. But we believe that the ultimate determination may not justly turn on metaphysical distinctions but must rest upon substantial realities. * * * When the State Highway Commissioner condemned, the possibility that there would be a re-verter entitling the individual appellants to actual use and enjoyment had no apparent worth, nor did it then accrue * *, and while there was also a taking of the bare legal title, that interest would seem, in the absence of a showing of special factors, to have little transferable value for purposes of condemnation.” 131 A.2d 1 . c. 763-764.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority v. City of St. Joseph

3. ““ * * * They [the authorities] recognize, however, that the owner of the fee or the reversionary interest should have a separate valuation of his interest where the land taken has some special value to him, as where the underlying lands are shown to be mineral bearing or otherwise of value separately from tile use of the surface of the land; but that otherwise the law will not take notice of the separate value of the fee and of the user where there is no substantial difference in their values, and if, in such case, at the time fixed for the valuation the reversion has not occurred, the reversionary interest is said not to have any compensable value in a condemnation proceeding. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 146 Cal. 290 , 79 P. 961 , 70 L.R.A. 221 , 106 Am.St.Rep. 36 , 2 Ann. Cas. 962; City of San Gabriel v. Pacific El. Ry. Co., 129 Cal.App. 460 , 18 P.2d 996 ; Lutes v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 158 Ky. 259 , 164 S.W. 792 ; Nichols, Eminent Domain, 2d Ed., vol. 1, p. 243; see also Lyford v. City of Laconia, 75 N.H. 220 , 72 A. 1085 , 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 1062, 139 Am.St.Rep. 680 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State Ex Rel. State Highway Commission v. Myers