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240 Ga. 28

239 S.E.2d 356

Hall v. Hall

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided October 24, 1977

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1977-10-24

Relies on Peppers v. Peppers · Hall v. Hall

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-10-24

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently November 2012

9 state decisions

3019771980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Marshall, Justice.

¶1 This case is here on appeal following remand to the trial court in the earlier decision of Hall v. Hall, 237 Ga. 477 (228 SE2d 865) (1976). The facts appear in the prior decision and will be restated here only as is necessary for a determination of the legal issues presented.

¶2 Following a hearing, the trial court has found that the appellant wife, through her attorney, received notice of the final divorce decree. She did not appeal it. Not being reversed or set aside, that decree is binding on her.

¶3 Furthermore, under numerous decisions of this court, the trial court in this contempt proceeding lacked the authority to modify the divorce decree. See Peppers v. Peppers, 238 Ga. 411 (233 SE2d 374) (1977) and cits.

¶4 The child support provision in the decree, which is the subject of this contempt action, is unenforceable to the extent that it requires the appellee husband to provide support for his daughter after she has reached the age of 18 until she reaches the age of 21. A father is not required to support his child after the child reaches the age of majority (Code Ann. § 74-105), which is 18 years of age in Georgia. Code Ann. § 74-104.1 (Ga. L. 1972, pp. 193, 199; 1973, p. 590). The divorce decree was rendered after the effective date of the 1972 Act changing the age of majority from 21 to 18. The child support award contained in the decree was not part of the parties’ agreement and was supplied by the trial judge. The child support award is, therefore, unenforceable.

¶5 Accordingly, the order of the trial court holding that the appellee husband can not be held in contempt is correct, although perhaps not for the reason assigned by the trial judge, and must therefore be affirmed.

¶6 Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur. *29 Brinson, Askew & Berry, C. King Askew, for appellant. Horace T. Clary, for appellee.
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