241 SW3D 520 - Herrera v. State

COCHRAN, J.,

¶1filed a concurring opinion.

¶2I join the majority opinion. I add these remarks only to emphasize what the record does not show. It does not show that appellant established the essential fact of “custodial interrogation.” Like the trial court, the unanimous Third Court of Appeals,1 and now a majority of this Court, I simply do not know enough about the setting in which appellant and Investigator Powell conducted their discussion to determine that this was a “custodial interrogation.” Here is what we do know:

(1) Appellant was arrested on an unrelated outstanding warrant;

(2) He spent the night in jail;

(3) The next morning Investigator Powell “asked [appellant] some questions. At that time, [he], was gathering information and didn’t know Mr. Herrera’s involvement, if any, in the assault.”

¶3What we do not know is where in the jail and under what circumstances this “interview,” “questioning,” or “discussion” took place. Perhaps it was a scenario involving custodial interrogation. Perhaps it was not. The record is simply incomplete. Nobody ever asked the questions to establish whether this was or was not a “custodial interrogation” setting.

¶4As the court of appeals noted, this Court has never directly stated who bears the burden of establishing that a “custodial interrogation” took place.2 Although neither of the parties have addressed this issue in their Briefs or acknowledged the importance of this issue, I agree with the court of appeals’ suggestion that this is the defendant’s burden.3

¶5The right to Miranda warnings applies once the defendant establishes that the setting is one of custodial interrogation.4*534Only then does the State have “a heavy burden” to establish that Miranda warnings were given and that the defendant voluntarily waived those rights and voluntarily responded to custodial questioning.5 In this case we know that there was a “one-on-one” discussion between appellant and Investigator Powell while appellant was housed in the Caldwell County Jail on other charges. We do not know where they spoke; we do not know how they came to have a discussion; we do not know anything about the circumstances under which they talked. We do not know enough to make an intelligent decision about whether there was “custodial interrogation.” I conclude that this is why every court that has considered the matter has properly rejected appellant’s contention.

¶6. Herrera v. State, No. 03-04-00766-CR, 2005 WL 3234413, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 10030 (Tex.App.-Austin Dec. 1, 2005) (not designated for publication).

¶7. Herrera, 2005 WL 3234413, at *4, n. 4, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 10030 at ⅜11 n. 4.

¶8. See id.Footnote four of the court of appeals’ opinion reads:

Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not addressed who bears the burden of proving that the statement was not the result of custodial interrogation, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant bears the burden of proving that a prosecution-offered statement is one to which Miranda applies. United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299, 1309 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir.1984); see also 41 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 13.384 (2d ed.2001).

¶9.See, e.g., Paez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (upholding the admission of a statement that the jailed suspect had given to a Department of Human Resources worker because we were "unable to say that the record as a whole establishes that [defendant’s] statements ... were the product of” *534custodial interrogation by a state official); see also State v. Rosado, 218 Conn. 239, 588 A.2d 1066, 1073 (1991) (stating that “the defendant has the initial burden of showing that he was subjected to custodial interrogation”).

¶10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).