J-S37004-20
2020 PA Super 271
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSHUA HEADLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 76 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 6, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0000546-2019
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: Filed: November 19, 2020
Appellant, Joshua Headley, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on December 6, 2019, in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas.
We affirm.
On September 6, 2019, Appellant was tried on stipulated facts before
the trial court sitting without a jury. The stipulated facts are as follows:
1. On or about January 5, 2019, at approximately 3:00 p.m.,
[Appellant] discharged a firearm while in his apartment located at
425 Crest Lane, Pottstown, Chester County, Pennsylvania.
2. [Appellant] was in his apartment with Kimberly R. Green.
[Appellant] and Ms. Green were involved in a romantic
relationship. On January 5, 2019, [Appellant] and Ms. Green
engaged in an argument. During this argument [Appellant]
discharged his nine-millimeter handgun inside the apartment unit.
3. The bullet fired by [Appellant] passed through the floor of
[Appellant’s] apartment into and then through the apartment
below, 415 Crest Lane, Pottstown, Chester County, Pennsylvania.
J-S37004-20
The resident of the 415 Crest Lane apartment was 91-year-old
Marie Ilg.
4. Ms. Ilg heard the argument between [Appellant] and Ms. Green,
followed by a loud noise. The victim was sitting in a chair in her
living room when the bullet fired by [Appellant] entered her
residence through the ceiling, proceeded past her, then pierced
the apartment wall next to an exterior window within three or four
feet of where she sat.
5. Ms. Ilg called law enforcement and Officers Gregory Bickel and
Nicholas Campitelli from the East Coventry Township Police
Department responded to the location.
6. The officers spoke with [Appellant], Ms. Green, and Ms. Ilg.
Both Ms. Green and Ms. Ilg gave officers written statements.
7. Ms. Green’s written statement is attached as Commonwealth
Exhibit 1.
8. Ms. Ilg’s written statement is attached as Commonwealth
Exhibit 2.
9. The officers’ investigation revealed that a bullet had penetrated
the ceiling of Ms. Ilg’s apartment by way of the floor of
[Appellant’s] apartment. The bullet traversed Ms. Ilg’s living
space and impacted a wall next to a chair in her living room.
10. Photos from Ms. Ilg’s residence of the bullet holes and chair
are attached as Exhibit 3.
11. [Appellant] told investigating officers that he had discharged
the firearm while in his apartment located at 425 Crest Lane,
Pottstown, Chester County, Pennsylvania.
12. The bullet from the firearm [Appellant] discharged passed
from [Appellant’s] apartment into the victim’s apartment.
13. [Appellant’s] apartment is a separately secured unit in an
apartment building.
14. The victim’s apartment, 415 Crest Lane, Pottstown, Chester
County, Pennsylvania, is a separately secured unit in the same
apartment building.
-2-
J-S37004-20
15. The firearm [Appellant] discharged is a firearm within the
definition of §2707.1(d).
16. §2707.1(d) also defines an “occupied structure” as “any
structure, vehicle, or place adapted for overnight accommodation
of persons or for carrying on business therein, ... whether or not
a person is actually present.”
17. [Appellant] discharged the firearm intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.
18. None of the defenses in §2707.1(c) apply in this case.
19. In discharging a firearm [Appellant] consciously ignored a
great and unjustifiable risk that what he was doing would cause
another person to be seriously injured.
20. In discharging a firearm [Appellant] recklessly placed Marie
Ilg in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Stipulated Facts, 9/6/19, at 1-3.
The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:
On September 6, 2019, following a stipulated facts trial
before the undersigned sitting without a jury, [Appellant] was
found guilty of discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure,1
and recklessly endangering another person [(“REAP”)].2
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2707.1[.]
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705[.]
[Appellant] was sentenced on December 6, 2019 to 11 ½ to
23 months [of] incarceration and 1 year probation, consecutive to
parole, for discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure and 1
year probation concurrent to the above sentence for recklessly
endangering another person. [Appellant] was also ordered to
perform 50 hours of community service. [Appellant] did not file
post-sentence motions. [Appellant] filed a timely Notice of Appeal
on December 26, 2019.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/23/20, at 1. Both the trial court and Appellant complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
-3-
J-S37004-20
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. Was the evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Appellant was guilty of recklessly
endangering another person?
2. Was the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Appellant was guilty of having discharged a firearm
into an occupied structure?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.1
In both issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. A
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence presents a question of law, and as
such, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Weimer, 977 A.2d 1103, 1104-1105 (Pa. 2009).
Additionally:
When presented with a claim that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain a conviction, an appellate court, viewing all of the evidence
and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, must determine
whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact-finder to
find that all elements of the offense were established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Woody, 939 A.2d 359, 361 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by proving the crime’s
elements with evidence which is entirely circumstantial and the trier of fact,
who determines credibility of witnesses and the weight to give the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”
Id. at 361-
____________________________________________
1 For purposes of our disposition, we have renumbered Appellant’s issues on
appeal.
-4-
J-S37004-20
362 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “As an appellate court,
we do not assess credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the testimony
of record.” Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super.
2014). “Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own
judgment for that of the factfinder.” Commonwealth v. Walker,
139 A.3d
225, 229 (Pa. Super. 2016).
In his first issue, Appellant alleges that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish the crime of REAP. We disagree.
A person is guilty of REAP, “a misdemeanor of the second degree[,] if
he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. To sustain a
conviction for REAP, “the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had
an actual present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to
do so. Danger, not merely the apprehension of danger, must be created.”
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 915 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal
citation omitted).
The mere act of discharging a firearm, by itself, does not constitute
REAP. See Commonwealth v. Kamenar, 516 A.2d 770 (Pa. Super. 1986)
(concluding the evidence insufficient to support a conviction of REAP where
the defendant fired a single gunshot away from the direction of other people
and into a wooded hillside). However, discharging a firearm near another
person or in a manner where the projectile could have struck a person is
-5-
J-S37004-20
sufficient to prove REAP. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Hartzell,
988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
2009)).
After review, we conclude that there is no merit to this issue. As
specified in the stipulated facts enumerated above, Appellant was arguing with
his paramour inside a multi-unit apartment building. During this argument,
Appellant discharged a firearm through the floor of his apartment. The bullet
passed through Appellant’s apartment floor and through the ceiling of the
apartment below. The apartment below Appellant’s was occupied by Ms. Ilg.
The bullet progressed through Ms. Ilg’s home within three or four feet of her.
The projectile then penetrated a wall inside of Ms. Ilg’s apartment.
These facts establish the elements of REAP. Appellant was not merely
presently able but did, in fact, fire a projectile into Ms. Ilg’s apartment and in
Ms. Ilg’s direction. Appellant’s reckless conduct of firing a bullet into Ms. Ilg’s
home, in her direction, and within three or four feet from where Ms. Ilg was
seated, placed Ms. Ilg in danger of death or serious bodily injury pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Shaw, 203 A.3d at 284. Appellant disregarded the risk
of death or injury and could have seriously wounded or killed Ms. Ilg. We
conclude that Appellant’s actions created actual danger and not merely the
apprehension of danger. Hopkins,
747 A.2d at 915. For these reasons, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove REAP, and Appellant’s claim
of error is meritless.
-6-
J-S37004-20
In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient
to prove that he committed the crime of discharging a firearm into an occupied
structure in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2707.1. Appellant challenges the
interpretation of the term “occupied structure,” and he avers that because he
and Ms. Ilg lived in the same apartment building, he could not have discharged
his firearm “into an occupied structure” as he was already within that
structure. Appellant’s Brief at 9-12. After review, we disagree.
When called upon to review the interpretation of a statute, we adhere
to the following:
Under the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, our paramount
interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of our General
Assembly in enacting the particular legislation under review. We
are mindful that the object of all statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly
and the best indication of the legislature’s intent is the plain
language of the statute. When the words of a statute are clear
and unambiguous, we may not go beyond the plain meaning of
the language of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
However, only when the words of the statute are ambiguous
should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent of the
General Assembly through considerations of the various factors
found in Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act,
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
Commonwealth v. Lites, 234 A.3d 806, 812-813 (Pa. Super. 2020).
Statutory interpretation is a question of law; our standard of review is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Smith,
221
A.3d 631, 636 (Pa. 2019).
The statute at issue, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2707.1, provides as follows:
-7-
J-S37004-20
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he
knowingly, intentionally or recklessly discharges a firearm from
any location into an occupied structure.
(b) Grading.--An offense under this section shall be a felony of
the third degree.
(c) Defense.--It is a defense to prosecution under this section
that:
(1) the person discharging the firearm was a law
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his
official law enforcement duties; or
(2) the person discharging the firearm was engaged in a
hunting activity; and
(i) the discharge of the firearm took place from a
location where the hunting activity is lawful; and
(ii) the passage of the projectile from the firearm into
the occupied structure was not intentional, knowing or
reckless.
(d) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words and
phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
“Firearm.” Any weapon which is designed to or may readily
be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an
explosion or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.
“Occupied structure.” Any structure, vehicle or place
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for
carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is
actually present.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2707.1.
Appellant cites Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 2009),
in support of his argument, asserting that because his apartment and Ms. Ilg’s
apartment were within the same building, they were inside one occupied
-8-
J-S37004-20
structure. Appellant alleges that, pursuant to McCoy, a person cannot fire
“into” an occupied structure if that person is already within the occupied
structure. Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant contends that apartments
located inside of one building are not separate occupied structures under
Section 2707.1, and “[a] projectile only travels ‘into’ an occupied structure
when the projectile begins its journey outside of the structure and either
enters the structure through an opening or penetrates the outer wall.”
Appellant’s Brief at 12 (quoting McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1167). After review, we
conclude that although the McCoy Court interpreted and explained the terms
used in Section 2707.1, the facts of that case are distinguishable, and McCoy
does not preclude Appellant’s conviction.
In McCoy, the appellant (“McCoy”) entered a restaurant where
approximately 250 customers were dining. McCoy approached the manager
and informed him that he had eaten at the restaurant earlier and had become
ill as a result. The manager asked McCoy some questions regarding what he
ate and whether he had a receipt. While the manager and McCoy were
speaking, a large group of customers entered the restaurant and the manager
walked to his office to “attend to business” for the customers. McCoy followed
and the manager asked McCoy to wait in a chair outside of the office. McCoy
initially waited, but then opted to follow the manager inside the office. McCoy
then reached into his pocket and withdrew a handgun. Upon seeing the gun,
the manager ran out of the office and into the kitchen area of the restaurant.
-9-
J-S37004-20
McCoy pursued the manager into the dining area, and McCoy fired his gun
multiple times in the direction of the kitchen. McCoy then left the restaurant,
and no one was physically injured. McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1161.
Following a nonjury trial, McCoy was convicted of several crimes
including discharging a firearm into an occupied structure. McCoy, 962 A.2d
at 1161. McCoy filed a timely appeal, and in its Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion, the
trial court concluded:
[McCoy ] violated Section 2707.1’s prohibition against discharge
of a firearm into an occupied structure by firing his gun while he
was within the [restaurant]. Section 2707.1(a) defines the offense
as follows: “A person commits an offense if he knowingly,
intentionally or recklessly discharges a firearm from any location
into an occupied structure.” The trial court acknowledged that
applying the plain meaning of “into” would necessitate that
[McCoy] be outside the structure in order to fire into it. However,
the trial court also noted that the statutory language dictated that
the shooter could be firing “from any location” into the occupied
structure. The trial court determined that the language “from any
location” modified the word “into,” requiring a finding that the
statute encompassed firing a weapon both into and from within
the occupied structure. Thus, the trial court determined that
[McCoy] was appropriately found guilty because he fired his gun
into the kitchen area of the restaurant, which satisfies the
definition of an occupied structure under the statute.
McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1162.
The Superior Court affirmed in a published opinion.
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 928 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. 2007).
The court viewed [McCoy’s] claim that he could not be convicted
of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure when he was
inside the structure at the time as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, noting that [McCoy] argued that there was no
evidence that he was outside of the structure at the time he fired
his gun. Agreeing with [McCoy] that the language of Section
2707.1 is unambiguous, the court focused on the meaning of the
phrase “from any location,” but failed to discuss the meaning of
- 10 -
J-S37004-20
the word “into” or its effect on the statute’s meaning. The
Superior Court concluded that the plain language of the statute
prohibited discharging a firearm “from any location;” therefore,
the statute did not require that the defendant be outside the
occupied structure when the gun was fired. In a footnote, the
Superior Court opined that an individual could even commit an
offense under Section 2707.1 by discharging a firearm from one
room to another within an occupied structure. Thus, the Superior
Court concluded that, because the General Assembly had included
the words “from any location” in the statute, the “clear and
unambiguous wording of Section 2707.1 does not limit a
defendant’s location to outside of a structure when discharging a
firearm.” McCoy, 928 A.2d at 311. The Superior Court
acknowledged that this was a case of first impression in the
Commonwealth, but dismissed [McCoy’s] citations to authority
from other jurisdictions as irrelevant because the cases were
“factually distinguishable” from the case at bar. Id. at 310.
McCoy,
962 A.2d at 1162.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal “because
the language of Section 2707.1 is arguably open to more than one
interpretation, and the Superior Court’s decision was the first instance of a
court in Pennsylvania interpreting the meaning and application of the statute.”
McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1162. The Supreme Court noted that our Court failed to
discuss or give effect to the word “into” from Section 2707.1. The Supreme
Court concluded that “reading the statute so that ‘into’ qualifies the term ‘from
any location’ yields logical results that do not require adding additional terms
to the statute.”
Id.
Our Supreme Court held:
the plain meaning of the term “into” requires that the original
location is outside of the destination—one does not walk “into” a
room one is already standing in; likewise, a gun is not fired “into”
a building when the shooter is located inside the building. A
- 11 -
J-S37004-20
projectile only travels “into” an occupied structure when the
projectile begins its journey outside of the structure and either
enters the structure through an opening or penetrates the outer
wall.
Under this construction, to be deemed criminal, the statute
requires that the defendant discharge the firearm from any
location outside the structure, and that the projectile move into
the structure. Thus, “into” modifies the meaning of “from any
location” to include only any location from which the shooter can
physically shoot “into” the occupied structure, including other
structures, moving vehicles and any other location outside of the
occupied structure.
This is a logical reading which, though it may make the
phrase “from any location” seem like a statement of the obvious,
nevertheless does not ignore its meaning in context. When there
is an interpretation available that gives effect to all of the statute’s
phrases and does not lead to an absurd result, that interpretation
must prevail. The best and logical reading of the statute,
therefore, counsels that the word “into” modifies the phrase “from
any location.” This construction also squares with the Section’s
title, which speaks of firing “into,” without any location qualifier.
Id. at 1168. The Court continued:
the view of the Commonwealth and the lower courts that Section
2707.1 should be interpreted as broadly as possible, so as to
criminalize both firing into and firing within an occupied structure,
must fail. This expansive interpretation of Section 2707.1,
however ingenious or intricate the reading may be, would operate
to criminalize conduct that the statute, on its face, does not
embrace. Thus, the statute, as interpreted by the lower courts,
fails to give fair notice of what conduct the statute prohibits.
…
The language of Section 2707.1, fairly interpreted in light of our
principles of statutory construction, requires that an actor be
located outside of an occupied structure in order to fire “into” that
structure. Here, it was undisputed that McCoy was inside the
structure.
Id. at 1168-1169.
- 12 -
J-S37004-20
In the instant case, Appellant avers that because he and Ms. Ilg lived in
the same apartment building, they were inside the same occupied structure
pursuant to McCoy. Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant asserts “[e]ach
single unit cannot be construed as an ‘occupied structure’ as defined in
§ 2707.1.” Id. at 12.
In support of his argument, Appellant claims that Section 2707.1 does
not define “occupied structure” in the same manner as other statutes.
Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. Appellant cites to the arson statute for the
proposition that the legislature could have defined individual apartments in a
single structure as separate occupied structures, but it did not. Appellant’s
Brief at 12. The arson statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301, defines occupied structure
in the same manner as Section 2707.1. However, it adds an additional
sentence that we conclude is irrelevant to Section 2707.1. Section 3301
defines occupied structure as “Any structure, vehicle or place adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein,
whether or not a person is actually present. If a building or structure is
divided into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the
actor is an occupied structure of another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(j)
(emphasis added). Although this language contemplates separate units in a
structure, it does not prevent the conclusion that an apartment is itself an
- 13 -
J-S37004-20
occupied structure under Section 2707.1.2 Rather, the arson statute describes
who occupies the units of a structure, but it defines “occupied structure” using
the same language as Section 2707.1.
Section 2707.1(d) unambiguously defines “occupied structure,” and it
includes a “place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons.” It cannot
be gainsaid that Ms. Ilg’s apartment is not “a place adapted for overnight
accommodation of persons.” Apartments are separate places of abode, and
the autonomy provided an apartment is distinct from areas of a restaurant or
rooms within the same home. Our Supreme Court’s definition of “place of
abode” is informative:
When interpreting a statute, words that are not defined in the
statute shall be construed according to their common and
approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “place of abode” as “one’s residence or domicile.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1149 (6th Edition 1991). Black’s further defines
domicile as “a person’s legal home,” Black’s Law Dictionary 485,
and residence as a “place where one actually lives or has a home;
a person’s dwelling place or place of habitation; an abode; house
where one’s home is; a dwelling house.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1309. Finally, Black’s defines dwelling as “the house or other
structure in which a person or persons live; a residence; abode;
habitation; the apartment or building, or group of buildings,
____________________________________________
2 Appellant also cites to the burglary statute at 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502 and the
criminal trespass statute at 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503 to support his assertion that
apartments in the same building are one occupied structure. Appellant’s Brief
at 13. However, upon review, we note that the burglary and criminal trespass
statutes employ the definition of “occupied structure” from 18 Pa.C.S. § 3501
which uses language identical to Section 2707.1. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3501
(defining “occupied structure” as “Any structure, vehicle or place adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein,
whether or not a person is actually present.”). Therefore, Appellant’s reliance
on these statutes does not advance his argument.
- 14 -
J-S37004-20
occupied by a family as a place of residence. Structure used as a
place of habitation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 505 …. In addition,
the Dictionary of Modern American Usage defines “place of abode”
as “a pretentious way of referring to someone’s home or house.”
The Dictionary of Modern American Usage 5 (1998) ….
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 738 A.2d 403, 404-405 (Pa. 1999) (internal
emphases omitted). Separate apartments within one building are
distinguishable from separate areas of a restaurant, or even separate rooms
within a single dwelling. McCoy,
962 A.2d at 1167-1168. Pursuant to Section
2707.1, Ms. Ilg’s apartment was an occupied structure.
Indeed, McCoy specifically stated that “‘into’ modifies the meaning of
‘from any location’ to include only any location from which the shooter can
physically shoot ‘into’ the occupied structure, including other structures[.]”
McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1168 (emphasis added). Appellant was inside his
apartment at 425 Crest Lane, an occupied structure, when he discharged a
round from his firearm into Ms. Ilg’s apartment, which is located one level
below his at 415 Crest Lane, another occupied structure. There is no dispute
that these are separate apartments or that Appellant fired into Ms. Ilg’s
apartment. Accordingly, the evidence established that Appellant discharged
a firearm into Ms. Ilg’s apartment, an occupied structure, and we find that
these facts satisfy all of the elements of Section 2707.1 pursuant to McCoy.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the
- 15 -
J-S37004-20
crimes of REAP and discharging a firearm into an occupied structure.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/19/20
- 16 -
