Jordan v. Flynt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of some known right, benefit, or advantage, which, except for such waiver, the party otherwise would have enjoyed.” Pfeffer v. Arrendóle, 114 Ga.App. 684 , 152 S.E.2d 651 (1966). Waiver may be established by expressed statements or implied by acts and conduct from which an intention to waive may reasonably be inferred. Ordinarily, mere silence is not sufficient to establish a waiver unless there is an obligation to speak. See, 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 154 et seq. (1966). Although a party “may be under no duty to speak as to a matter, if he undertakes to do so, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, he is bound not only to state truly what he tells, but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which materially quali fy those stated. If he speaks at all, he must make a full and fair disclosure.” Altman v. McCollum, 107 Cal.App.2d [Supp.] 847, 236 P.2d 914, 922 (1951); Sullivan v. Helbing, 66 Cal.App. 478 , 226 P. 803, 805 (1924); Brady v. Carman, 179 Cal.App.2d 63 , 3 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1960). [[Image here]] Questions of the existence of waiver are usually questions to be settled by the trier of fact.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · Historic MacOn Station Ltd. Partnership v. Piedmont-Forrest Corp. (In Re Historic MacOn Station Ltd. Partnership)

2. “Both this court and the Court of Appeals have followed the general rule that antecedent sales contracts covering the purchase and sale of real property merge in a subsequent deed involving the same property. Thus, where in a contract for sale of land the parties execute a preliminary sales contract and subsequently reduce that contract to a finality evidenced by a deed to secure debt, the terms of the preliminary contract, where not otherwise reserved, are merged into the deed, and those terms, conditions or recitals contained in the preliminary sales contract which are not included in the deed are considered as eliminated, abandoned or discarded. [Cits.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tallahassee State Bank v. Macon · P. B. R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Perren

3. “In Kirk v. First Ga. Invest. Corp., 239 Ga. 171 ( 236 SE2d 254 ) (1977), we held that the decree of specific performance was improper since the plaintiff was in default at the time suit was filed, he remained in default at the time of the decree, and the decree of specific performance was not conditional on the plaintifft’s] curing his default.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Krauth v. Bagley