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241 F. App'x 727

United States v. Singer

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Decided July 20, 2007

U.S. Courts of Appeals · decided 2007-07-20

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act)

Relies on United States v. Gonzalez · United States v. Williams

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2007-07-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently July 2025

1 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

10200720102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1SUMMARY ORDER

¶2Defendant-appellant Edward Singer appeals from the April 6, 2005, judgment of *729conviction entered by the district court following a jury verdict finding Singer guilty of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and specification of issues on appeal.

¶3We reject Singer’s argument that the district court should have instructed the jury on a justification defense. Assuming without deciding that such a defense exists for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Williams, 389 F.3d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir.2004), the district court correctly found that Singer had failed to set forth the requisite factual basis for that defense. “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense only if the defense has a foundation in the evidence.” United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant “must make some showing on each element” of the proffered defense. Id.As Singer acknowledges, one element of the justification defense is that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to the illegal conduct. In this case, every witness testified that Singer was either standing on the sidewalk or in the middle of the street several feet away from Miller when he reached for the gun. Thus, there is no indication that Singer could not simply have walked away from the apartment building just like his two companions did. Although Singer understandably relies on the fact that Miller also reached into his jacket pocket as if he had a weapon, the record is undisputed that Miller did so only after Singer had already taken possession of the gun and indicated that fact to Miller. Thus, there is no evidence of “necessity” for the possession of the weapon, the crime for which Singer was convicted.

¶4We also find no error in the district court’s denial of Singer’s request for a mistrial based on the colloquy with Juror # 12. The district court was not required to send the jury back for further deliberations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(d) because that rule only applies “[i]f the poll reveals a lack of unanimity.” Juror # 12 never expressed any disagreement with the verdict at the time it was read. Rather, she only indicated she may have earlier had a different view. When asked directly whether she agreed with the verdict that had just been delivered, Juror # 12 answered “yes” without qualification or explanation. Similarly, because Juror # 12 never indicated any current disagreement with the verdict, there is no support in the record for Singer’s claim that the district court’s questioning coerced Juror # 12 into a rendering a verdict with which she may not have agreed. Finally, to the extent Singer requests a new trial because Juror # 12’s statements may have indicated a misunderstanding of the burden of proof, courts do not inquire into the jury’s deliberative process except in narrow situations not present here. See Fed.R.Evid. 606(b).

¶5Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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