J-S28017-20
2020 PA Super 246
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RASHAWN DAVID WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1386 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 17, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-41-CR-0001442-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 08, 2020
Appellant, Rashawn David Williams, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 17, 2018,1 following his jury trial convictions
for first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, tampering with
physical evidence, and obstruction of administration of law.2 Upon review, we
affirm.
We summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as follows.
On June 22, 2017, at approximately 1:10 a.m., Williamsport City Police
responded to an emergency call regarding a stabbing at the corner of Locust
Street and Center Place in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania. N.T., 10/15/2018,
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s judgment of sentence was made final by the denial of his
post-sentence motions on May 22, 2019.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 4910, and 5101,
respectively.
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at 23-24. Police discovered “a white male, mid-30s laying on the sidewalk …
bleeding heavily.” Id. at 24. The investigating officer performed CPR after
not finding the victim’s pulse. Id. at 29. Emergency medical personnel also
responded, but the victim died later at the hospital. Id. at 33.
Three unrelated eyewitnesses on the scene told police that just prior to
the stabbing they heard someone repeatedly yelling, “Stop it. You’re killing
me.” Id. at 47-83. Each of the eyewitnesses ran toward the screams until
they came upon the bleeding victim who was lying on the street. Id. One of
the eyewitnesses, John Miller, who was approximately 50 feet away from the
incident, described a “scuffle” wherein the victim was on the ground, with
another man standing over him. Id. at 47-51. Another witness, Travis
McCarthy, who was in his apartment on Locust Street watching a movie, ran
outside and toward the screams. Id. at 54-56. Although he did not see a
weapon, McCarthy saw a “person [] on top of another” swinging both arms.
Id. at 57. McCarthy could not identify the alleged attacker, but saw him run
into a residence, later identified as 321 Locust Street, where Appellant lived.
Id. at 57-58. McCarthy saw the victim lying in a pool of blood and yelled at
the purported attacker to come back outside. Id. Beth Luckner who was
outside gardening nearby also responded to the screams and saw the victim
lying in a pool of blood. Id. at 72-73. She witnessed McCarthy yelling at the
alleged attacker and pointing at the residence where he retreated. Id. at 73.
Luckner called the police, waited for their arrival, and assisted with rendering
aid to the victim. Id. at 74-75.
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When police arrived, they surrounded the residence at 321 Locust
Street. Id. at 81. Police apprehended Appellant on the back porch. Id. at
84. Appellant was visibly sweaty and dropped a cellular telephone when
police arrested him. Id. at 85. When later told he was to be charged with
homicide and related offenses, Appellant claimed the victim came into his
home and that he had the right to defend himself and his family. Id. at 113.
In a subsequent search of Appellant’s residence, police recovered a
damaged knife from the kitchen sink. Id. at 163. The tip of the knife’s blade
was missing. Id. Police also testified that they smelled the strong odor of
bleach and found a bucket of bleach water on the floor in the kitchen. Id. at
32 and 105. From the second floor, police recovered a man’s slipper and white
towels that appeared to be stained with blood. Id. at 158-163. Police
additionally observed and collected samples of drops of blood on the living
room television, inside and outside of the exterior front door threshold, and
from the front porch. Id. at 164-165. There were broken spindles and traces
of blood on the railing around the front porch. Id. at 123. In addition, police
observed a plastic outdoor chair with bloodstains overturned in the yard. Id.
at 124. Police also documented bloodstains on a wall leading to Locust Street
where the victim was found. Id. at 127-129. The bloodstains were located
approximately seven to eight feet from the ground, which police later
described at trial as “cast off.” Id.
In a subsequent autopsy, a forensic pathologist confirmed that the
victim died as a result of 35 stab wounds to the face, neck, back, chest, arms,
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and hands. N.T., 10/17/2018, at 104-135. The pathologist recovered a knife
tip lodged in the victim’s cheekbone. Id. at 116. A microscopic comparison
of that knife tip with the knife blade recovered from Appellant’s sink revealed
“one entity before being fractured.” N.T., 10/16/2018, at 93. Subsequent
testing revealed the presence of the victim’s DNA on the recovered bloody
slipper, a bloody white towel found in a second floor bathroom, the blood
found on the living room television, as well as inside and outside the threshold
to the front door. Id. at 62-83. There was no blood found on the knife
recovered from the sink. Id. at 39.
A six-day jury trial commenced on October 15, 2018 wherein the
Commonwealth presented the aforementioned evidence. Appellant testified
in his own defense. In his appellate brief, he summarizes his testimony as
follows:
The defense asserted that [Appellant] suffers from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder [(PTSD)] and had been the victim of sexual
assaults as a minor. He testified that [the victim] entered his
home without his permission, grabbed [Appellant’s] groin, and
attempted to sexually assault him. [Appellant] grabbed a knife to
scare him, but [the victim] kept coming at him. Then [Appellant]
said he blacked out or went into a rage and did not recall stabbing
[the victim] but acknowledged doing so.
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
More specifically, Appellant avers he testified as follows:
With respect to the events of the evening, Appellant testified that
the decedent came through an unlocked door into his apartment
[and] touched his thigh and [buttocks] without his permission.
[Appellant] repeatedly asked the decedent to leave the residence,
but he refused to do so, saying, “Pussy, I’m not leaving here until
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I get what I want.” After saying this, the decedent touched
[Appellant’s] groin and when [Appellant] tried to swat his hand
away, [the victim] sprayed mace at [Appellant], while repeatedly
saying, “I’m not leaving until I get what I want.” A struggle
ensued with the decedent touching [Appellant] in his “private
area.” When [Appellant] went to the kitchen, the decedent threw
a chair at [Appellant], and in response, [Appellant] picked up a
knife to scare the decedent, but it didn’t work and [Appellant] kept
trying to push him away. They continued to struggle when the
decedent maced [Appellant] in the neck and chest, and a third
time in the face. It was at this point that [Appellant] stabbed the
decedent for the first time.
Eventually, they ended up outside, because [Appellant] wanted
the decedent out of the house, but when [Appellant] attempted to
get back into the apartment, the decedent pulled on [Appellant’s]
shirt and he fell to the bottom of the steps, where the decedent
threw a chair at him. [Appellant] tried to ascend the stairs to get
back into the apartment. At that point, the decedent was grabbing
[Appellant] by his lower half and had hold of his groin, and
[Appellant] blacked out, and stabbed the decedent to get him
away from him. By this time, the two had fallen over the bannister
of [Appellant’s] front porch, and the decedent got up and walked
across the street and collapsed, with [Appellant] following to make
sure he didn’t get up and come back after him.
Id. at 9-10 (record citations omitted).
To rebut Appellant’s defense, at trial, the Commonwealth also presented
evidence of a secret romantic relationship between Appellant and the victim.
The victim’s mother testified that her son was openly gay. N.T., 10/15/2018,
at 38. The victim often wore women’s capris pants, lipstick, and women’s
perfume and he regularly carried a purse. Id. at 38-39. Police recovered two
cellular telephones from the victim – one on the street in a pool of the victim’s
blood and the other from inside the victim’s purse. N.T., 10/16/2018, at
122-123. The victim’s mother confirmed one of the victim’s cellular telephone
numbers. N.T., 10/15/2018, at 38. As previously mentioned, police also
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recovered a cellular telephone that Appellant dropped on the back porch when
he was apprehended. N.T., 10/16/2018, at 123. In an interview with police,
Appellant confirmed his cellular telephone number. N.T., 10/17/2018, at
30-31. Police served search warrants on the cellular telephone service
providers and obtained the records for all three cellular telephone numbers
for the month prior to the stabbing. N.T., 10/16/2018, at 28-34. At trial, the
Commonwealth presented evidence of specific text messages between
Appellant and the victim. Id. at 47-55. During the month leading up to the
incident, Appellant and the victim contacted each other 363 times. Id. at
44-45. The Commonwealth also presented records indicating that Appellant
initiated lengthy, late-night conversations with the victim almost daily. N.T.,
10/18/2018, at 58-60. The Commonwealth confronted Appellant with
evidence of the internet browsing history from the cellular telephone
associated with him, which showed searches for “shemale porn videos,”
“transvestite porn,” “free gay porn,” and “hermaphrodite porn.” Id. at 80-82.
Appellant denied conducting those internet searches and claimed that another
roommate staying with him at the time had access to his cellular telephone.
Id. at 67-68 and 80-82. Appellant, however, confirmed that audio call records
showed that there were telephone calls from Appellant’s cellular telephone to
the victim immediately after the aforementioned internet searches. Id. at 80-
82. Appellant denied having photographs depicting partially naked men stored
on his cellular telephone. Id. at 68. Upon cross-examining Appellant, the
Commonwealth presented evidence of a photograph of a man in a jock strap
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retrieved from the images section of Appellant’s cellular telephone. N.T.,
10/19/2018, at 72-73. Appellant claimed that he was unaware that the
photograph was stored on his cellular telephone. Id.
Additionally, two experts testified at trial -- Dr. Scott Scotilla and Dr.
William Anthony Cox. Dr. Scotilla, an expert in forensic psychology, evaluated
Appellant, diagnosed Appellant with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
and testified about Appellant’s history of physical and sexual abuse and
neglect. N.T., 10/18/2018, at 147-218. Dr. Cox, a forensic pathologist and
neuropathologist, testified regarding the toxicology report that was prepared
as part of the victim’s autopsy. N.T., 10/19/2018, at 34-60. The toxicology
report indicated the presence of alcohol, Alprazolam (an antidepressant),
Clonazepam (an anticonvulsant), amphetamines, methadone, cocaine, and
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, a metabolite of marijuana) in the victim’s blood.
Id. Dr. Cox explained the general effects of each of these substances. Id.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the
aforementioned crimes. On December 17, 2018, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree
murder. The trial court imposed sentences of five to ten years of incarceration
for aggravated assault,3 one to two years of imprisonment for tampering with
____________________________________________
3 The trial court imposed a sentence for aggravated assault pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4) and determined that the other conviction for
aggravated assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2) merged for
sentencing purposes.
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physical evidence, and one to two years of incarceration for obstruction of the
administration of law. The trial court imposed these sentences consecutively
to the sentence for first-degree murder and to each other. Appellant filed a
timely post-sentence motion seeking a new trial and reconsideration of his
sentence. The trial court denied relief by order entered on May 22, 2019. On
June 3, 2019, the trial court issued an accompanying opinion for the reasons
it denied relief. This timely appeal resulted.4
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in admitting text messages allegedly
exchanged between the decedent and [Appellant]?
II. Did the trial court err by permitting the Commonwealth to
introduce a picture of a partially naked male found on
[Appellant’s] cell[ular] [tele]phone?
III. Did the trial court err by limiting the testimony of defense
experts based on the alleged inadequacy of expert reports?
IV. Did the trial court err by permitting the Commonwealth
crime scene processing expert to give a lay opinion about
“cast off” blood pattern evidence when he had not been
qualified as an expert in blood pattern evidence?
V. May a witness who has been convicted of false identification
be further impeached through evidence of numerous
aliases?
VI. Did the trial court err in excluding relevant rebuttal
evidence?
____________________________________________
4 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 4, 2019. On June 5, 2019, the
trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied timely on
June 12, 2019. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court filed an opinion
relying entirely upon its prior decision issued on June 3, 2019.
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VII. Under the circumstances of this case, was [Appellant]
entitled to jury instructions on both the [c]astle [d]octrine
and [s]elf-[d]efense?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant’s first six issues challenge various trial court evidentiary
rulings. We adhere to the following standard:
The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there
is a clear abuse of discretion. Our standard of review of a
challenge to an evidentiary ruling is therefore limited. Abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where
the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 353–354 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
In the first issue presented on appeal, Appellant claims that the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the text messages between the victim
and Appellant into evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. More specifically,
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the text
messages pursuant to the party-opponent exception to hearsay under Pa.R.E.
803(25). Id. at 15. He claims that “[w]hile the statements attributable to
[Appellant] may be admissions by a party-opponent pursuant to Pa.R.E.
803(25), the statements attributed to the decedent were not.” Id. Further,
Appellant argues that while the trial court “opined that the texts were
introduced by the Commonwealth to provide context to the [Appellant’s]
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texts[,]” the Commonwealth introduced the evidence to prove the truth of the
matters asserted. Id. at 15-16. More precisely, Appellant argues:
The Commonwealth spent a great deal of its argument focusing
on the fact that there was a secret romantic and potentially sexual
relationship between [Appellant] and [the victim], and a
significant portion of the argument attempting to stress that [the
victim] had been trying to end the relationship through the
content of these text messages - clearly using the decedent’s text
messages for the truth of the matter asserted.
This evidence was improperly admitted as hearsay, and was
prejudicial to the trial of the case. The Commonwealth used what
was written in the texts to presume what was going on in the
remainder of the relationship between [the victim] and
[Appellant], the content of phone calls between them and other
aspects of their friendship. As a focal point of the
Commonwealth’s case, the introduction of the text messages was
not harmless error.
Id. at 17-18.
The admissibility of electronic communications is to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis as any other document to determine whether or not there
has been an adequate foundational showing of their relevance and
authenticity. In the Interest of F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 96 (Pa. Super. 2005).
In Commonwealth v. Koch,
39 A.3d 996 (Pa. Super. 2011), as a matter of
first impression, our Court examined: 1) the law pertaining to authentication
of text messages and, 2) whether text messages constitute hearsay subject
to exception. The Koch Court determined:
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 provides that authentication is
required prior to admission of evidence. The proponent of the
evidence must introduce sufficient evidence that the matter is
what it purports to be. Pa.R.E. 901(a). Testimony of a witness
with personal knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be
can be sufficient. Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1). See also comment, citing
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Commonwealth v. Hudson, 414 A.2d 1381 (Pa. 1980).
Furthermore, electronic writings typically show their source, so
they can be authenticated by contents in the same way that a
communication by postal mail can be authenticated.
Circumstantial evidence may suffice where the circumstances
support a finding that the writing is genuine. In the Interest of
F.P., a Minor, 878 A.2d 91 (Pa. Super. 2005).
…
Importantly, in In the Interest of F.P., a Minor, supra, we
rejected the argument that e-mails or text messages are
inherently unreliable due to their relative anonymity and the
difficulty in connecting them to their author. Id. at 95. We
reasoned that the same uncertainties existed with written
documents: “A signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on
another's typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied
or stolen.” Id. Concluding that electronic communications, such
as e-mail and instant messages, can be authenticated within the
framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and our case law, we declined to create
new rules governing the admissibility of such evidence. We held
that such evidence is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as
any other document to determine whether there has been an
adequate foundational showing of its relevance and authenticity.
…
[…E]-mails and text messages are documents and subject to the
same requirements for authenticity as non-electronic documents
generally. A document may be authenticated by direct proof, such
as the testimony of a witness who saw the author sign the
document, acknowledgment of execution by the signer, admission
of authenticity by an adverse party, or proof that the document or
its signature is in the purported author's handwriting. See
McCormick on Evidence, §§ 219–221 (E. Cleary 2d Ed. 1972).
A document also may be authenticated by circumstantial
evidence, a practice which is “uniformly recognized as
permissible.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 508 A.2d 316 (Pa.
Super. 1986) (citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nolly, 138 A. 836
(Pa. 1927) (letters authenticated by contents: facts known only
to sender and recipient); Commonwealth v. Bassi, 130 A. 311
(Pa. 1925) (unsigned letter authenticated by defendant's
nickname written on it, along with contents indicating knowledge
of matters familiar to both defendant-sender and
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witness-recipient); and McFarland v. McFarland, 107 A.2d 615,
616 (Pa. Super. 1954)).
As these cases illustrate, the difficulty that frequently arises in
e-mail and text message cases is establishing authorship. Often
more than one person uses an e-mail address and accounts can
be accessed without permission. In the majority of courts to have
considered the question, the mere fact that an e-mail bears a
particular e-mail address is inadequate to authenticate the
identity of the author; typically, courts demand additional
evidence.
Text messages are somewhat different in that they are intrinsic to
the cell[ular] [tele]phones in which they are stored. While
e-mails and instant messages can be sent and received from any
computer or smart phone, text messages are sent from the
cellular phone bearing the telephone number identified in the text
message and received on a phone associated with the number to
which they are transmitted. The identifying information is
contained in the text message on the cellular telephone. However,
as with e-mail accounts, cellular telephones are not always
exclusively used by the person to whom the phone number is
assigned.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1002–1005 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Moreover, in Koch, we recognized:
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as follows:
(a) Statement. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A “declarant” is a person who makes a
statement.
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Pa.R.E. 801. Additionally, Pa.R.E. 802 provides: “Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules, by other rules
prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.”
Pa.R.E. 802.
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Arguably, [] text messages could [be] admitted under the
exception to the Pennsylvania hearsay rule for admissions of a
party opponent. See Pa.R.E. 803(25). However, [in order to
constitute] party admissions [] the Commonwealth [must] prove
[] author[ship].
Id. at 1006.
Finally, this Court noted that errors in admitting evidence may be
deemed harmless:
An error may be deemed harmless, inter alia, where the properly
admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict. Harmless error exists when the error
did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis
or the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of
other untainted evidence, which was substantially similar to the
erroneously admitted evidence.
Id. at 1006–1007 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Here, the trial court determined that “[t]here was no dispute that
[Appellant] sent the text messages [and, i]n fact, [Appellant] testified about
the text messages at trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/2019, at 2. Upon review,
we agree. Initially, we note that Appellant does not dispute the authenticity
of the text messages. At trial, the Commonwealth presented Appellant with
the phone logs and text messages at issue. N.T., 10/18/2018, at 28-30.
Appellant confirmed that he had authored the text messages. Id. at 31 and
79. As previously mentioned, there was also evidence regarding the
ownership of the cellular telephones. Appellant confirmed his cellular
telephone number with police and it matched with the cellular telephone police
recovered upon Appellant’s arrest. The victim’s mother confirmed the victim’s
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one cellular telephone number. Police recovered the other cellular telephone
from the victim’s purse located at the scene of the crime.
Upon review of Appellant’s trial testimony, when confronted with the
text messages at issue, it is clear that Appellant believed he was
communicating with the victim. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Commonwealth properly authenticated the text messages between the victim
and Appellant. In turn, having proven Appellant authored the text messages
he forwarded to the victim, it was proper for the trial court to admit those text
messages into evidence under the party-opponent exception to the rule
against hearsay. The victim’s responsive text messages were also properly
admitted. As the trial court noted, “[t]he victim’s text messages were not
being offered for the truth of [their] content, but rather to put [Appellant’s]
text messages in context and to show his responses to the victim, which
showed [Appellant’s] state of mind and his anger towards the victim.” Trial
Court Opinion, 6/3/2019, at 3. We agree with that assessment. The
Commonwealth simply did not attempt to prove that the victim acted in
conformity with the messages he forwarded to Appellant or that the matters
asserted within those messages were true. Indeed, the Commonwealth
appears to have relied more upon the volume and frequency of the exchanges,
not their content, to establish a relationship between Appellant and the victim.
Lastly, Appellant neither identifies nor explains how or in what instances the
Commonwealth introduced a specific text message sent by the victim to
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Appellant to demonstrate the truth of the matter asserted therein. As such,
Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first claim.
In his second issue presented, Appellant argues the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting into evidence the “photograph found on
[Appellant’s] cell phone which depicted a partially nude male.” Appellant’s
Brief at 17. Appellant objected to its introduction arguing the Commonwealth
had not properly authenticated the photograph, as “there was no evidence of
the context of the photograph, such as where the photograph came from,
when it was accessed, and even whether [Appellant] had ever viewed the
photograph. Id. Appellant claims the photograph was irrelevant, but also
used impermissibly by the Commonwealth as collateral impeachment
evidence against him.
Id.
On this issue, the trial court determined the photograph at issue was
properly authenticated and admissible, but that the jury was free to weigh the
evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/2019, at 3-4. The trial court opined that
“the Commonwealth was not trying to prove that [Appellant] took the
photograph, that the photograph was an accurate representation of any
particular person, or that [Appellant] was the one who put the photograph on
the [cellular tele]phone.” Id. at 4. The trial court noted there was no dispute
that the cellular telephone belonged to Appellant. Id. Thus, it was proper for
the Commonwealth “to prove that [Appellant] was not being truthful when he
stated that no such photographs were on his [cellular tele]phone.” Id.
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Regarding authentication, as previously set forth, Pa.R.E. 901(a)
provides that the proponent of the evidence must introduce sufficient evidence
that the matter is what it purports to be. Pa.R.E. 901(a). The Commonwealth
only alleged that there was a photograph depicting a man in a jockstrap
recovered from Appellant’s phone. Here, as described in detail above, there
was ample evidence that the cellular telephone belonged to Appellant.
Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that the photograph in fact depicts a
man in a jockstrap. As such, the Commonwealth introduced sufficient
evidence that the photograph was what it was purported to be. Accordingly,
the Commonwealth properly authenticated the photograph and we discern no
abuse of discretion in admitting it. Thereafter, it was for the jury to determine
the weight of Appellant’s testimony that he did not know about it, had not
accessed it, and/or that someone else had access to his cellular telephone.
See Commonwealth v. Stays, 70 A.3d 1256, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The
weight given to trial evidence is a choice for the factfinder.”). Finally, even if
there were error, it was harmless. Admitting the photograph was both de
minimus and cumulative, in light of the properly admitted, and unchallenged,
evidence of pornographic internet searches found on Appellant’s cellular
telephone as detailed above.
We turn now to Appellant’s third appellate issue regarding the admission
of expert evidence, which entails two subparts. As Appellant explains, he
presented two defenses at trial – “heat of passion and self-defense.”
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Appellant’s Brief at 18. In support, Appellant “presented the testimony of two
experts: Dr. Scott Scotilla and Dr. William Anthony Cox.” Id. As to each
doctor, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings limiting the
scope of their trial testimony.
Regarding Dr. Scotilla, Appellant notes that he is “a psychologist who
testified regarding the heat of passion defense [and] had prepared a report
which had been provided to the Commonwealth in discovery.” Id. at 19.
Appellant asserts:
Dr. Scotilla was permitted to testify about [Appellant’s] history of
physical and sexual abuse and neglect, as well as testing which
led him to a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
He described symptoms of PTSD, including hypervigilance,
overreaction and dissociation. [The trial court precluded Dr.
Scotilla from] testify[ing] to a degree of psychological certainty
that [Appellant’s] behavior during the stabbing was consistent
with his examination and diagnosis.
Id. Appellant claims the trial court limited Dr. Scotilla’s testimony because
“his report did not include a statement of the facts of the offense upon which
he based his opinion, even though Dr. Scotilla did listen to [Appellant’s]
testimony at trial prior to his testimony[.] Id. at 19-20. Appellant
acknowledges that an expert must state the facts upon which his opinion is
based pursuant Pa.R.E. 705. Id. at 20. However, he argues he should have
been permitted to ask Dr. Scotilla “to assume the truth of [Appellant’s]
testimony the expert ha[d] heard” or “to pose a hypothetical question” to Dr.
Scotilla. Id. at 19-20, citing Pa.R.E. 705 Comment.
With regard to Dr. Cox, as Appellant recounts:
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Dr. Cox, a forensic pathologist/toxicologist, was called to testify
regarding the effect of the various substances found in the
decedent’s system, and their combined effect on an individual’s
behavior. The defense proffered that Dr. Cox would testify that
due to the multiple drugs used, the decedent would have acted in
an aggressive way and could have been suffering from
hallucinations, as had been stated within the expert report.
Generally, the court permitted Dr. Cox to testify that the
controlled substances in the victim’s system were consistent with
certain [conduct] such as bizarre behaviors and aggression, but
Dr. Cox could not testify that was the way the victim acted on the
night in question.
Appellant’s Brief at 22.
On these somewhat related issues, the trial court limited both experts
because their expert reports did not indicate specific, necessary facts upon
which the doctors relied in rendering their opinions. With regard to Dr.
Scotilla, the trial court noted that while his “report delved into [Appellant’s]
mental health history and diagnosis, it did not relate that information to the
alleged facts of this incident, even in hypothetical form.” Trial Court Opinion,
6/3/2019, at 6. “[Dr. Scotilla’s report contained] no discussion of the facts
that allegedly caused [Appellant] to act in the heat of passion.” Id. Regarding
Dr. Cox, the trial court “[g]enerally [] permitted Dr. Cox to testify that the
controlled substances in the victim’s system were consistent with certain
[conduct] such as bizarre behaviors and aggression, but Dr. Cox could not
testify that was the way the victim acted on the night in question as his report
repeatedly indicated that the effects were dependent on the individual’s
experience with drugs.” Id. at 7. The trial court concluded “Dr. Cox’s report
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did not include any facts regarding the victim’s experience or [drug] use
history.” Id.
“If an expert states an opinion the expert must state the facts or data
on which the opinion is based.” Pa.R.E. 705. If a defendant intends to call an
expert at trial, the trial court may require pretrial disclosure of a “report
stating the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the
substance of the facts to which the expert is expected to testify; and a
summary of the expert's opinions and the grounds for each opinion.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(C)(2). Failure to comply allows the trial court “to prohibit
[a] party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the
defendant.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E). Moreover, in an unpublished memorandum
decision,5 a prior panel of this Court recently noted:
Although there are no rules of procedure in criminal cases
precisely governing the scope of expert trial testimony, it cannot
be asserted that either the Commonwealth or a defendant has
carte blanche to allow an expert to testify beyond the information
contained in his or her report. Commonwealth v. Roles, 116
A.3d 122 (Pa. Super. 2015). To hold otherwise would eviscerate
the requirement that reports be disclosed. Id. In
Commonwealth v. Stith, 644 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. 1994), this
Court discussed the civil rules in the context of a criminal case.
…
Stith relied on Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(c), and civil jurisprudence
governing expert reports to argue that an expert is not permitted
____________________________________________
5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that non-precedential decisions, referring
to unpublished, memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May
1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
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to testify beyond the scope of his report. Rule 4003.5(c) states in
pertinent part,
(c) To the extent that the facts known or opinions held by
an expert have been developed in discovery proceedings ...
his direct testimony at trial may not be inconsistent with or
go beyond the fair scope of his testimony in the discovery
proceedings as set forth in his ... separate report ...
However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to
facts or opinions on matters on which he has not been
interrogated in the discovery proceedings.
Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(c).
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 2019 WL 3383703, at *9 (Pa. Super. filed July
25, 2019) (unpublished memorandum)(footnote omitted).
In this case, we discern no error in limiting the testimony of Dr. Scotilla
or Dr. Cox. The trial court limited the scope of each experts’ trial testimony
to the substance of the facts contained in their reports. Appellant does not
dispute that Dr. Scotilla’s report lacked a factual foundation of the events of
the incident or that Dr. Cox’s report did not rely upon information of the
victim’s drug use and experience. Instead, Appellant contends the trial court
should have permitted the experts to assume facts heard at trial were true or
to answer hypothetical questions. However, such actions would permit the
experts to testify outside of the scope of their reports, which our procedural
rules and relevant jurisprudence prohibit. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing
reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in limiting expert testimony.
In his fourth issue presented, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred
by permitting Officer Joseph Ananea, the police officer and qualified expert
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who processed the crime scene, to testify about “cast-off” blood spatter.
Appellant’s Brief at 24-27. More specifically, he argues:
the Commonwealth was required to qualify Officer Ananea as an
expert in blood pattern evidence, and moreover was not
competent to testify to opinion as to how the blood was deposited
in these locations. [Officer] Ananea was qualified as a crime scene
processing expert, and not an expert in forensic science or blood
pattern evidence. There was no expert report provided, nor
testimony which would suggest that the officer’s conclusion was
consistent with generally accepted scientific principles.
The manner in which the blood would have been found higher up
on the wall was potentially relevant to the Commonwealth’s case
in trying to describe how the victim was stabbed, specifically in
terms of what type of force was used. Therefore, the officer’s
testimony went far beyond merely describing where evidence was
found or how it was collected, which was the scope of the officer’s
expertise in crime scene processing.
Id. at 26. Accordingly, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing Officer Ananea to provide lay opinion testimony about
blood spatter. Finally, on this issue, Appellant contends:
This was not harmless error because [the blood evidence] was
used by the Commonwealth to prove that the stabbing occurred
not only within [Appellant’s] home, but continued at the spot
where the victim’s body was found, and to ascribe a particularly
violent or forceful action on the part of [Appellant] in wielding the
knife, which was used to argue intent by the Commonwealth.
Th[is] directly impacted the defenses of self-defense and heat of
passion, and had a direct relation to the verdict of guilt on
first[-]degree murder in this case. Had the [trial c]ourt excluded
this testimony, the result would have been different.
Id. at 27.
This Court previously determined:
Based upon a plain meaning interpretation of [Pennsylvania Rules
of Evidence 701, 702, and 704], when read pari materia, we
conclude that the rules do not preclude a single witness from
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testifying, or offering opinions, in the capacity as both a lay and
an expert witness on matters that may embrace the ultimate
issues to be decided by the fact-finder. Rule 702 permits an
expert to testify to scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge beyond that possessed by a layperson. Rule 701
permits a layperson to testify in the form of an opinion, however,
such testimony must be rationally based on that witness'
perceptions. Thus, an expert must have additional specialized
knowledge in rendering an opinion; whereas, a lay witness must
form an opinion based upon his or her rationally based
perceptions. The Rules, however, do not specifically delineate that
a witness must be only one or the other. Instead, the witness'
association to the evidence controls the scope of admissible
evidence that he or she may offer. Furthermore, Pennsylvania
Rule of Evidence 704 clearly permits both expert and lay opinion
testimony on issues that ultimately must be decided by the trier
of fact, in this case, the jury.
Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 967 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Here, with the aid of a crime scene photograph, Officer Ananea testified
that he saw blood droplets on a wall, seven to eight feet from the ground.
N.T., 10/15/2018, at 128. The evidentiary rules permit him to offer an
opinion as to how blood droplets were transferred to the site of their discovery
based upon his personal perceptions. We discern no abuse of discretion in
allowing Officer Ananea’s testimony. Furthermore, his blood spatter analogy
of “flailing around” a “wet paint brush” did not require expert knowledge. Id.
We also note that Appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine Officer
Ananea and did so by testing his theory using a different hypothetical example
of blood “cast-off.” N.T., 10/16/2018, at 6.
Moreover, we would conclude that any error in admitting the evidence
was harmless. Despite Appellant’s contentions, there was more than ample,
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cumulative evidence showing the stabbing continued outside of Appellant’s
home. As set forth above, police recovered evidence of a trail of blood that
led throughout Appellant’s home, across the front door threshold, over the
front porch, on a wall, and into the street. Three eyewitnesses saw and heard
various aspects of the altercation. They all heard someone yelling, “Stop it.
You’re killing me.” Two of the witnesses saw someone standing over the
victim, swinging their arms, when the victim was lying in the street.
Furthermore, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that Officer Ananea’s testimony
prejudiced him by ascribing a particularly violent or forceful action on his part.
Here, there was overwhelming evidence of the violent or forceful actions of
Appellant. The victim endured 35 stab wounds and the attack resulted in the
tip of the knife breaking off in the victim’s face. The Commonwealth presented
the autopsy results and photographs of the victim to the jury for their review.
With this overwhelming additional evidence, we deem any error in permitting
Officer Ananea’s lay testimony harmless.
In his fifth issue presented, Appellant contends:
The Commonwealth [] introduced the testimony of Emerson
Chase, who had seen the decedent a few hours before his death
at a local bar. He testified that [the victim] was “intoxicated, but
coherent.” The defense sought to impeach [Mr.] Chase’s
credibility with the fact that he had a number of aliases listed on
his [criminal record]. The defense cross-examined him about four
of those [eleven] aliases before the Commonwealth objected, at
which point the [trial] court held that this line of questioning was
not relevant to his credibility and did not want to have a trial within
a trial.
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Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant maintains that “[t]he use of multiple aliases
in the context of falsifying his identity to law enforcement tends to prove that
[Mr. Chase] was not credible, even to public officials, and weighs on his
credibility as a witness.” Id. at 20. As such, Appellant argues the trial court
abused its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from questioning Mr. Chase
about all of the aliases listed on his criminal record. On this issue, Appellant
concludes,
exclusion of this impeachment testimony was not harmless error
because Emerson Chase was called to rebut significant portions of
the defense, including those aspects involving the decedent’s
mental state or level of intoxication at the time of the killing. This
evidence weighed directly on his credibility and was relevant for
that purpose.
Id. at 21.
Here, the trial court permitted Appellant to question Mr. Chase about
four of ten aliases allegedly used by Mr. Chase. N.T., 10/16/2018, at 101-
102. Mr. Chase admitted that he used the four aliases. Id. The jury also
heard that Mr. Chase “plead[] guilty to a count of false identification to law
enforcement in 2007[.]” Id. at 101. Even without evidence of the purported
use of additional aliases, the jury heard evidence that Mr. Chase was convicted
of providing false identification to police and had used at least four aliases.
Finally, we note that Mr. Chase testified about his personal perceptions of the
victim’s level of intoxication hours before the stabbing. However, as described
at length above, Dr. Cox presented extensive testimony regarding the victim’s
toxicology report, the substances found in the victim’s bloodstream, and the
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general effects of each of those substances. Thus, we discern no abuse of
discretion in limiting the questioning of Mr. Chase, but otherwise conclude any
error was harmless. For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s fifth claim is
meritless.
In his sixth issue presented, Appellant argues that the trial court erred
by limiting his testimony regarding his intent to attend college. Appellant’s
Brief at 30-31. He claims:
The Commonwealth objected to a question [regarding Appellant’s]
level of education. By way of proffer, [defense] counsel indicated
that [Appellant] was making plans to attend college at Elmira
Business Institute in the coming semester, that he was moving
from the area.
Id. at 30. Appellant claims the testimony was relevant to rebut the
Commonwealth’s evidence, and theory of motive, that the victim sent text
messages to Appellant stating he was ending their relationship. Id. Appellant
claims the error was not harmless “because it hampered the defense effort to
rebut the Commonwealth’s motive.” Id. at 31.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence
to determining the action. See Pa.R.E. 401. Here, the trial court determined
that the proffered evidence was not relevant because evidence that Appellant
was enrolled in college “did not make it more or less probable that [Appellant]
was the person who stabbed the victim or that he did so intentionally, in
self-defense or in the heat of passion.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/2019, at 11.
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We agree. Appellant’s level of education was completely irrelevant to the
crimes on trial. Furthermore, Appellant in fact testified that, at the time of
the incident, he “was getting prepared to go to college[.]” N.T., 10/18/2018,
at 67. Thus, although the trial court previously precluded the proffered
evidence, the testimony came into evidence later. Therefore, any error in
limiting Appellant’s prior testimony was harmless. Appellant’s sixth allegation
is without merit.
Finally, in his last appellate issue, Appellant claims that the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury separately on self-defense and the castle
doctrine. Appellant’s Brief at 31-34.
This Court recently stated:
When a court instructs the jury, the objective is to explain to the
jury how it should approach its task and the factors it should
consider in reaching its verdict. In examining jury instructions,
our standard of review is to determine whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law controlling
the outcome of the case. A charge will be found adequate unless
the issues are not made clear, the jury was misled by the
instructions, or there was an omission from the charge amounting
to a fundamental error. Moreover, in reviewing a challenge to a
jury instruction the entire charge is considered, not merely
discrete portions thereof. The trial court is free to use its own
expressions as long as the concepts at issue are clearly and
accurately presented to the jury.
Commonwealth v. Bradley, --- A.3d ---, 2020 PA Super 109 (Pa. Super.
filed May 5, 2020) (internal citations, quotations, and original brackets
omitted).
Our Supreme Court explained:
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The traditional common law castle doctrine is a basic tenet of
American law: The principle that a man's home is his castle is
basic to our system of jurisprudence. The ideological foundation
for the castle doctrine is the belief that a person's home is his
castle and that one should not be required to retreat from his
sanctum.
…
Although the castle doctrine has existed at common law in this
Commonwealth essentially since its founding, it was not codified
in Pennsylvania until 1972, with the enactment of 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 505. In enacting section 505, the legislature sought “to codify
existing case law pertaining to ‘self-defense’ and to cover in a
single rule the law governing the use of defensive force.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 505 (amended June 28, 2011), Official Comment
1972. […] Section 505 set forth the circumstances under which
the use of force for purposes of self-defense was justified, and
addressed the use of deadly force [codifying the castle doctrine]
specifically in subsection (b)(2).
Commonwealth v. Childs, 142 A.3d 823, 829 (Pa. 2016).
In pertinent part, Section 505(a) provides as follows. “The use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against
the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). Additionally, relevant here, Section 505(b) presently
provides:
(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.—
…
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section
unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect
himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
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(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious
bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in
the same encounter; or
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using
such force with complete safety by retreating, except the
actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of
work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his
place of work by another person whose place of work the
actor knows it to be.
(2.1) […A]n actor is presumed to have a reasonable belief that
deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse
compelled by force or threat if both of the following conditions
exist:
(i) The person against whom the force is used is in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has
unlawfully and forcefully entered and is present within, a
dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle; or the person
against whom the force is used is or is attempting to
unlawfully and forcefully remove another against that
other's will from the dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle.
(ii) The actor knows or has reason to believe that the
unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring or has
occurred.
…
(2.5) […A] person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts
to enter an actor's dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle or
removes or attempts to remove another against that other's will
from the actor's dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle is
presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit:
(i) an act resulting in death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) kidnapping or sexual intercourse by force or threat.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2), (2.1), and (2.5).
At trial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
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The evidence in this case presents the question of whether
[Appellant] acted in self-defense when he stabbed [the victim].
Self-defense is called justification in the law of Pennsylvania. If
[Appellant’s] actions were justified you can find him not guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
To carry its burden of proving that [Appellant’s] use of deadly
force was not justifiable self-defense in this case, the
Commonwealth must prove one of the following elements beyond
a reasonable doubt. One, that at the time [Appellant] used the
deadly force [Appellant] did not actually believe that he was in
danger of immediate sexual intercourse compelled by force or
threat from [the victim], such that [Appellant] needed to use
deadly force to defend himself at that moment; or, that while
[Appellant] actually believed he needed to use such force, his
belief was unreasonable in light of all the circumstances known to
him. In making this determination you must understand that the
law presumes [Appellant] to have a reasonable belief that deadly
force is immediately necessary to protect himself against sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat if both of the following
conditions exist:
The person against whom the force is used is in the process of
unlawfully and forcibly entering, or has unlawfully and forcefully
entered and is present within a dwelling or residence, or the
person against whom the force is used is or attempting to remove
another person against that other person’s will from the dwelling
or residence; and [Appellant] kn[e]w or had reason to believe that
the unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring or had occurred.
A dwelling means any portion of a building or structure, including
any attached porch, deck, or patio, even though it is moveable,
for -- which is, for the time being, the home or place of lodging of
[Appellant]. Forcefully means by act of such violence or threat,
gesture, sign or menace, as may give ground to apprehended
personal injury or danger in standing in defensive possession.
Actual violence is not needed, but the conduct must be calculated
to alarm the most timid. Opening an unlocked door is not
sufficient in and of itself. In fact, the law further presumes that
someone who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter
[Appellant’s] dwelling or residence – or removes or attempts to
remove someone against their will from the residence, is acting
with the intent to commit an act resulting in sexual intercourse by
force or threat.
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Let me just reread that to you so it makes sense. In fact, the law
presumes that someone who unlawfully and by force enters or
attempts to enter [Appellant’s] dwelling or residence, is acting
with intent to commit an act resulting in sexual intercourse by
force or threat. If [Appellant] knows or has reason to believe that
this unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring or has occurred,
then the law presumes that [Appellant’s] belief in the necessity of
using deadly force is reasonable and justified.
Keep this in mind. A person is justified in using deadly force
against another not only when they are in actual danger of
unlawful attack, but also when they mistakenly but reasonably
believe that they are. A person is entitled to estimate the
necessity for the force he employs under the circumstances as he
reasonably believes them to be at the time. In the heat of conflict
a person who has been attacked ordinarily has neither time nor
composure to evaluate carefully the danger and make nice
judgments about exactly how much force is needed to protect
himself.
…
Consider the realities of the situation faced by [Appellant] here
when you assess whether the Commonwealth proved beyond a
reasonable doubt either that he did not believe he was actually in
danger of sexual intercourse by force or threat to the extent that
he needed to use such force in self-defense, or that while he did
believe, that his belief was unreasonable.
[Appellant] – the parties talked about the duty to retreat or no
duty to retreat. The Commonwealth must also prove [Appellant]
had a duty to retreat instead of using deadly force, and did not
fulfill that duty. A duty to retreat arises where [Appellant] knows
that he could avoid the necessity of using deadly force with
complete safety by retreating. However, there are certain
exceptions to this duty to retreat.
[Appellant] is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling unless he
was the initial aggressor. If the Commonwealth proves one of
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the actions of
[Appellant] in using deadly force are not justified. If the
Commonwealth fails to prove these elements [Appellant’s] action
was justified, and you must find him not guilty[.]
N.T., 10/22/2018, at 144-148.
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We conclude that the trial court’s instruction was a clear and accurate
representation of the law pertaining to self-defense and the castle doctrine.
Although Appellant urged the trial court to separate its instruction for the two
defenses, it was unwarranted. As previously mentioned, Section 505 codified
the law governing the use of defensive force into a single rule. Thus, it covers
both self-defense generally and the castle doctrine specifically. Here, the trial
court’s single jury instruction closely tracked the statutory language of Section
505. Upon review, we conclude that the instruction was an adequate
representation of the law. “It is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow
the trial court's instructions.” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1280
(Pa. 2016). As such, we conclude that Appellant’s final appellate issue does
not entitle him to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/8/2020
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