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← 241 F.3d 862 - Frost National Bank v. Midwest Autohaus, Inc.

Frost National Bank v. Midwest Autohaus, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

241 F.3d 862 · 2001

Citation profile

20
cited by 20 later decisions
2
states following
January 2017
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act)

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Reves v. Ernst & Young · Salinas v. United States · United States v. Neapolitan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “), and that FOA did not breach its duty of good faith imposed by section 4-103 of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code. We find that the district court properly construed the evidence in this case, and we agree with the court's determination regarding Frost's specific claims. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court. I. History 2 Defendants Geekie and Parker operated a check kiting scheme through their respective automobile dealerships, Midwest Autohaus (”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “). Frost disputes the district court's ruling generally, arguing that the court improperly construed the evidence presented in the light most favorable to FOA when determining whether to grant FOA's motion for summary judgment. Additionally, Frost challenges certain specific findings of the court, including its conclusion that FOA did not violate 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962 (d), the conspiracy provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Action or nonaction approved by this division or pursuant to Federal Reserve regulations or operating circulars is the exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence of special instructions, action or nonaction consistent with clearinghouse rules and the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by this division, is prima facie the exercise of ordinary care.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.