Schaffer v. Clinton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) “injury in fact,” by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,” and has not resulted “from the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Weinman v. Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund · 189 F. Supp. 2d 1302 - Universal Life Church v. Utah

2. “In sum, appellees have alleged no injury to themselves as individuals (contra, Powell), the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed (contra, Coleman), and their attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to historical experience. We attach some importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit. We also note that our conclusion neither deprives Members of Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or exempt appropriations bills from its reach), nor forecloses the Act from constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act). Whether the case would be different if any of these circumstances were different we need not now decide. We therefore hold that these individual members of Congress do not have a sufficient “personal stake” in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112 - Kerr v. Hickenlooper

3. “Like the plaintiffs in Raines , Congressman Schaffer has not alleged a sufficiently personal injury to establish standing because he has not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of the House of Representatives. Instead the COLAs, which apply to every Representative, necessarily damage all Members of Congress equally. Congressman Schaffer’s allegations of harm to his political position and his credibility among his constituency are even more abstract than the assertion of a dilution of institutional legislative power the Court found wanting in Raines . Finally, as in Raines , there has been no nullification of Congressman Schaffer’s ability to vote on the COLAs; if he received a COLA ..., that is simply because he lost that vote. The [COLA] has no effect on either Congressman Schaffer’s ability to press for a change in the law setting Representatives’ salaries or for Congress to amend the COLA provisions pursuant to the normal legislative process.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112 - Kerr v. Hickenlooper