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← 241 MINN 211 - Simon v. Carroll

Simon v. Carroll’s Empirical Analysis

1954

Citation profile

58
cited by 58 later decisions
6
states following
June 2011
most recently cited

4 district · 54 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 58 later decisions — most recently June 2011 · most notably Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki (1963), Hanson v. Bailey (1957)

4 district · 54 state decisions

1601954196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Lumiansky v. Tessier · Hamilton v. State · Nees v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. · Cahill v. Eastman · Wojtowicz v. Belden

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Since the enactment of § 169.18 in 1937 custom as a factor in and of itself has had no statutory recognition as a justifiable cause for a motorist’s failure to keep to his right half of a road when such half is of sufficient width and is otherwise reasonably usable. The prior statute (Mason St. 1927, § 2720-9) which was expressly repealed simultaneously with the adoption of the present highway act — of which § 169.18 is a part — did give recognition to custom when it provided that ‘the driver of a vehicle shall drive the same upon the right half of the traveled portion of the highway.’ ” (Italics supplied.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “«* * * The jury under the circumstances could reasonably find that, had Carroll been driving at a reasonable rate of speed, Simon would have been enabled to turn to the right from his negligent though customary course of travel and that the accident would then not have occurred. It follows that the jury could reasonably find that Carroll’s excessive speed was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that Simon was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““* * * It follows that, pursuant to § 169.18, subd. 1, despite the existence of any custom to the contrary, the act of driving a motor vehicle to any extent whatever to the left of the center line of a roadway of sufficient width, constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence (§ 169.96) and the prima facie case so established must prevail against the violator in the absence of countervailing evidence showing a statutory or other reasonable ground for such violation.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.