24 Tenn. App. 61 - Stevens v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘Compensation may be for a pecuniary injury which has resulted as the, natural or probable result of a wrong, although the extent of the injury is not capable of precise proof.’ 15 Am. Juris., page 797, sec. 356. “ ‘There is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that the plaintiff has sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. Formerly, the tendency was to restrict the recovery to such matters as were susceptible of having attached to them an exact pecuniary value, but it is now generally held that the uncertainty which prevents a recovery is uncertainty as to the fact of the damage and not as to its amount and that where it is certain that damage has resulted, mere uncertainty as to the a,mount will not preclude the right of recovery. This view has been sustained where, from the nature of the case, the extent of the injury and the amount of damage are not capable of exact and accurate proof. Under such circumstances all that can be required is that the evidence, with such certainty as the nature of the particular case may permit, lay a foundation which will enable the trier of facts to • make a fair and reasonable estimate, and the plaintiff will not be denied a substantial recovery if he has produced the best evidence available and it is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating his loss.’ 15 Am.Juris., pages 414, 415, sec. 23.” (Emphasis supplied.) Stevens v. Moore”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Western Sizzlin, Inc. v. Harris · 380 F. Supp. 1294 - Koehler v. Cummings

2. “[failure of a party to call an available witness possessing peculiar knowledge concerning the facts essential to a party’s case, direct or rebutting, or to examine such witness as to the facts covered by his special knowledge, especially if the witness would naturally be favorable to the party’s contention, relying instead upon the evidence of witnesses less familiar with the matter, gives rise to an inference that the testimony of such uninterrogated witness would not sustain the contention of the party. No such inference arises where the only object of calling such witness would be to produce corroborative, cumulative, or possibly unnecessary evidence; or when an adverse inference would be improper for any other reason....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dickey v. McCord

3. ““It is error for the Trial Judge to single out particular facts and give them undue prominence, or emphasize particular evidence, thus leading the jury to believe that the Court thinks such evidence of greater significance and weight than other evidence not mentioned in the charge.” Stevens v. Moore, 24 Tenn. App. 61, 76 , 139 S.W.2d 710, 720 (1940).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Boyd v. Boyd