State v. Adee’s Empirical Analysis
1987
Citation profile
140 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 140 later decisions — most recently November 2020 · most notably In Re Marriage of Ross (1989), Boatright v. Kansas Racing Commission (1992)
140 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Schmerber v. State of California · State v. Brunner · Standish v. Department of Revenue · Curless v. Board of County Commissioners · State v. Bristor
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 140 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when the intent can be ascertained from the statute. In construing statutes, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the entire act. Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [Citations omitted.]” State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825, 829 , 740 P.2d 611 (1987).”
14 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Any person who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle within this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this act, to submit to one or more tests of the person’s blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance to detemnine the presence of alcohol or drugs.” (Emphasis added.)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We believe that the intention of subsection (g) as enacted was not to change existing law as to the prohibition against the issuance of search warrants for DUI suspects refusing alcohol concentration testing, but rather to clarify that nothing in the implied consent statute (K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1001) rendered alcohol concentration test results from search warrants issued under some other authority inadmissible in DUI trials. Conceivably, a search warrant for a blood sample could be issued for a suspect of some crime other than DUI. If so, and the results were relevant to a DUI charge against the same individual, then (g) states that nothing in the implied consent statute (K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1001) renders such results inadmissible in the DUI trial.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.