Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 241 Mont. 501 - State v. Krantz

State v. Krantz’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
3
states following
May 2016
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 35 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently May 2016 · most notably State v. Arlington (1994), State v. Guillaume (1999)

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 35 state decisions

220199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 924 · 21 U.S.C. § 848 (§ 408 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 849 (§ 409 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Mullaney v. Wilbur · Patterson v. New York · McMillan v. Pennsylvania · Oyler v. Boles

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) A person who has been found guilty of any offense and who, while engaged in the commission of the offense, knowingly displayed, brandished, or otherwise used a firearm, destructive device, as defined in 45-8-332(1), or other dangerous weapon shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state prison of not less than 2 years or more than 10 years, except as provided in 46-18-222.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “The Montana weapon enhancement statute contains a number of elements similar to those found in substantive criminal statutes, but those elements do not make it a separate crime. The enhancement statute contains a recidivist provision, requires a mental state of knowingly, and may require a finding of fact, use of a weapon, not necessary to establish guilt of the underlying crime. The recidivist provision carries out the statute’s purpose by limiting the sentencing court’s discretion in imposing increased punishment for repeat offenders. The mens rea requirement protects the defendant by imposing on the court an additional and appropriate finding in determining weapon usage. All sentencing factors may, and often do, require the court to consider facts not established during trial. These elements are as much pertinent and necessary attributes of traditional sentencing considerations as they are attributes of substantive crimes. This Court has repeatedly held that Montana’s weapon enhancement statute does not create a separate crime or element of a crime, (cites omitted) The Montana legislature has chosen a scheme which makes dangerous offender status and use of a weapon sentencing factors. So long as that scheme remains constitutional, it is not the province of this Court to transmute these statutory factors into separate crimes or elements of crimes.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Additional sentence for offenses committed with a dangerous weapon. (1) A person who has been found guilty of any offense and who, while engaged in the commission of the offense, knowingly displayed, brandished, or otherwise used a firearm, destructive device, as defined in 45-8-332(1), or other dangerous weapon shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state prison of not less than 2 years or more than 10 years, except as provided in 46-18-222. (2) Aperson convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this section shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of the present offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state prison of not less than 4 years or more than 20 years, except as provided in 46-18-222.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.