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240 Va. 26

393 S.E.2d 599

6 Va.LawRep. 2538

Cheng v. Commonwealth

Supreme Court of Virginia

Decided June 8, 1990

Supreme Court of Virginia · decided 1990-06-08

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“We have held in many cases that, upon appellate review, the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court. The judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The issue upon appellate review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including 30 Va. App. 254 - Clay v. Commonwealth, Prieto v. Com.

“will not be disturbed by us unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 30 Va. App. 254 - Clay v. Commonwealth

Relies on Spencer v. Commonwealth

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1990-06-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 221 later decisions — most recently June 2019 · most notably Spencer v. Commonwealth (1990), Goins v. Commonwealth (1996)

221 state decisions

1140199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE HASSELL

¶1join, dissenting in part.

¶2I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the capital murder conviction. Rather, I am of opinion that when the rules of appellate review are applied properly to this evidence, the conviction and sentence to death must be affirmed.

¶3We have said repeatedly that “when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the. Commonwealth. The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed unless it appears that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 283, 384 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. _, 110 S.Ct. 759 (1990).

¶4The crucial issue on sufficiency of the evidence is, of course, whether the defendant was the “triggerman.” The defendant confessed to Deputy Kwan that “he had to do it because the man had put the contract on him.” Reasonably to be inferred from this undisputed evidence is that “it” meant the actual shooting of the victim and that defendant “had to do it” because of “the contract” that the victim “had put” out on defendant. Even though a fact finder is entitled to draw different inferences from this evidence, the appellate reviewer is not entitled to make such a choice once the jury has selected the inference supporting guilt. When this evidence is viewed upon appeal in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there is but one conclusion which should be *45drawn — the defendant pulled the trigger and fired the shots causing the victim’s death.

¶5The majority says, “It is not surprising that Kwan was uncertain as to Cheng’s exact words because Kwan neither recorded nor made notes of Cheng’s statements.” That idea merely affects the weight of the evidence, a consideration appropriate for a fact finder but inappropriate upon appellate review.

¶6The majority also says, “More remarkably, Kwan did not press Cheng to state who fired the fatal shots.” This, too, affects the weight of the evidence. More importantly, however, the reason Kwan did not press further Was probably because he was satisfied from what the defendant already had said that the defendant had admitted firing the fatal shots. At any rate, the several inferences flowing from Kwan’s conduct, as shown by the evidence, were for the jury, and not this Court, to determine.

¶7Given the prior connections between the victim and the defendant, and the other circumstantial evidence pointing unerringly to the defendant as the perpetrator of the capital murder, I submit that the evidence is wholly sufficient to support the conviction.

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