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← 240 U.S. 430 - Carey v. Donohue

Carey v. Donohue’s Empirical Analysis

240 U.S. 430 · 1916

Citation profile

207
cited by 207 later decisions
5
cited 5 times by the Supreme Court
13
states following
February 2004
most recently cited

90 federal appellate · 33 district · 26 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 207 later decisions (5 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2004 · most notably Corn Exchange Nat Bank Trust Co Philadelphia v. Klauder (1943), International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp. (1975)

90 federal appellate · 33 district · 26 state decisions — followed in 13 states

5001916192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedCarey v. Donohue (from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Humphrey v. Tatman · First Nat. Bank of Buchanan County v. Connett · Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Pipkin Drug Co. · Loeser v. Savings Deposit Bank & Trust Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 207 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““As Congress dl<l not undertake in section 60 to hit all preferential transfers (otherwise valid) merely because they were not disclosed, either by record or possession, more than four months before the bankruptcy proceeding, the inquiry is simply as to the nature of the requirement of recording to which Congress referred. The character of the transfer itself, both with respect to what should constitute a transfer and its preferential effect, liad been carefully defined. It is plain that the words are not limited to cases where recording is required for the purpose of giving validity to the transaction as between the parties. For that purpose, no amendment of the original act was needed, as in such a case there could be no giving of a preference without recording. But in dealing with a transfer, as defined, which, though valid as between the parties, was one which was ‘required’ to be recorded, the reference was necessarily to a requirement in the interest of others who were in the contemplation of Congress in enacting the provision. The natural, and we think the intended, meaning was to embrace those cases in which recording was necessary in order to make the transfer valid as against those concerned' in the distribution of the insolvent estate; that is, as against creditors, including those whose position the trustee was entitled to take. This gives effect to the amendment and interprets it in consonance with the spirit and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. See Senate Repor”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The reference to the requirement for record in section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act is not to a requirement for the protection of bona fide purchasers without notice and who are outside the purview of the aet, but to a requirement of record for protection of creditors and persons interested in the bankrupt’s estate and in whose behalf or place the trustee is entitled to aet; and where there is no such requirement and the transfer was made more than four months before the filing of the petition there can be no recovery under section 60. A provision in a state statute that instruments conveying real estate shall until filed for record be deemed fraudulent, only so far as relates to subsequent bona fide purchasers without knowledge or notice, as in section 8543, General Code of Ohio, is not a requirement that the instrument be recorded within the meaning of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “«* * * where the preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months shall not expire until four months after the date of recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or registering is required or permitted.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.