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240 Ga. 436

241 S.E.2d 1

Adams v. Smith

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided January 3, 1978

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1978-01-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“It is a rather fundamental rule of both equitable jurisprudence and appellate procedure, that if the thing sought to be enjoined in fact takes place, the grant or denial of the injunction becomes moot. See Padgett v. Cowart, 232 Ga. 633 ( 208 SE2d 455 ) (1974). To prevent such an appeal from becoming moot the appealing party must obtain a supersedeas. [Adams v. Smith, 240 Ga. 436, 437 ( 241 SE2d 1 ) (1978).]”

quoted by 1 later decision, including The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF RICHMOND COUNTY v. Cooper

Relies on Padgett v. Cowart

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1978-01-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently August 2014

5 state decisions

3019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Marshall, Justice.

¶1 The appellants filed this class action on June 20, 1977, seeking to enjoin the Douglas County Tax Commissioner from issuing 1976 ad valorem tax notices, and collecting ad valorem taxes for 1976, based on the 1976 ad valorem tax levy adopted by Douglas County *437 Board of Commissioners by resolution on June 7, 1977.

Submitted October 14, 1977 Decided January 3, 1978. Hartley & Reid, G. Michael Hartley, George C. Reid, for appellants. Coney, Tinsley & Tinsley, William C. Tinsley, *438 Barbara V. Tinsley, for appellees.

¶2*437 The appellants alleged that the millage rate for the 1976 ad valorem tax levy was erroneous in two respects. First, the appellants contended that the millage rate was not reduced to account for the collection of a 1% local retail sales and use tax, which became effective on October 1, 1976, pursuant to a referendum by the county electorate and a resolution passed by the county board of commissioners. The appellants alleged that this failure to reduce the millage rate was in violation of Code Ann. § 92-3447a.l(j) (Ga. L. 1975, pp. 984, 991). Secondly, the appellants alleged that the millage of 4.5 mills submitted by the appellee county board of education for the retirement of bonded indebtedness, to be factored into the 1976 ad valorem tax levy, erroneously included 2.0 mills for funds to retire a school bond issue not validated until December 7, 1976.

¶3 The trial court denied the appellants’ prayers for injunctive relief. The appellants did not make any application for supersedeas from this order. The tax commissioner mailed out the tax notices pursuant to the 1976 levy, and those taxes became due and payable as of August 26,1977. We agree with the appellees that under these circumstances the appeal is now moot.

¶4 It is a rather fundamental rule of both equitable jurisprudence and appellate procedure, that if the thing sought to be enjoined in fact takes place, the grant or denial of the injunction becomes moot. See Padgett v. Cowart, 232 Ga. 633 (208 SE2d 455) (1974). To prevent such an appeal from becoming moot the appealing party must obtain a supersedeas. Since this was not done in the present case, we grant the appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of mootness.

¶5 Appeal dismissed.

All the Justices concur.
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