Volume 242 — Federal Reporter

Clarke, Judge. Action by the United States against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company for penalties. Judgment for the government, and defendant brings error.

Clarke, Judge. Action by the United States against the Biwabik Mining Company. Judgment for the United States, and defendant brings error. The Biwabik Company is an operating iron mining company. In 1919 the company made its return to the collector of internal revenue, for the year 1910, as required by the excise tax law of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. p. 1Í2, § 3Sq and paid the tax indicated by the return.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio; Howard C. Hollister, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the United States against the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Douis Railway Company. Judgment for the United States on a directed verdict, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Rufus .E. Foster, Judge.</p> <p>. Suit in admiralty by Kahmann & McMurry against the /Etna Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn. Decree for respondent, and li-belants appeal.'</p>

Suit in equity by Thomas Durland Uandon against Elizabeth Clark and Mary F. Clark. Decree for defendants on cross-bill, and complainant appeals. The plaintiff is a citizen of the state of New Jersey. The defendants are citizens of the state of New York.

Suit by the S. E. Hendricks Company, Incorporated, against the Thomas Publishing Company. From a decree in favor of complainant, defendant appeals.

Suit in admiralty by the Ben Franklin Transportation Company against the Federal Sugar Refining Company. Decree for libelant, and respondent appeals. The Ben Franklin Transportation Company, hereinafter called the Transportation Company, is a corporation organized and existing under tlie laws of the state of New York, and is engaged in the business of lightermen and transporting freight and cargoes and the like for hire.

Cushman, Judge. Actions by Frank P. McKinney, as receiver of the Olympia Bank & Trust Company, in which C. S. Reinhart and another, stockholders of the Olympia Bank & Trust Company, for themselves and all other stockholders, intervened, and by Roy A. Langley, as receiver of the State Bank of Tenino, against the United States National Bank of Centralia. and A. R. Titlow, as its receiver. From the judgment, the plaintiffs in each case and the interveners separately appeal.

Action by Howell C. Perrin against Anna M. U. Blake, as executrix. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. The action was commenced Iw the service of a summons, on January 20, 1915, in the Supreme Court, Westchester county, state of New York. It was removed to the United States DisLrict Court for the Southern District of New York on March 16, 1915.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; J. W. Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Morris Herrmann against the Bower Chemical Manufacturing Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Eoster, Judge. Suit by the New York Trust Company against the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad Company. Erom certain orders denying him leave to intervene, and overruling his objections to confirmation of a sale, Julius Simon appeals.

<p>1. Limitation of Actions <S^»16(2) — Accrual of Cause of Action.</p> <p>Where plaintiff found tenants to take defendant’s property at the expiration of an existing lease, but it was specifically provided that such tenancy should not arise until and unless the existing lease terminated with all its terms fully complied with, plaintiff’s right of action on a quantum meruit for its services did not accrue, and limitations did not begin to run, until the termination of the existing lease, as it had no cause of action presently enforceable until that time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 211.]</p> <p>2. Trial <§=>315. — Verdict—“Compromise Verdict.”</p> <p>In an action on a quantum meruit for services as broker, a “comxiromise verdict” means one the result, not of justifiable concession of views, but of improper compromise of the vital principles which should have controlled the decision.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 740-712.</p> <p>Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Compromise.]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error <3=>264 — Review—Necessity of Exceptions.</p> <p>A claim that the verdict was a compromise verdict need not be considered, where it rests upon no exception taken at the trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1533= 1535.]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error <®=s263(l) — Review—Necessity of Exceptions.</p> <p>A ruling directing the jury to allow interest upon whatever verdict they should render could not be reviewed, where no exception was taken.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 1516.]</p> <p>5. Interest ©=^19(1) — Eight to Interest — Unliquidated Damages.</p> <p>In an action on a quantum meruit for services as broker, interest should not have been allowed; the damages being unliquidated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Interest, Cent. Dig. §§ 35, 36, 38, 40.]</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <Sr=>292 — Actions Against Trustee — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A trustee in bankruptcy brought ancillary proceedings in the Eastern district of Louisiana, claiming ownership of certain cotton, and obtained a preliminary injunction against its removal from the court’s jurisdiction. Thereafter the cotton was delivered to certain foreign banks on forthcoming bonds. Plaintiffs sued the trustee and the parties to such ancillary proceeding to impress a trust on the cotton, on the ground that it was purchased with money obtained from them by the bankrupt by fraud, and the jurisdiction was sustained on the theory that it was in the nature of an ancillary suit affecting property within the custody of the court. Held that, while this had probably become the law of the case, the court’s jurisdiction could not be sustained, where the ancillary proceeding by the trustee had terminated adversely to the trustee; the bond having only been intended to take the place of the cotton, and the foreign defendants having done nothing to subject themselves personally to the court’s jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 410, 410, 415, 416.]</p>

<p>Bankruptcy ^=>120 — Appointment of Trustee — Euigibility.</p> <p>Tinder Bankruptcy Ad; July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 45-, 30 Stat. 557 (Comp. St. 191(1. § 8029), providing that trustees may be individuals competent to perform the duties of the oííiee, and residing or having an office in the judicial district within which they are appointed, or corporations authorized to act in such capacity, where no candidate for the office of trustee received the votes of a majority of creditors in number and amount, and the appointment of a trustee thereupon devolved upon the referee, a person otherwise qualified was not ineligible because he was ono of the unsuccessful candidates voted for by the creditors.</p> <p>[Ifld. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 185.]</p>

Action by the Chadeloid Chemical Company against the H. B. Chal-mers Company and another. Prom an interlocutory decree, defendants appeal. On application to a Circuit Judge for an injunction and stay.

<p>Patents <@=3.328 — Validity—Infringement.</p> <p>Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Stumpf patent, No. 1,042,168, for an improvement in steam engines, held valid and infringed, but claim 18 held not infringed.</p>

<p>1. War <@==>10(2) — Civil Rights and Remedies — 'Suspension op Proceedings.</p> <p>A plaintiff, who becomes an alien enemy, cannot continue an action at law or in equity, or institute further proceedings in the courts, until the war is ended, save in certain exceptional instances.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — 'For other cases, see War, Cent. Dig. §§ 31-36.)</p> <p>2. War <@=10(2) — Civil Rights and Remedies — Suspension op Proceedings.</p> <p>A German subject, residing in Germany and owning a patent, authorized an American citizen to grant licenses for the manufacture, sale, and use of engines embodying the patented devices, and to receive for his services as sales agent one-half of the receipts from licenses and royalties; the agency to be irrevocable during the life of the patent. Thereafter he executed a power of attorney to such sales agent, authorizing him to sue for infringement of the patent. Suit was brought in the patentee’s name, resulting in a decision in his favor, on which no decree had been signed or entered prior to the President’s war proclamation. Feld, that the sales agency agreement did not operate as an assignment of the patent, and a suspension of proceedings could not be denied on the theory that the sales agent was the real plaintiff, and the patentee only a nominal plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see War, Cent. Dig. §§ 31-36.)</p>

In Equity. Suit by Frank Sullivan Smith, as receiver of the Pitts-burg, Shawmut & Northern Railroad Company and the mortgaged properties of the Shawmut Mining Company and the Kersey Mining Company, against james R. Barnett and others. On motion to remand.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Standard Computing Scale Company, Limited, against John E. Farrell, as State Superintendent of Weights and Measures of the State of New York.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company against Swift & Co1. Sur motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by William A. Puder against Walter E. Agler, On •motion to dismiss the bill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Philip E. du Pont, wherein Eleanor du Pont Perot and others intervened, as plaintiffs, against Pierre S. du Pont, Irenee du Pont, Lammot du Pont, Alexis Felix du Pont, John J. Raskob, Robert Rulith Morgan Carpenter, Henry F. du Pont, Eugene E. du Pont, William Coyne, Harry G. Haskell, Harry E. Brown, John P. Laffey, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., du Pont Securities Company, and E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company. Decree for complainant, and intervening complainants.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Santa Marina Company against the Canadian Bank of Commerce. Decision for complainant.</p>

<p>.Pemberton W. Stickrath was indicted, for an offense. Ón demurrer to an indictment.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of A. J. Ellis, Incorporated, bankrupt. On review of order of referee.</p>

<p>At Taw. Action by the United States against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. On demurrer to certain paragraphs of the answer.</p>

<p>1. Guaranty <&wkey;>77(2) — Right op Action — Necessity op Proceeding Against Principal — “Absolute Guaranty” — “Conditional Guaranty.”</p> <p>A guaranty of the faithful performance of all the terms and covenants of a lease, including the payment of rent, was an absolute and not a conditional guaranty, and the lessor could sue thereon without exhausting his remedy against the lessee; a “conditional guaranty” being one importing the happening of some contingency other than the default of the principal debtor, and being usually an undertaking to be liable for the principal’s default in ease satisfaction cannot be obtained from the principal without reasonable diligence, while an “absolute guaranty” is one under whicli ¡he liability of the guarantor is fixed by the failure of the principal debtor to pay at maturity.</p> <p>|lid. Note.- — For other cases, see Guaranty, Cent. Dig. § 89.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Absolute Guaranty ; Conditional Guaranty.]</p> <p>2. Corporations <&wkey;484.(3, 4) — Corporate Powers — Guarantor or Surety.</p> <p>As a general rule no corporation has power, without express authority conferred by the eorix>rate articles, to become a surety or guarantor for another by any form of contract or indorsement.</p> <p>[lid. Noce. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1815.]</p> <p>3. Goporatjons <&wkey;484(3) — Corporate Powers — Guaranteeing Payment op Kent.</p> <p>A corporation authorized to manufacture, buy, sell, and deal in beer and other liquors, and to do all things incident to or convenient in carrying out such purposes, had authority to guarantee the payment of rent under a lease to persons who agreed to handle its beer in any saloon conducted upon the leased premises, and who further agreed that their failure to handle its beer should operate as an immediate assignment and transfer of the lease to it.</p> <p>[lid. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1815.]</p>

<p>ADMIRALTY <&wkey;>19 — JURISDICTION — MARITIME TORTS — INJURY TO MARINE Cable.</p> <p>Admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit for the negligent injury by a vessel of a marine cable resting on the bottom under navigable waters, although the ends of the cable are supported on the shore.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§■ 233, 234.]</p>

In Admiralty. Suit for collision by the Booth Steamship Company, Limited, against Frederick B. Dalzell and W. Freeland Dalzell, doing business as Fred B. Dalzell & Co., in which the tug Rose Reichert, the Reichert Towing Line, Incorporated, claimant, and the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company were impleaded.

<p>1. SHIPRING <&wkey;1.04-LIABILITY OP VESSEL-LIEN FOR BREACH! OP CONTRACT.</p> <p>The maritime law does not give a lien on a vessel lor an alleged breach of contract by failing to proceed to the designated bertli for loading, and this general proposition is not different in “the event that the cargo is later loaded on the vessel at another place.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 225, 404-410.]</p> <p>2. Makitime Liens <&wkey;57 — Locai, Statutes — Enforcement in Admiralty.</p> <p>Courts of admiralty are not inclined to recognize local statutes purporting to establish a lien, whore the maritime law gives none, unless the right is unequivocal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Maritime Liens, Cent. Dig. § 96.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by C. A. Trice, trustee of George Duren, bankrupt, against the Coolidge Banking Company and another. On plea to the jurisdiction.</p>

Dietrich, Judge. Suit by A. E. Caldwell, W. F. Mikesell, V. E. Morgan, J. E. Pohl-man, W. C. Pond, James W. Beauchamp, Carl Washburn, and Harold S. Simms, in their own behalf and in behalf of all persons similarly situated with them, against the Twin Falls Salmon River Rand & Water Company, Salmon River Canal Company, Eimited, Commonwealth Trust Company of Pittsburgh, trustee, and A. C. Robinson. Decree for complainants (231 Fed. 769), and defendants appeal.

Suit in admiralty by the Gulf Refining Company, D. M. Picton & Co., and the Steele Towing & Wrecking Company against the steamship Rivietta, Dall-Orso & Co., claimants, and R. Digo, master, as bailee and claimant of her cargo. Decree for libelants, and claimants appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico; Peter J. Hamilton, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Maria Leonor Santiago y Muniz and others against Miguel Roses y Artau and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.</p>

Wolverton, Judge. Suit by Elizabeth M. Price against Marie Dewey Wallace. From a decree dismissing the bill (224 Fed. 576), plaintiff appeals. This is a suit to have Marie Dewey Wallace, the appellee, adjudged a trustee for the benefit of the complainant, appellant, Elizabeth N. Price, and her children, with respect to a two-thirds interest in the property of the estate of Peter B. Smith, deceased, and for an accounting and general relief.

In the matter of the Seward Dredging Company, bankrupt. On petition to revise an order granting a petition by one Estabrook for delivery of certain chattels to him. The bankrupt owned a placer mining property in Alaska. This will be assumed to be real estate, for purposes of decision, a holding not to be complained of by appellant, who takes the point for granted.

Action by the A. H. Andrews Company against the Stave & Timber Corporation in Norfolk, Ya. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Defendant in error (hereinafter called Andrews Co.) contracted in writing with plaintiff in error (hereinafter called Stave Co.) to furnish and erect certain kilns for the artificial drying of lumber. The kilns, after completion, were' operated by Slave Co,, and a portion of the contract price was paid.

Petition for Revision of Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Bankruptcy; Oliver B. Dickinson, Judge. In tho matter of the Order of Sparta, alleged bankrupt. On peti • tion by Eouis A. Vadakin to revise an order (238 Fed. 437) refusing to vacate an adjudication on his application, opposed by Eucy E. Cass and others.

Sheppard, Judge. Suit in admiralty by Eugene J. F. Coleman, as assignee of the Clooney Construction & Towing Company, against I. H. Aiken, doing business as the I. H. Aiken Towboat Company. Decree for respondent, and libelant appeals.

J. Cochran, Judge. Petition by Roszelle Bros, and others to have the Continental Coal Corporation adjudicated a bankrupt. From an order adjudicating bankruptcy, the bankrupt and others appeal.

<p>Petition to Superintend and Revise, in Matter of Law, Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling, in Bankruptcy; Alston G. Dayton, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Mound City Coal Company, bankrupt. On petition by the Union Electric Company and others to superintend and revise an order granting a petition of Nelson C. Hubbard and others.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; John Rellstab, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of Oswin W. Shelly, bankrupt. On petition by Clifford F. MacEvoy, trustee, to revise an order (235 Fed. 311) affirming a decision of the referee in favor of E. & Z. Van Raalte, Incorporated.</p>

<p>1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ¡&wkey;57(4) — VALIDITY OR TRANSACTIONS — SOLVENCY op Grantor.</p> <p>J., 'intending' to give his grandson a lot in a tract of unimproved land, and to build a house thereon for him, lot a contraed, on which $.100 had been paid before J.’s death. He devised such tract, including the lot, to T., his soil, the father of such grandson. His wife and children arranged to llave the house finished at the expense of the estate, and after its completion, at an additional cost of over $2,400, T. conveyed the lot to his son. The lot was worth only $300 or less, and the transaction was in good faith and with no intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. T. then owed no personal debts and believed himself to be solvent, and there was no affirmative proof that he was not solvent; but subsequently, owing to the failure of enterprises in which he owned stock, he Upenme unable to pay obligations on which he was security for others. Held, that the transaction would not be set aside, especially as the house, constituting the principal value of the property was not equitably T.’s property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, seo Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. S$ 150 -152, 15 L]</p> <p>2. Fraudulent Conveyances <&wkey;272 — Suits to Set Aside — Burden oe I’roiot ■ — Insolvency.</p> <p>In a suit to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance, the grantor's insolvency was a question of fact, and the burden of establishing it was on plaintiff; the conveyance being prima facie valid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. § 80 íj</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Charles B. Witmer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Donato Fillipon against the Albion Vein Slate Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. Evidence <&wkey;882 — Documentary Evidence — 'Authentication—Discretion of Court.</p> <p>In an action for architectural services, under a contract which provided for payment based on the schedule of charges indorsed by the American Institute of Architects, it was within the trial court’s discretion, and not an abuse of its discretion, to admit a printed circular over the name of the secretary of such Institute, identified as its schedule of charges, as against the objection that the schedule should be proved by the minutes of the society, as this objection simply went to its authentication, and the question was one of incidental procedure and sufficiency of proof.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1658, 1639.1</p> <p>2. Evidence <&wkey;242(5) — Admissions—Declarations of Employés.</p> <p>In an action for architectural services, under a contract which was canceled pursuant to a provision therein, evidence that a person in plaintiff’s employ, who visited defendants-for the purpose of negotiating a new contract, but not shown to have had anything to do with the settlement of the old contract, said plaintiff’s charge would be only §600, was properly excluded.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Gent. Dig. § 898.]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error &wkey;>690(5) — Record—Questions Presentí® for Review.</p> <p>In an action for architectural services, under a contract which designated its subject-matter as the additional items in connection with the alterations and additions to a bank building, where the plans and specifications were not reproduced in the record, or produced before the appellate court, it could not hold that error was committed in excluding evidence that the plans and specifications furnished were for a new structure, and not for alterations.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 2902.]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error &wkey;>690(5) — Record—Questions Presented for Review.</p> <p>The alleged error in overruling an objection to a question as not being cross-examination cannot be reviewed, where the witness’ testimony in chief is not in the record.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 2902.]</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Thos. G. Haight, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Marianna Consalvo and others against the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.</p>

Foster, Judge. Suit in admiralty by the Planters’ Steamship Company against the steamship Híspanla; the Rolf Seeberg Ship Chandlery Company, claimant. Decree' for claimant, and libelant appeals. The opinion filed in the District Court is as follows: This is a libel for damages to a cargo of bananas. Libelants had chartered the steamship Hispa nia for one or more trips between New Orleans and Honduras.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Rufus E. Foster, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Sociétc Anouyme do la Distillerie de la Liqueur Benedictine de L’Abbaye de Fecamp and others against Louis Emanuel Jung. From an order granting a preliminary injunction, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Patents <&wkey;328 — Infringement—Light Controller for Automobiles.</p> <p>The Myers patent, No. 1,099,7.15, for a light controller for automobiles, consisting of a light bulb having one-half its surface silvered to reflect the light against the main reflector, thus increasing the intensity of the rays, with means for rotating the bulb from the driver’s seat, so as to turn the rays so reflected in any desired direction, helé not infringed by a device in which the bulb can only be manually turned or adjusted</p> <p>2. Patents <&wkey;168(2) — Construction—Proceedings in Patent Office.</p> <p>A patentee, who has acquiesced in the ruling of the patent office limiting his claims by the inclusion of certain elements, is estopped to claim the broader construction, which he has abandoned.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 244.]</p> <p>3. Courts &wkey;>356 — Record on Appeal — Approval by Trial Judge.</p> <p>The failure of an appellant to present his statement of the evidence to the trial judge for approval, as required by equity rule 75 (198 Fed. xi, 116 C. C. A. xi), will be disregarded (except as to costs), where it otherwise appears that the transcript is complete and accurate, and the decision on the merits would be the same, whether or not the testimony is considered."</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 937.]</p> <p>4. Courts <s&wkey;356 — Record.</p> <p>The failure of an appellant to state the evidence in the record on appeal in narrative form, as required by equity rule 75 (198 Fed. xi, 115 C. O. A. xi), does not affect the appeal, but subjects him to the imposition of costs.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 937.]</p>

<p>Patents <&wkey;219(2> — Licenses—Suit foe Royalties — Defenses.</p> <p>Where a contract giving a license under a patent contained no guaranty against competition by infringers, the fact of such competition, through which the licensee lost; sales, is no defense to a suit by the licensor to recover the agreed royalties.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 340.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Meurer Steel Barrel Company, Incorporated, against the National Enameling & Stamping Company. On final hearing. Decree for complainant.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;399(3) — Exemptions—Forfeiture by Concealment of Assets.</p> <p>Where a bankrupt’s disclosure of Ms property and liabilities showed that his liabilities had been largely increased and his assets depleted since he gave a statement to a mercantile agency within one year, and showed a net worth of about $230 as against a net worth of $3,250 shown by such statement, the facts showed that he had not made a full and fair disclosure of all of his property, and such nondisclosure defeated his right to-his homestead exemption.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 657, 669.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;400(l) — Exemptions—Ruling of Referee — Review.</p> <p>The finding of the referee as to the bad faith of one claiming exemption will not be disturbed, unless clearly erroneous.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 671, 673.]</p>

In Admiralty. Suits by Namlooze Vennoot Schap, master of the •steamship Willem Van Driel, Sr., and by Edwin Dyason, master of the steamship Welbech Hall, against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the Central Elevator Company. Decree for libelants, against the Elevator Company only.

Suits by the Eastern Texas Railroad Company and others against the Railroad Commission of Texas and others; and by the Gulf, Texas & Western Railway Company and others against the same defendants. On motion for a temporary injunction.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Kansas City, Clay County & St. Joseph Railway Company against John T. Barker, Attorney General, and others. On motion for temporary injunction.</p>

<p>1. CORPORATIONS <&wkey;244(6) — Sale or Stock — Assumption op Debts op Corporation.</p> <p>G. & Sons, owning ail of tlie common stock) and most of the preferred stock of a corporation, sold it to defendant by an agreement whereby defendant was to apply the purchase price towards the payment of the corporation’s indebtedness, and was to advance G. &' Sons on their note the further sum of $35,000, which it was also to apply on the corporation’s liabilities, and G. & Sons agreed to guarantee, indemnify, and save defendant harmless against the payment of any further debts and liabilities ; the purpose being, as recited, that defendant should obtain title to tho corporation’s property and assets free and clear of all indebtedness. Hold, that defendant assumed the entire indebtedness of the corporation by implication, not only up to the amount of the purchase price, but all of the liabilities beyond that amount.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.' — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 968-971.J</p> <p>2. CORPORATIONS <&wkey;244(6) — Assumption of Debts — Agreement for Benefit of Third Person — Right to Sue.</p> <p>While an executory contract, whereby one party, for a consideration moving from the other, agrees to pay the debt of a third, gives the third party no right of action against the promisor, a party holding a note of the corporation was entitled to sue defendant, under the rule that, where a person has received from another some fund, property, or thing in consideration of which he has made a promise or entered into an undertaking primarily and directly for the benefit of a third party, such third party may sue directly upon such promise or undertaking.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 968-971.]</p> <p>3. Frauds, Statute of <&wkey;18(3) — Assumption of Another’s Indebtedness.</p> <p>The implied undertaking or promise to assume the corporation’s debts, was not within the statute of frauds.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. § 29.]</p>

In Admiralty. Proceeding by Frederick Bouchard and others against the schooner George W. Élzey, Jr. Decree for libelants in accordance with the opinion.

<p>1. Courts <§=>103.- — Number of Judges — Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231) § 266, 36 Slat. 1162 (Comp. St. 1916, § 1243), providing that no interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of any state statute shall he issued, on ground of unconstitutionality, unless the application shall be heard and determined by three judges, at least one of whom shall be a Supreme Court Justice or Circuit Judge, does not include unconstitutionality under the state Constitution, but only under the federal Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 344-350, 629.]</p> <p>2. Courts <§=>308(2) — Federal Courts — Jurisdiction—Suits Against State.</p> <p>A suit to enjoin the members of the Minnesota Public Safety Commission from enforcing an order of such Commission, or prosecuting or threatening 'to prosecute for nonobservance of such order, injunction, being asked upon the ground that such order is not within the purview of the statute creating the Commission, is not a suit against the state, of which federal courts are denied jurisdiction.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other eases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 844%.]</p> <p>3. Constitutional Daw <§=>26 — Grant or Dimitation of Power — State Constitutions.</p> <p>State Constitutions are limitations, and not grants, of power.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 36-38.]</p> <p>4. Constitutional Law <§=>81 — Police Power — ’Scope and Extent.</p> <p>The proper extent of the exercise of the police power by a state is determined by the necessities of the situation, within constitutional limitations.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 148.]</p> <p>5. Injunction <§=>114(2) — Public Safety Commission — Persons Entitled.</p> <p>An order of the Minnesota Public Safety Commission, declaring it necessary and proper for the public safety, the protection of life and property, and as a matter of military expediency and necessity, that licensed saloons be closed at 10 p. m. and remain closed until 8 o’clock the following day, and providing that the city council, board of trustees, or other governing body of municipalities forthwith proceed to enact ordinances executing the provisions of such order, is not directed against any individual, and, if it orders any one to do anything, is directed only against city councils, etc., and hence an individual who has voluntarily closed his saloon at 10¡ p. m., and who has not been ordered by the Public Safety Commission to do anything, or been threatened in any way by it, is not entitled to an injunction restraining the enforcement of such order, as any loss suffered by him is not directly attributable to the Commission’s order.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 203-210.]</p> <p>6. War <§=34 — Precautionary Measures — Safety Commission — Powers.</p> <p>Such order was within the power granted to such Commission by Laws Minn. 3917, c. 261, § 3, providing that, in the event of war, such Commission shall have power to do all acts and things not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the state, or of the United States, which are necessary or proper for the public safety and the protection of life and public property, or private property requiring protection, and to do all acts and things necessary or proper, so that the military, civil, and industrial resources of the state may be most efficiently applied toward the maintenance of the defense of the state and nation, and towards the successful prosecution of such war, and it was also authorized by the specific provision of such section that the Commission shall have power and it shall be its duty to co-operate with the military and other officers and agents of the United States government, and to aid it in the prosecution of such war and in relation to public safety so far as possible.</p> <p>7. War <@=34 — Safety Commission — Powers.</p> <p>Raws Minn. 1917, c. 261, § 3, authorizing the Public Safety Commission to do all acts and things “non-ineonsistent with the Constitution or laws of the state of Minnesota or of the United States,” which are necessary and proper for the purposes therein specified, should not be narrowly construed, but as giving the power to do all things not inconsistent with the broad purposes or the underlying principles and fundamental requirements of the laws of the state.</p> <p>8. Constitutional Law <@=>62 — War <@=>4 — Safety Commission — Powers— Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Laws Minn. 1917, c. 261, § 3, construed as authorizing the Public Safety Commission to require the closing of saloons at 10 p. m., is not invalid, as delegating legislative powers to such Commission, though under other statutes saloons may be kept open until 11 p. m., and until 12 p. m. under a city ordinance, as the Legislature may leave the administrative details to a board or officer, and may permit a change of administrative details by a public board or individual, even after they have been enacted into the statute, and the power in question relates simply to an administrative detail.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 94-102.]</p>

Rogan Billingsley and others were convicted of offenses. On applications for the allowance of assignments of error, etc.

<p>At Raw. Action by the Puget Mill Company against Skagit County. Decree for plaintiff.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Jesse E. Adams, bankrupt. On application to set asidq the discharge.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the St. Louis Independent Packing Company 4against David P. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, A. D. Melvin, Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and James J. Brougham, Chief Inspector of such Bureau at St. Louis. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals.</p>

Action by Benjamin Barker and another, as receivers of Patterson & Co., a copartnership, against the City of New York. Judgment for plaintiffs for an insufficient amount, and they bring error.

P. Bledsoe. Judge. Suit by Louisa Pickens and another against J. H. Merriam and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal.

Keller, Judge. Suit by Sabin W. Colton, Jr., and others, trustees of the Guyandotte Rand Association, against Newton Midkiff. From a decree in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

M. Morton, Jr., Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by Lewis Holmes, owner of the schooner Henry D. May, against the tug Piedmont and barge No. 25; the Consolidation Coal Company,, claimant. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the Citizens’ Trust Company, as receiver of the Pemiscot County Bank, against Abston, Wynne & Co. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio; Howard C. Hollister, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Warren Dohner against the Twin Takes Land & Water Company. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; John H. Clarke, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by the United States against Dew Doy. From a judgment of deportation, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Monroe Burns against the Eouisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Keller, Judge. Suit by W. T. Williams and others against the Provident Rife & Trust Company of Philadelphia and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.

<p>1. Railroads <§=>229 — Equipment of Trains — Hauling Cars for Repairs.</p> <p>Under Act April 14, Í.910, c. 160, § 4, 36 Stat. 209 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8621), providing that any carrier subject thereto, using, hauling, or permitting to be used or hauled, on its line, any ear subject thereto, and not equipped as provided thereby, shall be liable to a specified penalty, provided that where any car shall have been properly equipped, and such equipment shall have become defective or insecure while such car was being used by such carrier upon its line of railroad, it may be hauled from the place where the equipment was first discovered to be defective or insecure to the nearest available point for repairs, if such movement is necessary to make such repairs, the fact that a car being hauled for repairs is hauled in connection with cars in commercial use does not take such movement of the car out of the proviso.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 743.]</p> <p>2. Statutes <@=>228 — Construction—Provisos.</p> <p>The general rule of statutory construction is that a proviso carves special exceptions only out of a general enacting clause, and that those who set up any such exception must establish it as being within the words as well as the reason thereof.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 310.]</p> <p>3. Railroads <@=^229 — Equipment of Trains — Hauling Cass fob Repairs.</p> <p>The hauling of a car having a drawbar of less than the standard height to a point where such defective equipment may be repaired is not within the proviso of Act April 14, 1010, § 4, if the car was improperly equipped before being put in use; the proviso' only applying if the car was properly equipped in the first instance and the equipment became defective while being used.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 743.]</p> <p>4. Railroads <@^229 — Equipment of Trains — Hauling Cars for Repairs— “Such Carrier.”</p> <p>The hauling of a ear having a drawbar of less than the standard height to a point where it can be repaired is not within the proviso of Act April 14, 1910, § 4, unless the equipment became defective while being used by the carrier so hauling it, and the proviso does not apply where the carrier hauling it received the car from a connecting carrier with defective equipment, since “such carrier” is not necessarily to be referred, according to strict .grammatical construction, to the last antecedent, namely, “any common carrier subject to the act,” when the meaning of the clause would thereby be impaired, but plainly relates to the carrier hauling the defective car for repairs.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 743.]</p> <p>5. Railroads @=>229 — Connecting Carriers — Duty to Receive Oars.</p> <p>No duty rests upon a carrier to accept from a connecting line a car equipped in violation of Safety Appliance Act March 2, 1893, e. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (Comp. S£. 1916, §§ 8605>-8612), as supplemented by Act April 14, 1910.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 743.]</p> <p>6. Railroads @=>229 — Equipment of Trains — Hauling Cars foe Repairs.</p> <p>Where.a ear with defective equipment is received by a railroad from, a connecting carrier in a string or train of cars, the mere incidental handling of such car by the receiving carrier refusing to accept it, in such manner as may be necessary to disconnect it from the other cars for redelivery to the connecting carrier, and to proceed with the use of the other cars, is not a hauling of such defective car by the receiving carrier, which would subject it to the penalties of Act April .14, 1910, § 4.</p> <p>[Ed; Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 743.]</p>

<p>1. Judgment <@=>341 — Setting Aside — Authority During the Term.</p> <p>As a general rule, all judgments or other orders ■ of courts are under the control of the court which pronounces them during the term at which they are rendered or entered of record, and during that period may be set aside, vacated, modified, or annulled by that court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 667.]</p> <p>2. Judgment <@=>342(1) — Setting Aside — Authority After Term.</p> <p>It is the general rule that after the term has expired all final judgments and decrees pass beyond the control of the court, unless steps were taken during the term to set aside, modify or correct them.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 668.]</p> <p>3. Equity <@=>430(1) — Vacating Decrees — Power oe Court.</p> <p>As a general rule, the control of a court of equity over its decrees continues throughout the term at which they are entered; but after the expiration of the term no power ordinarily exists to make a substantial change, except by a bill of review.</p> <p>[Ed. Note; — For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 1034W.040, 1047.]</p> <p>4. Equity <@=>Í30(1) — Vacating Decrees — Power of Court.</p> <p>Where, in a suit to set aside two alleged fraudulent conveyances by a bankrupt, a decree was entered dismissing the bill as to the earlier conveyance on defendant’s representation that the equity in the property covered by the subsequent conveyance, at the time of the first conveyance, was sufficient to pay the then existing creditors, of the bankrupt, and thereafter defendant’s counsel moved to set aside a decree for plaintiff as to the second conveyance on the ground that title to the property was in the bankrupt and his wife as tenants by the entirety, the court had authority to set aside the decree dismissing the bill as to the first conveyance though the term at which it was entered had expired, as it was obtained by misrepresentation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 1034-1040, 1047.]</p>

Eoster, Judge. Suit in admiralty by Frank Howard against the steamship Alabama, as to which Holdt & Isaachsen were claimants, and others. Decree for respondents, and libelant appeals.

<p>1. RAILROADS ®=»351(18) — Crossing Accidents — Instructions--Effect of Open Gates.</p> <p>An instruction that, when gates at a railway crossing are up, and the operator of the gates known to be present, they constitute an implied notice that no train is approaching, and that a traveler may safely cross, and therefore all the care that he is obliged to exercise is such care as men of ordinary prudence, approaching a railroad crossing, and seeing the gates up, and seeing the gateman at his post of duty, would customarily exercise under such conditions does not relieve such traveler from all duty to exercise care in his own behalf, but leaves it to the jury to determine whether he was guilty of contributory negligence, under all the circumstances, especially where paragraphs of the charge, immediately following, required plaintiff to use his powers of looking and listening as men of ordinary prudence, exercising ordinary care, would do.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1210.]</p> <p>2. Damages <@==>19 — Personal Injuries — Mental Suffering.</p> <p>In the case of a merely negligent omission of duty, not malicious or intentional, recovery cannot ordinarily be had for mental suffering, not connected with or accompanied by personal injury, or direct interference' with plaintiff’s person.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ J 00, 255.]</p> <p>3. Damages <@=>52 — Personal Injuries — Fright.</p> <p>When defendant’s negligence causes physical injuries to plaintiff’s person, damages resulting from incidental fright may be recovered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Gent. Dig. §§ 100, 255.]</p> <p>4. Damages <@=^216(10) — Instructions—Personal Injuries — Fright.</p> <p>In an action for injury sustained in a crossing accident, the evidence showed, without dispute, that plaintiff -was either thrown from the wagon in which he was riding by a collision, or jumped therefrom immediately before the collision, that he either alighted on Ms hands and knees, or on his feet and went down on his knees, that one of his hands was more or less bruised and cut, and that immediately following the fall, or after he had gone a short distance and lain down, he was assisted, weeping, into a factory near the crossing. Except for testimony that ho said, after the accident, he was not hurt, it was also undisputed that for a time, at least, one of his knees was lame, and he was unable to do his usual, work. Held, that the refusal of an instruction that plaintiff was not entitled to damages for mere fright, and that for him to recover he must show some real and actual injury, aside from fright alone, was not error, as the jury would not have been justified in finding that plaintiff suffered no physical injury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 555.]</p> <p>5. Damages <@=>52r — Personal Injuries — Fright.</p> <p>Though plaintiff jumped from the wagon in which he was riding when a collision with a railway train was immediately impending, and his sole physical injury resulting from an attempt to escape from actual danger, damages wore recoverable for impairment of his health, occasioned by the consequent fright.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 100, 255.]</p> <p>6. Damages <®=»52 — Personal Injuries — Fright.</p> <p>The rule permitting recovery for fright does not require that the direct physical injury be permanent or severe.</p> <p>[-Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 100, 255.]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <§=>302(1) — Preferences—Suits by Trustee — Pleading.</p> <p>In a suit to set aside a deocl by a bankrupt as preferential, the omission from the petition of any statement that the recipients were chargeable with notice that a preference would result is fatal.</p> <p>LEd. Note.. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 4.G&.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy @=175 — Fraudulent Conveyances — Preferences.</p> <p>A transfer by a bankrupt merely because it is preferential under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 562 (Comp. St. 1916, § 9644), is not also fraudulent under section. 67e, providing that all conveyances, etc., by a bankrupt within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, shall be null and void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 247, 248.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy @=178(2) — Fraudulent Conveyance by Bankrupt — Payment op Debt.</p> <p>Where the existence and good faith of a debt against a bankrupt in favor of his mother and sister were not questioned, and property conveyed to them and credited on the indebtedness was fairly worth the amount at which it was taken over, and the grantees’ only offense was that they accepted partial payment of an honest debt when offered; the conveyance was not fraudulent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 267, 269, 270.]</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy @=166(1) — Preferential Transfers — Knowledge of GranTEE.</p> <p>Á bankrupt’s mother and sister, to whom he conveyed land to be applied on a debt, lived apart from him and had no knowledge of other transfers of practically all of his property, nor any reason to think him insolvent. Interest on the debt had been regularly paid, and he told them he would rather give them some property and get rid of his interest burden. They desired to own some land, looked into the value of that conveyed and agreed on a price which was its fair value. Held, that the facts did not show knowledge on their part that they would be paid while other creditors would not be.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 250, 251.]</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy @=181 — Fraudulent Transfers — Payment of Debt Barred by Limitations.</p> <p>There was nothing inherently fraudulent in a bankrupt recognizing and paying a debt honestly due his wife, though barred by limitations.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 259, 260, 27Í, 273, 274.]</p> <p>6. Bankruptcy @=175 — Fraudulent Conveyances — Preferences.</p> <p>■ Though there is nothing fraudulent merely in the giving of a preference which remains Subject to attack under the Bankruptcy Act, yet when the preferential transaction is so manipulated, or carried along into later steps so as to attempt to defeat the recovery of the preference by the trustee, the parties come within the condemnation of Bankr. Act, § 67e (Comp. St. 1916, § 9651), as to fraudulent conveyances.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 247, 248.]</p> <p>7. Bankruptcy @=166(1) — Preferential Transfers — Knowledge of GranTEE*</p> <p>Where a bankrupt’s wife, receiving a preferential payment from him, knew of and participated in a series of nearly simultaneous transactions, by which he was divesting himself of practically all of his property for the payment of a part of his debts, and she knew that he was leaving a large part unpaid and unsecured, the preferential payment was voidable as against her and the money recoverable from her, if it remained in her hands.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 250, 251.]</p> <p>8. Bankruptcy @=186(1), 303(1) — Preferential Transfers — Recovery of Property — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Property transferred by a preferential conveyance by a bankrupt may be recovered from, any one not a purchaser in good faith and for value, and the burden rests upon the person claiming to be such purchaser to show that he paid value.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — 'For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 319, 458, 459.]</p> <p>9. Bankruptcy <@=303(3) — Preferential Transfers — Recovery oe Property — Evidence.</p> <p>A bankrupt’s wife, upon receiving from, the bankrupt a preferential payment of $3,000, loaned $2,000 to her son on his note, and almost immediately took from S. a deed to 40 acres of timber Land, giving S. therefor the remaining $1,000 of money, the son’s note for $2,000, and a mortgage on the land for $1,000. There was no evidence as to the value of the land, and none of the parties had ever seen it, or seemed to have any definite information about it. Held, that S. did not sustain the burden of showing the payment of value; there being no sufficient reason to ihink that the land was worth anything more than the amount of the mortgage.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Gent. Dig. § 402.']</p> <p>10. Appeal and Error <®=>1047(1) — Harmless Error — Basing Decree on Evidence in Another Case.</p> <p>A trustee in bankruptcy brought a suit against the bankrupt’s mother and sister to recover land conveyed to them by the bankrupt, and another suit against S. to recover a preferential payment to the bankrupt’s wife, paid by her to S. in exchange for land, and the two cases were tried together. Held that, where it appeared that S. was not a purchaser in good faith, she was not prejudiced because the decree against her was based in part on testimony offered and received in the other suit on the question of whether the transfer to the wife was preferential and fraudulent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. §§ 4146, 4150-4152.]</p>

Action by Mary Kaleialii and' others against Henrietta Sullivan and ■others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. This is an action brought to quiet title to certain real estate in Hawaii, all the parties claiming title from a common source, a deed, from Alexander Adams, Jr., dated September 15, 1858, and running to the daughters of the grantor, Peke and Maria.

Original proceeding by Edward E. Brown and others for disapproval of an order appointing a receiver, which proceeding was ordered filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals by the Circuit Judge to wliich the application was presented. On motions to dismiss petition.

<p>1. Damages &wkey;>68 — Action on Contract — Construction of Statute.</p> <p>How. Ann. St. Mich. 1912, § 2874, which provides that “in all actions founded on contracts express or implied, whenever in the execution thereof any amount in money shall be liquidated or ascertained in favor of either party, by verdict, report of referees, award of arbitrators, or by any other mode of assessment according to law, it shall he lawful * * * to allow and receive interest upon such amount * * * until payment thereof, or until judgment shall be thereupon rendered, and * * * the interest on such amount shall be added thereto and included in tlie judgment,” does not authorize the jury, in an action to recover an unliquidated amount claimed to be due on contract, to1 add interest to the sum they find to have been due, and include the same in their verdict, but applies only to a case whore the amount due has been definitely liquidated, and authorizes the allowance of interest from that time until it is carried into judgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note1. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 141-143.]</p> <p>2. Damages <&wkey;68 — Breach of Contract — Interest.</p> <p>Under the law of Michigan, as settled by decision in harmony with the general American rule, in the absence of statute, where a sum certain is found to be clue on a contract, interest in the nature of damages is recoverable from tlie the time when the money should have been paid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 141-143.]</p> <p>3. Damages &wkey;>08 — Breach of Contract — Interest.</p> <p>1’laintifE contracted to sell lumber to defendant, to be paid for on. delivery at certain prices according to grade; the quantity and grade to be determined by a firm of inspectors named. One delivery defendant refused to pay for at the contract price, on the ground that such a gross mistake was made in the inspection as to effect a fraud. On this issue the jury found in favor of plaintiff, and under the instructions of the court returned a verdict for the contract price, with interest. Held that, under such finding, the action of the inspectors was binding on the parties. and that interest was properly allowed on the full contract price.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 141-143.J</p>

Suit by the Crescent Manufacturing Company against Charles S. Wilson, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of New York. From an order (233 Fed. 282) denying an interlocutory injunction,, complainant appeals. The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Washington.

Warren Davis, Judges. Involuntary bankruptcy proceeding by C. B. Smith & Co. and others against Albert C. Wester. On petition to revise orders refusing a jury trial and striking out the bankrupt’s answer.

<p>1. RailRoads <&wkey;328(4) — Crossing Accidents — Duty to Look and Listen— Obstructed Crossings.</p> <p>When an automobile reached a point 40 feet from a railroad crossing, buildings and standing cars had so far ceased to obstruct the driver's view that he could see 120 feet along the track upon which a car was approaching. It was broad daylight, there was neither smoke nor dust, and there was no other moving train, nor anything to distract the driver’s attention. He was familiar with the crossing, and knew that by reason of the obstructions it was dangerous, and must be approached cautiously. Held, that it was his clear duty to look as soon as he could see, and to have his machine under such control that, if necessary, he could stop before getting into the danger zone, and in driving upon the track in front of an approaching car, which could have been seen, he failed 'to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1061.]</p> <p>2. Railroads <®=>339(2) — Crossing Accidents — Wanton or Willful Negligence.</p> <p>Gross and wanton negligence of a railway company, to avoid the contributory negligence of a person struck by a railway motor car, must be really willful or so highly reckless as to constitute the equivalent of willfulness.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads. Cent. Dig. § 1085.]</p> <p>3. Railboads <&wkey;839(2) — Crossing Accidents — Wanton or Willful Negligence.</p> <p>Though it is the rule in Tennessee that the violation of a city ordinance, by a railway company contributing to a collision, is negligence per se, and riot merely evidence of negligence, the simultaneous violation oí three ordinances does not, regardless of the character of the ordinances or the nature of the violations, indicate a degree of indifference or recklessness having the same effect to avoid contributory negligence as deliberate willfulness.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1085.]</p> <p>4. Railroads <&wkey;339(2) — Crossing Accidents — Wanton or Willful Negligence.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s automobile was struck by a railway motor ear traveling 12 miles an hour, in violation of an ordinance limiting the speed of railway cars or trains to 0 miles an hour, at a crossing where there were neither gates nor a flagman, as required by am ordinance at all crossings within the city limits. In violation of another ordinance a car was standing within 150 feet of the crossing. There had been no municipal determination that the particular crossing needed gate's or a flagman, and the conditions at the crossing did not indicate an imperative necessity therefor, nor did any former accidents or complaints appear. The standing car had no causal connection with the injury, as it did not obstruct the. view after a building was passed. The speed of the car was less than that permitted by ordinances in the case of street cars. Held, that the concurrent violation of the three ordinances did not amount to wantonness, avoiding the effect of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, especially where it appeared that the motorman was vigilant, was using his whistle and Ms bell seasonably, and that he saw the automobile and put on his brakes at the earliest possible instant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1085.]</p>

Foster, Judge. Suit in admiralty by the Bisso Towboat Company and others against the steamship George Hawley, of which the Boston-Virginia Transportation Company was claimant, and others. Decree for libelant, from which the Towboat Company appeals.

<p>1. Bankruptcy &wkey;?304 — Preferences—Actions—Questions op Fact.</p> <p>In a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside an alleged preferential transfer by the bankrupt to his mother-in-law, evidence held to make a question of fact as to whether the grantee had reasonable ground to believe that the transfer to her would effect a preference, and was intended to effect a preference, and to support the trial court’s finding upholding the transfer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 463.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;303(l) — Preferences—Actions—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside an alleged preferential transfer, the burden of proof is on the trustee to prove that the transferee had reasonable ground to believe that the transfer would, and was intended to, effect a preference.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 458, 459.]</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <&wkey;123 — Election of Trustee — Right to Vote — Proxies.</p> <p>Where the District Court specifically found that proxies solicited by P. were solicited by B., a creditor, thereby necessarily finding that P. was B.’s agent, and not the agent of the bankrupt, and there was no finding that they "were procured in the interest of the bankrupt, or that the holders of the proxies were in any way subject to the bankrupt's control or direction, the proxies were properly voted, though the referee had disapproved B.’s election as trustee on the ground that there was some sort of an arrangement between him and the bankrupt.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 303, 308, 311.1</p>

<p>1. Shipping <&wkey;86(2) — Injuries in Loading — Parties Liable — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action by an employe of a derrick and wrecking company, which was hoisting lumber by means of a steam derrick from a pier to a lighter, for injuries sustained when the lighter capsized, a letter written by one of the defendants to the lumber company, confirming an understanding as to doing the stevedoring of the lumber company’s ships, was improperly admitted to show that such defendant was engaged in the loading of the lumber, where it appeared that on the occasion of the injury the lumber company was doing its own stevedoring by means of plaintiff’s employer, as 'the letter was only a general offer to do steve-doring.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 356, 357.]</p> <p>2. Evidence <&wkey;215(3) — Admissibility—Letters.</p> <p>A letter from such defendant to the lumber company, requesting an opportunity to do all of the lumber company’s stevedoring, and lighter-age, was properly admitted for the sole purpose of showing that such defendant was engaged in both stevedoring and lightering.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 756, 757.]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1056(2) — Principal and Agent <&wkey;159(2) — Liability op Agent — Harmless Error.</p> <p>Where the vice president of a company operating a lighter upon which lumber was being loaded, over the protest of the master of the lighter, who objected that it would be unsafe to'take any more lumber, ordered him to take it, and the lighter was capsized by a large package of lumber hoisted aboard, such company was liable for an injury to an employé of another company, even though the lighter belonged to a third party, and it was operating it as agent for her, and the exclusion of evidence to show that it was only an agent was not prejudicial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4188; Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 606-612.]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error <&wkey;>1173(l) — Reversal as to One or More Coparties.</p> <p>Where defendants were charged severally, judgment may be affirmed as to those properly held liable, and reversed as to any not properly held.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4562-4567, 4569, 4656.]</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;165(4) — Preferences—Exchange of Securities.</p> <p>. A bankrupt conveyed land to L., bis brotber-in-law, as security for a debt, by a deed wbicb was not recorded. Within four months before bankruptcy be conveyed the land to a third party in exchange for other land, wbicb he thereupon conveyed to L. upon surrender of the unrecorded deed and the notes representing the indebtedness. Held, that there was no preference, but merely an exchange of valid securities.</p> <p>' [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 268.]</p> <p>2. Evidence <&wkey;178(4, 8) — Secondary* Evidence — Destruction or Loss oi Writing.</p> <p>Parol testimony as to the contents of a deed and notes was properly admitted, where there was testimony that the deed and notes had been destroyed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 584, 589.]</p> <p>3. Courts <&wkey;37fi — Federal Courts — State Laws — Rules of Evidence.</p> <p>Tax Law (Consol. Laws N. a. c. 60) § 258, providing that no mortgage of real property subject to the taxes imposed by that law shall be received in evidence in any action or proceeding, applies only to actions in the New York courts, and not to actions in the federal courts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other casos, see Courts, Cent. Wig. § 984.]</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy <&wkey;161(l) — Preferences—Failure to Record Transfer.</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 60a, 30 Slat. 562 (Comp. St. 1916, § 9644), providing that certain transfers within four months before the filing of the petition shall constitute preferences, and that, where the preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months shall not expire until four months after the recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or registering is required, and Real Property Law (Consol. Laws, N. Y. c. 50) § 291, making unrecorded deeds 'void as against subsequent purchasers in good faith and for value, whose conveyance is first recorded, an unrecorded deed, executed as security for a debt more than four months before bankruptcy, was not a voidable preference; the trustee in bankruptcy not being a subsequent purchaser in good faith, for value, and not representing any such person.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 261, 262, 287.]</p>

Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. In the matter of Solomon Sobol, bankrupt. On petition of John b. Dyttle, as trustee, to revise an order denying an application to punish the bankrupt for contempt.

Hollister, Judge. Suit in equity by the American Piano Company against the Knabe Bros. Company. From a decree entered on mandate, N. H. Fairbanks, receiver of the Knabe Bros. Company, appeals.

<p>In Error to the'District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; J. Whitaker Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Philadelphia, Harrisburg & Pittsburgh Railroad Company, to the use, etc. against Ephraim Eederer, Collector of Internal Revenue. Judgment for defendant (239 Fed. 184), and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Rose, Judge. Libel in admiralty by. Naylor & Co. and others against the Arundel Sand & Gravel Company and another. From a decree against the defendant named, it appeals.

<p>1. Courts &wkey;>96(l) — Rules of Decision — Precedents.</p> <p>The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals as to the country to. which a Chinese person unlawfully within the United States should be deported is the law of the circuit until overruled by the Supreme Court, or until the law is amended by Congress.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 325, 327, 334.]</p> <p>2. Aliens <&wkey;,32(10) — Deportation—Country to Which Aliens Should be Deported.</p> <p>There is no conclusive presumption that one of the Mongolian race was bom in China, and where all that is known regarding him is that he was seen last in. Canada, he must be deported to Canada or discharged.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 92.]</p>

Suit by the Safe-Cabinet Company against the Globe-Wernicke Company. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. The Safe-Cabinet Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Ohio and has its principal place of business in the dty of Marietta in that state. Tho Globo-Wernicke Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Ohio and has its principal place of business in the city of Cincinnati.

Suit by the Barrett Company and another against Thomas Ewing, as Commissioner of Patents. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal. The plaintiff is a corporation organized and' existing under the laws of the state of West Virginia and having its principal place of business in the borough of Manhattan, in the city of New York. August E. Schutte is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the city of Boston in the state of Massachusetts.

Suit in equity by the Miller Rubber Company against Albert Behr-end and Joseph Rothschild, doing business as Behrend & Rothschild. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. The plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Ohio. The defendants are citizens of the state of New York and reside in the city of New York.

In Equity. Bill by George Schrade against the Camillus Cutlery Company and others. On motion to dismiss certain causes of action. This is a motion by defendants to dismiss the second and third alleged causes of action, set forth in the bill of complaint, on the ground that, as complainant and defendants are and are alleged to be citizens of the state of New York and such causes of action are for mere breaches of contract, this court has no jurisdiction thereof.

<p>1. Admikat.ty <@=>47 — Process—Foreign Attachment.</p> <p>Admiralty rule 2 (29 Sup. Ct. xxxix) provides that in a suit in personam the mesne process may be by a sample warrant oí arrest in the nature of a capias, or by warrant of arrest with a clause directing, should the defendant not be found, the attachment of his goods and chattels to the amount sued for. Rule 47 (29 Sup. Ct. xliv) abolishes imprisonment for debt on process issued out of admiralty courts, where by the laws of the state imprisonment for debt is abolished. Held, that the writ of attachment was a well-recognized process long before the roles were adopted, and the authority for its issuance does not depend upon the rules, and rule 2 does not abolish such writ in those cases where, by reason of the abolishment of imprisonment for debt, there can lie no warrant of arrest.</p> <p>(Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 396-403.]</p> <p>2. AdmtRAXtt <@=>47 — Process—Foreign Attachment.</p> <p>A District Court, having admiralty jurisdiction conferred ujion it, has power to issue a writ of attachment in a suit in personam, though it has adopted no rule as to such writ.</p> <p>lEd. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 396-403.]</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company against the Washington & Choctaw Railway Company. On demurrers to complaint.</p>

<p>The Hillsdale Distillery Company was indicted for an offense. On demurrer to the indictment.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Postal Telegraph Cable Company against the City Council of Augusta. Decree for plaintiff.</p>

<p>Removal or Causes <S=»31 — Bight to Remove — Necessary Parties.</p> <p>A county in Georgia issued a series of warrants, and was subsequently induced to issue another series for the same consideration. The holder of the second series brought suit against the holders of the first warrants, and also against the county for equitable relief. Held that, if the whole matter was to be adjusted in one proceeding, as it should he, the county was both a proper and a necessary party, since it was entitled to be heard as to the legality of the second series of warrants, and also as to the propriety of a part payment which had been made on the first series, and hence the cause was not removable from a Georgia state court to the federal court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other1 cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. § 71.]</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the Matter of Knapp Bros., a copartnership, and Charles J. Knapp and others, individuals, bankrupts. On application by Ella J. and Nellie E. Wheaton for an order directing the trustee to assign a certain judgment to the petitioners.

At Law. Two actions — one by J. Herbert Knapp and another, partners doing business as Knapp & Black, against the Bullock Tractor Company, and the other by L- F. Vance against the Chicago Portrait Company and others. On motions to1 quash the service of summons. These two cases, though entirely unrelated in other respects, present the same general question of law, and for that reason, and for purposes of brevity, have been considered and will be decided, together.

<p>1. Navigable Watees <®=»39(4) — Sights of Riparian Owners — Improvement of Channels.</p> <p>Whatever may be the rights of riparian proprietors in the land underlying a navigable stream below mean high-water line, they are held in subordination to the public right of navigation and the coincident right to employ all appropriate means to improve the channel for such purpose. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. § 21.1</p> <p>2. Navigable Waters <S=^>37(7) — Rands under Water — Conste,uotion of Grant.</p> <p>Where the state granted a tract of marsh or tide land, which was intersected by many tidal sloughs or creeks, some of considerable magnitude and others dwindling to mere ditches or rivulets, and neither the channel of one of such streams nor the land underlying it was excepted from the grant, the grantee had a valid legal title to the land through which the stream ran, including the soil underlying the channel, even though the stream was navigable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. §§ 212-215.]</p> <p>3. Navigable Watees <S=s>30(4) — Rights of Riparian Owners — Improvement of Channels.</p> <p>Even for the purpose of improving a stream for purposes of navigation, then; is no right to take and carry away the soil underlying the stream and belonging to the riparian proprietor without compensation, and to sell it to another for the betterment of his land.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. § 21.]</p> <p>4. Evidence <S=10(5) — Navigable Waters <§=1(7) — Evidence of Navigability — Judicial Notice.</p> <p>While courts take judicial cognizance oí the navigable character of large and well-known bodies of water, as to those of a more insignificant character, the history and nature of which are less known, the fact of navigability must be established by evidence, and the burden of proof rests on the party asserting that character.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 13; Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-15.]</p> <p>5. Navigable Waters <S=»1(3) — Test of Navigability.</p> <p>The mere depth of water does not place a stream in the category of a navigable waterway, other essentials being absent; nor will the want of depth or capacity in part of its course take a stream out of that category, if the other characteristics are present.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. § 7d</p> <p>6. Navigable Waters <@=>1(4) — Test of Navigability.</p> <p>That a stream is one in which the tide ebbs and flows does not necessarily tend to demonstrate its navigable character.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. § 8.]</p> <p>7. Navigable Waters <@=»1(1) — What Constitutes — Navigable Stream.</p> <p>A tract of marsh or tide land, largely submerged at flood tide, was intersected by many tidal sloughs or creeks, one of which was, in its lower reaches, as wide as 100 feet or over, with a depth of from 2 feet or less at low tide in its shallowest parts to approximately 7 or 8 feet at its flood, and deepening somewhat towards its mouth. A grant of such lauds did not except such stream, and it had never been meandered by the state, or designated as a navigable stream by statute. It had never been used or regarded as navigable, other than, for duck boats or punts for hunting and fishing, until within a few years, when an oil company established a plant on adjoining land, and on a few occasions took small amounts of material to its plant on the flood tide by power boats ana scows of light draft. It ran wholly through unimproved private property, and was not accessible or available to the public, or to any private industry other than the oil company’s plant, and, though within the corporate limits of a city, it was at least a quarter of a mile from the nearest established street. Sold, that it was not a navigable stream, which could be improved for purposes of navigation against the wishes of the riparian proprietor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. §§ 5, 11, 16.]</p>

In Equity. Suit by Mrs. M. S- Jennings and others against Zadoc Smith and others. On application by plaintiff for leave to amend, and application by plaintiffs and defendant Eonnie Bullard to strike him as a defendant.

<p>In Admiralty. L,ibel in personam by William A. Higgins & Co. against the Anglo-Algerian Steamship Company.</p> <p>This is a libel in personam, by the assignee of a bill of lading for damage done to part of a cargo of dates shipped on board the steamship Armiston from Bussorah, Persia, for New York during the first days of November, 1911. The steamer lay in the Bussorah Roads, and the dates were brought alongside in lighters, wrapped in oil paper and packed in wooden cases made of three-eighths inch boards. While the loading was going on, heavy tropical rains fell on Bussorah for several nights, drenching the lighters and wetting some of the dates so much that the master refused to take them and sent the lighters back. Some 25;000 cases, nevertheless, were shipped, among which were the 3,000 afterwards sold to the libelant. When they came over' the side, the mate gave receipts, and in every case noted upon the receipt that the cases were stained by their own contents, or were discolored, or the equivalent. Whether the cases were actually wet by the rain on the lighters does not appear from the testimony of the ship’s crew.</p> <p>When the loading was complete, the ship’s agent, at the request of the shippers, gave them a “clean” bill of lading, which read, “Apparently in good order and condition.” In the fine printed portion of the bill of lading, however, there appeared this clause: “Mate’s receipts to be conclusive evidence of the quantity of and condition in which goods are received by this company from river steamers and craft.” In order to procure this “clean” bill, the shippers gave to the ship’s agents at Bussorah a contract of indemnity holding them harmless for all consequences arising therefrom.</p> <p>When the dates arrived in New York, they were placed upon the pier, and it was there found that out of 3,000 cases about 2,000 had been damaged. Of those 2,000 the casings of 440 were stripped, and it was finally ascertained that, some water damage had happened to about 500 in all; but whether the damage was from salt or fresh water is in dispute. More than 1,000 of tins cases were removed by the libelant without notice of damage, the bill of lading containing a provision that such removal should be a waiver of all claims.</p> <p>The master, carpenter, and the mate of the Anniston were examined, and testified without contradiction that the hatches were closed during the heavy rains at Bussorah, and that they had examined the holds and found them dean and dry before the loading began. At Muscat more cargo was taken in line weather, and the ship had no trouble till she passed Gibraltar. In the Atlantic she experienced unusually heavy weather even for December, and for some days labored heavily and took on board large sea; hut no hatches were broken open, and there was no evidence of damage to the cargo The weather was very cold, and when the hatches were opened in New York it transpired that the holds had sweat, but the sweat did not appear to be enough to cause the damage to the dates, although some cargo was damaged in each of the holds except No. 3.</p>

<p>1. Admiralty &wkey;>28 — Proceedings in Rem — Effect of State Daws.</p> <p>Whether a proceeding in rem can be maintained against a vessel for tort causing death depends upon the construction of the state laws.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 278-288.]</p> <p>2. Admiralty <&wkey;48 — Decree in Rem — Process to Support.</p> <p>A decree in rem cannot be rendered against a vessel by an admiralty court, where no attachment was ever served.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 404-413.]</p> <p>3. Admiralty <&wkey;46 — Decree in Personam — Process to Support.</p> <p>The ordinary monition issued in suits in rem in admiralty does not comply with the requirements of the monition in personam, and under service thereof jurisdiction to render a decree in personam cannot be maintained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. 393-395.]</p> <p>,4. Admiralty <&wkey;44 — Process—Effect of Appearance.</p> <p>Where, in a suit in admiralty, defendant filed exceptions challenging the sufficiency of the libel and an answer putting in issue its allegations of fact, it made itself a party to the proceeding in such manner that the court had jurisdiction to proceed to an adjudication of the rights of the parties in personam, though there was not a sufficient service of process to support a decree in personam.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 376-384.]</p> <p>5. Constitutional Law <@=>245 — Master and Servant <&wkey;>ll — Validity of Statutes.</p> <p>Laws Fla. 1913, c. 6521, regulating the liability of employers for injuries to employés, does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. 14, because it includes, in the persons, firms, and corporations subject thereto as engaged in hazardous occupations, persons and corporations engaged in boating, when the boat is propelled by steam, gas, or electricity, thereby excluding' sailing vessels.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 702.]</p> <p>6. Shipping <&wkey;84(5) — Injuries to Stevedores — Assumption of Risk — Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>A stevedore, engaged ini loading or unloading a steam vessel, is within the protection of Laws Fla. 1913, c. 6521, section 4 of which abolishes the doctrine of assumed risk in all cases arising thereunder.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 342.]</p> <p>7. Shipping <&wkey;84(5) — Injuries to Stevedores — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>An experienced stevedore, engaged in such -business for many years, was guilty of negligence contributing to his injury, caused by the negligent handling of a hatch cover, where it appeared that it was dangerous to be under the hatch when the ship was being loaded and when covers were being placed upon the hatch, and that stevedores were cautioned about this and warned not to stand under the hatches at such time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 3421]</p> <p>8. ShtppiNG &wkey;>84(5)- — Injuries to Stevedores — Contributory Neguigence.</p> <p>Under Laws Fla. 1913, c. 6521, § 3, abolishing! the defense of contributory negligence as a bar to an employé’s suit for injuries, except where the injured party and the person whose negligent act caused the injury are fellow servants engaged in the performance of the act causing tnc injury, and 1he employer is guilty of no negligence contributing to the injury, contributory negligence of a stevedore, engaged in loading a vessel, but having nothing to do with the work of putting a cover on a hatch, did not bar recovery for injuries caused by the negligence of the stevedores engaged in placing such cover.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 342.]</p> <p>9. Death &wkey;>95(1) — -Damages for. Death — Amount.</p> <p>Four thousand dollars would be a proper award for the death of a stevedore having a life expectancy of 27 years, and having a wife 0 years younger than himself and three children, where it was not shown . how much he expended on his family in their care and maintenance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 108, 113-115, 120.)</p>

<p>1. BANKRUPTCY <&wkey;488 — COMPOSITION-RIGHTS AS TO PROPERTY UNDISPOSED OP.</p> <p>Certain persons claiming to be creditors of a bankrupt firm, were claimed by the other creditors to be partners of the bankrupts. ■!., acting as (heir represente! h e, or as the representative of the bankrupts, bought up the other claims and the proceedings were terminated by an agreement between all of the parties interested, under whifch the estate in the hands of the trustee was turned over to 3. in full settlement of all of his claims, but the individual property of N., one of the bankrupts, was released and given back to him. The bankrupts, Individually and as partners, were discharged. Certain certificates of stock and certificates of indebtedness, which had been in the hands of the trustee, but not scheduled, and apparently considered worthless, were returned to N., and subsequently proved to be valuable, field, that 3. had no claim, thereto after the expiration of the time for sotting aside a composition or a discharge; Hie situation being exactly as though a composition had been offered and approved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 026.]</p> <p>2. BANKRUPTCY &wkey;417(4), 4&1-- -Composition — Discharge--Setting Aside— Limitations.</p> <p>While N., by applying to the bankruptcy court for an order reopening the proceedings to the extent of taking over the shares of stock and offering them for sale, in order to make his title thereto good, waived the effect of the statute of limitations, so far as it was something to be taken advantage of by himself, he did not'waive the statute as to his discharge, nor as to the possibility of indictment for making false statements in the schedules.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 871.]</p> <p>S. Bankruptcy <&wkey;i>72 — Reopening Proceedings — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>It was within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to grant N.’s application for leave to turn the property over to the estate and to soli it, in order to remove any question as to title from the failure of such property to pass through the hands of the bankruptcy court;.</p> <p>[.Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 574.]</p>

In Admiralty. Suits by the New York Disposal Corporation against the barge Benefactor, on libel and petition of Smith & Terry, Incorporated, and by Smith & Terry, Incorporated, against Joseph F. Clinton. Decrees for libelant, Smith & Terry, Incorporated, in both suits.

<p>At Law. Action by the Savannah River Sales Company against James B. McFarland, Jr., trading as the McFarland Lumber Company. On motion by defendant for a new trial.</p>

<p>1. SHIPPING <§=^84(2)-LIABILITY OB' VESSEL-INJURY TO STEVEDORE.</p> <p>The duty of a ship to a stevedore is to exorcise reasonable care In providing him with a safe place to work, and in keeping the premises where he has a right to ho secure against danger to life and limb. While the deck of a ship is not a highway, it must be made reasonably safe for workmen who are invited to render service to the ship, and who are in the exercise of ordinary prudence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, seo Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 851.]</p> <p>2. Shipping <§=>84(3, 5) — Injury to Stevedore — Liability of Vessel — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Libelant, with others, was employed as a stevedore by an independent contractor in discharging a coal barge. On coming from the hold at night, he went across the deck for his coat, passing over one side of No. 2 hai:ch. He recovered his coat, and in starting for the dock side of the barge stepped upon the other side of the same hatch cover, and fell through into the hold, and, was injured. It was the custom of the crew, as soon as a hatch was discharged, to replace and secure the covers. This custom libelant knew, and also that No. 2 hatch had been discharged ; hut he did not look to see whether the covers had been secured. They had been put in place and secured on one side, but not on the other. Held, that the vessel was negligent in leaving them in such condition, without marking them by a light, or otherwise to give warning of the danger, but that libelant was also chargeable with contributory negligence in not looking, where he knew there was likely to be danger.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 342, 350.]</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In tlie matter of William P. Zartinan, bankrupt. On review of the referee’s order awarding funds to the trustee.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the American Beaver Company. Petition to'review referee’s order refusing to approve sale of real estate and personal property by trustee in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Peter Thompson, bankrupt. On review of an order of the referee.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy @=>289 — Suits by Receiver in Bankruptcy — Intervention.</p> <p>Where a receiver in bankruptcy appointed in New Jersey, claiming that the bankrupt estate owned 80 per cent, oí the capital stock of a Washington corporation, brought suit in a District Court of Washington to wind up the affairs of such corporation, persons claiming that they were fraudulently deprived of stock iri such corporation hold by the receiver could not intervene and have their right to such stock adjudicated, as the stock was in the possession of the bankruptcy court, through its receiver, and any issue concerning it must be determined in that court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 448.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy @=>293(3) — Jurisdiction op Courts op Bankruptcy — -Ancillary Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The filing of a petition in bankruptcy and an adjudication brings the property of the bankrupt, wherever situated, into the custody of the bankruptcy court, and a court in which ancillary proceedings are pending has nothing to do but collect the assets and transmit them to the bankruptcy court for distribution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 411 J.</p> <p>3. Corporations @=>129 — Transfer oir Stock- — Necessity of Registration.</p> <p>The transfer of stock by a shareholder passes title, though not registered on the books of the corporation.</p> <p>¡Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 479, 480, 482, 492.]</p> <p>4. Corporations @=>65 — Shares of Stock — Nature of Property.</p> <p>The property of shareholders in their shares and the property of the corporation in its capital stock are distinct property interests.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 165-173.]</p>

<p>1. Removal oe Causes <@=>12 — Restrictions as to District in Which Suit Might be Brought.</p> <p>An action in which, the jurisdiction of the federal court, if any, depends upon the fact that it arises under a law of the United States, could not be brought in a district other tlian that of which defendant was an inhabitant, and therefore cannot be removed by defendart against plaintiff’s objections to the District Court of a district other than that of which defendant is an inhabitant.</p> <p>[lid. Note. — For other cases, see Removal of Causes:, Cent. Dig. §§ 32, 33.j</p> <p>2. Removal oe Causes <@=>102 — Remand—Doubt as to Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where it is doubtful whether a. cause arises out of a law of the United States, so as to give jurisdiction to a federal court under Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231) § 24, subd. 8, 36 Stat. 1092 (Comp. St. 1916, § 99irSJ), the case will be remanded to the state court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. §§ 218-220, 224.]</p>

E. Wolverton, Judge. Action by the United States against Williard N. Jones. Judgment for defendant on the pleadings ([D. C.] 232 Fed. 218), and the government brings error. The United States brought action against the defendant, Jones, for damages for alleged fraud and deceit committed by Jones in securing the issuance of patents to certain lands within the Siletz reservation in Oregon.

<p>1. Street Railroads <@=>88 — Collision Between Cars or. Trains — Railroad Crossings.</p> <p>Where, from the first operation of the trains of a steam railroad across the tracks of a street car company, such trains had the right of way, and had been accustomed to proceed without stopping or slackening their speed, while it had been the uniform custom for the street cars to come to a full stop, and for the conductor to go forward to ascertain whether a train was approaching, and then signal the motorman, and the street car company had instructed its conductors to pursue this course, it was the duty of a conductor, before signaling the motorman, to go upon the track and look for trains, and it was also his duty to see an approaching train, unless it was so obscured by smoke and dust that he could not see it, in which event it was his duty to delay signaling the motorman for a reasonable length of time to allow the smoke and dust to clear away.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.. — For other cases, "see Street Railroads, Gent. Dig. §§ 188y 189.]</p> <p>2. Trial <@=>295(7) — Construction oe Charge as Whole — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>In an action by a steam railroad against a street car company for damages in a collision, an instruction that, if there was no smoke or dust to obscure the street car conductor’s vision, he was chargeable with seeing wiiat was to have been seen in the exercise of reasonable care, and that if a train was approaching, and he signaled the street car to come forward, and the collision occurred, defendant was negligent, and liable to plaintiff, was not erroneous, as permitting a finding for plaintiff, without consideration of plainUff’s claimed acts of contributory negligence, where the court further charged that, even if defendant committed an act which proximately caused the collision, there could he no recovery, if plaintiff was also guilty of negligence proximately contributing thereto, that if plaintiff was guilty of negligence in the operation of its train, no matter how slight, that contributed to the accident, there could be no recovery, although defendant’s employes were negligent, and that it was plaintiff’s duty in tide exercise of reasonable care to rirg the bell or blow the whistle, keep an outlook on the engine for obstructions on the track, and, if an obstruction appeared, to apply the brakes and do all that could be done to stop the train, and to do such other things to avoid the collision as a reasonably prudent person would have done under like conditions and circumstances, since the charge is not to be considered with reference to isolated portions, but as an entirety.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 709.]</p> <p>3. Street Railroads <@=98(11) — Collisions Between Cabs ob Trains — CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.</p> <p>Where, from the first operation of the trains of a steam railroad across street car tracks, it had the right of way, and had been accustomed to proceed without stopping or slackening the speed of its trains, while it had been the custom for the street cars to come to a stop-, and for the conductor to go forward and look for trains, the street railroad, by consenting that the railroad trains might operate over the crossings without reducing their speed, thereby impliedly agreed that such operation should be attended with no danger to itself, and, in an action by the steam railroad for damages sustained in a collision, could not rely on the rate of speed of the railway train as contributory negligence.</p> <p>4. Tbial <Sfc=>250 — Instructions—Applicability to Case.</p> <p>Where instructions were inapplicable to the situation disclosed by the record, error might not be predicated on their refusal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 584-586.]</p> <p>5. Appeal and Error <@=978(3) — Review—Discretion—Denial of New Trial.</p> <p>’ If a plain prejudicial error is committed in the denial of a new trial on account of a juror’s disqualification, such error may be considered on appeal, notwithstanding the established rule that the granting or refusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and cannot be reviewed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3895.]</p> <p>6. New Trial <@=56 — Disqualification of Jurors — Prejudice.</p> <p>In an action by. a railway company, the jurors on their examination were asked collectively whether they were directly or indirectly interested with plaintiff, or had any contracts with it that would cause them to incline favorably toward it, and all remained silent, indicating that they answered in the negative. One juror in fact owned one share of stock in the railway company, but such ownership had passed from his mind, tie was the foreman of the jury and the last to vote, and made no attempt to influence his fellow jurors, and diet not make his views known before voting. At the same term he had sat in several cases against the railway company, and had voted for verdicts against it. If the verdict had been apportioned among the stockholders, his share would have been slightly more than one-third of a cent. Meld, that prejudice was not shown, and his ownership of stock was not cause for granting a new trial, especially as a juror whose examination is so conducted as to not bring his attention to a disqualifying circumstance, or cause him to refresh his memory touching it, is not required to know or surmise that something more is intended than is clearly expressed by the questions asked him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 116-119.]</p>

<p>1. Admiralty <@=>118 — Appeal—Review. o</p> <p>An. appellant in admiralty, as in equity, is confined to the limits he voluntarily imposes when he appeals,' and the appellate court is not called upon to review in his interest such findings of the trial court as he has not challenged by his appeal or assignments of error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 758-775, 794.]</p> <p>2. Collision <@=>71(2) — Fault—Vessels Maneuvering in Slip.</p> <p>The steamship Stadacona, lying) in a slip, on request moved astern to the end of the slip to permit the Onoko, farther in, to move out between her and another vessel on the opposite side of the slip.. When-tbe Onoko passed out, she was swung by the wind and current against the Stada-cona’s propeller, and one of the blades punctured her hull, causing a leak which compelled her to beach after proceeding a distance on her voyage, and also damage to her cargo. If eld, on the evidence, that the primary fault was that of the Onoko in failing to take measures to prevent swinging against the Stadacona, and that the fact that the latter’s propeller was moving slowly at the time was not such a contributory fault as rendered her liable to the Onoko or to the cargo owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. § 101.]</p> <p>3. Collision <@=>17 — Contributory Fault.</p> <p>Where the danger has been created by the fault of one vessel, the other will not also be condemned, unless her fault appears clearly and satisfactorily.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. § IS.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the .Western District of New York.</p> <p>Habeas corpus by Yee Ding and another. From an order (225 Fed. 335) dismissing the writ, petitioners appeal.</p> <p>This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Npw York dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued on the application of the appellants alleging that they were unlawfully held under restraint by the immigration inspector in charge at the port of Buffalo, N. Y., for the alleged reason that they are Chinese persons and aliens not lawfully entitled to be in the United States. The District Judge found that the appellants were in this country in violation of section 21 of the Immigration Act and that the Acting Secretary of Labor was not prevented from invoking the provisions of the Immigration Act because the warrant charged a violation of the Chinese Exclusion Act (Act May 5, 1892, c. 60, 27 Stat. 25 [Comp. St. 1916, §§ 4315-4323]).</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri; Wilbur E. Booth, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Art Metal Construction Company against the Missouri Fidelity & Casualty Company and the Southern Surety Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Otto R. Barnett against the Track Specialties Com - pany. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan; Arthur J. Tuttle, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Percy Wareham against the Hazen Manufacturing Company. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Vacuum Cleaner Company against the Bis-sell Carpet Sweeper Company. On final hearing. Decree lor complainant.</p>

<p>1. Patents <§£=>328 — Validity and Tnfbingement — Towel Cabinet.</p> <p>The Itousso patent, No. 1,157,016, for a towel cabinet, was not anticipated by similar devices in the art of paper and card files, but the patented device is sufficiently differentiated from them to show patentable invention, even conceding that to be an analogous art. Claims 1 to 6, inclusive, also held infringed.</p> <p>2. Patents <S==>22 — ImnsiNGjaiMYT- -Substitution oe Mechanical Equivalents.</p> <p>The fact that, instead of a rod in a patented device, a chain is used, does not avoid infringement, where the chain performs the same function as the rod, even though it affords an additional advantage, which would entitle defendant to a patent.</p> <p>3. Patents <3=>27(1) — 'Invention—Adaptation op Device to Analogous Art.</p> <p>Changes made in adapting a device to use in a different, but analogous, art, although slight in themselves, may be substantial, when they substantially change the method of operation; and the very fact that the needed change is slight may be one of the obstacles to its discovery.</p>

<p>Action by John W. Schofield, receiver, etc., against George W. Baker and others. On appeal from the clerk’s disallowance of costs.</p>

In Equity. Suit by John M. Randon, as receiver of the Kansas Natural Gas Company, against the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Kansas; Joseph L. Bristow, C. E. Foley, and John M. Kinkel, as the Public Utilities Commission of the state of Kansas; H. O. Caster, as attorney for the Public Utilities Commission of the state of Kansas; S. M. Brewster, as Attorney General of the state of Kansas; John T. Barker, as Attorney General of the state of -Missouri; William G.…

<p>1. Chattel Mortgages <J&wkey;124 — Property Covered — After-Acquieed Prop-EETY.</p> <p>A mortgage upon real estate upon which a stonecutting plant was located, and the buildings and improvements, together with tho machinery and other personal property used in such business, did not embrace machinery installed after the mortgage was executed, except so far as such machinery had become part of the realty.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 208, 209.]</p> <p>2. Mortgages <&wkey;133 — Property Covered — Fixtures.</p> <p>That such mortgage by its terms embraced machinery “and other iier-sonal property” did not limit it as a mortgage of real estate to tho land and buildings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other ca.ses, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 260, 264, 265.1</p> <p>3. Fixtures &wkey;>18(5) — Rights of Mortgagees — -Machinery.</p> <p>In a stonecutting plant there was installed a traveling crane of steel construction with concrete foundations, a circular saw weighing about 10 tons, and a planing machine weighing about 20 tons. The track of the crane was upon heavy steel girders resting on steel pillars, the bases of which were sunk in concrete and anchored therein by bolts. The saw consisted of two tracks set in a concrete foundation, two tables mounted on wheels on the tracks, an overhead track and carriage, and a motor attached to the carriage; the ends of the carriage being fastened to concrete pillars, and the anchor bolts buried in such pillars. The base of the planing machine was imbedded in concrete and secured by anchor bolts. To a large extent they could not be removed without injuring the buildings and could not be lemoved to any extent without disintegration of the plant as a complete whole. Held that, as between a mortgagor and mortgagee, they constituted a part of the realty.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 38-41.]</p> <p>4. Fixtures <&wkey;18(5) — Rights of Mortgagees — Machinery.</p> <p>Though cross-girders supporting the hoisting machinery and hoisting machinery which traveled along such cross-girders, the tables used in connection with the saw, and the belting of some of the planing machinery, were not physically annexed and could be removed, they were parts of an entire structure constituting one co-ordinated piece of machinery, and were parts of the machinery, and hence parts of the land itself.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 38-41.]</p>

<p>1.. Damages <&wkey;79(l) — Liquidated Damages oe Penalty.</p> <p>By an agx-eement between claimant and tlie bankrupt, a corporation, claimant was to make advances for labor and material on orders received by tlie bankrupt acceptable to claimant, to whom the bankrupt was to assign all accounts receivable for merchandise covered by such orders, the merchandise itself, etc. Claimant agreed to supervise the collection of all accounts so assigned, to advise as to the credit and financial responsibility of 1he bankrupt’s accounts, assist in the bankrupt’s credit department, and perform all such other services usual in its business. At its option the advances might be applied directly in payment for labor or materials. The bankrupt was to pay interest on daily balances, and, in addition, though advances were to be made only on orders acceptable to claimant, and it was therefore not obligated to make any advances, it was to be paid a commission of $2,500 for its services until orders or accounts receivable amounted to $100,000 a year, when it was to be paid a commission of 2% per cent. It was also to be paid all actual disbursements and reasonable attorney’s fees. Held that, while the contract was not usurious, because the' bankrupt, being a corporation, could not plead usury under the state law, it was unconscionable, and the provision for the payment of $2,500 was in the nature of a penalty, as there would be no difficulty in ascertaining the value of the services actually rendered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 164.]</p> <p>2. Damages <&wkey;80(l) — Liquidated Damages ok “Penalty.”</p> <p>Where the sum agreed upon as liquidated damages is so great as to be unconscionable, it will be regarded as a “penalty.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 170-172.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Penalty.]</p> <p>3. Damages <&wkey;80(l) — Liquidated Damages ok Penalty.</p> <p>Where the amount stipulated as liquidated damages is disproportionate to the presumable and possible damages, or to a readily ascertained loss, it will be treated as a penalty.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 170-172.]</p> <p>4. Chattel Mortgages <&wkey;115 — Attorney’s Fees — Eight to Attorney’s Fees.</p> <p>Under a chattel mortgage given as additional security for advances under a contract providing for the payment of all of the lender’s disbursements or expenditures and all reasonable attorney’s fees, where the lender was compelled to defend the validity of the mortgage in bankruptcy proceedings, it was entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 190, 191.]</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy <&wkey;474 — Costs—Review oe Reeeree’s Orders.</p> <p>Where, on the trustee’s motion for review of an order of the referee in favor of another litigant, neither party was wholly successful, the disbursements should be taxed equally against the trustee and such litigant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 87S-834.]</p>

<p>At Law. Action by Henry R. Towne against Max Eisner, Collector of United States Internal Revenue lor the Third District of the State of New York. On demurrer to the complaint.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue &wkey;9 — Income Tax — Stock Dividends — Accumulated Earnings — “Net Income Arising or Accruing in the Preceding Calendar Year.”</p> <p>Plaintiff, as a holding corporation, owned all of the stock of subsidiary corporations, except sufficient to qualify their directors. Such subsidiaries were associated in a common enterprise, the earnings of which had been for a number, of years prior to January 1, 1913, used in .common by the several subsidiary companies in the acquisition of property and the carrying on of the business, with the result that there was indebtedness between them, as shown by their books. About March 1, 1913, such accumulated earnings were taken over by plaintiff in the form of dividends declared by the several subsidiaries, equal in amount to their respective interests therein. Each was charged on plaintiff’s books with the amount of the dividends, and its indebtedness to the other subsidiaries, if any, became due to plaintiff. Held, that such dividends did not constitute “net income arising or accruing 51 :s * in the preceding calendar year” to plaintiff., within the moaning of Income Tax Act Oct. 3, 1913, c. 16, § 2A (1), 38 Stat. 166, which became effective from March 1, 1913, and were not subject to tax thereunder, but were a distribution of accumulated earnings arising through a period of years, the equitable ownership of which was vested in plaintiff as owner of the stock prior to January 1, 1913.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 13-28.J</p>

In Equity. Suits by the United States against the Brookshire Oil Company, E. D. Burge, and others, and against the Brookshire Oil Company, the Standard Oil Company, and others, and against the Brookshire Oil Company, the Midway Pacific Oil Company, and others.

<p>1. Mines AND Minerals <&wkey;2 — Public Lands — Withdrawal—Rights ok • Occupants.</p> <p>To bring an occupant or claimant o£ oil or gas lands within Pickett Act June 25. 1910, c. 421, § 2. 38 Slat 817 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4524), providing that the rights ol any person who at the date of any withdrawal order is a bona iide occupant or claimant of oil or gas lands, and who at such date is in diligent prosecution of work loading to the discovery of oil or gas, shall not be affected by such order, it is not necessary that such occupant be efigaged in actual drilling for oil or gas on a particular tract at the date of withdrawal, or necessarily that work is then being performed upon the identical claim upon which discovery must ultimately he made in order to make location, and it is enough if reasonable effort is being made at that time, indicating a bona fide intention to complete tho work of discovery on the particular claim with all practical expedition; such intention being manifested by the doing of physical acts having a direct tendency to facilitate the exploration for and discovery of oil or gas.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 2J</p> <p>2. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;2 — Public Lands — Withdrawal—Rights ok Occupants.</p> <p>A company which for months before the date of a presidential order withdrawing oil and gas lands from entry, and at the date thereof was engaged in work necessary and proper in order to effect a discovery of oil, with the then present bona iide purpose of completing such work with all reasonable expedition, was diligently prosecuting the work, so as to be within the protection, of the Pickett Act, though it was delaying the installation of its machinery and the commencement of drilling until it could be assured of a supply of water necessary for the prosecution of the drilling; tho land being in a semiarid region.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 2..I</p> <p>3. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;>2 — Public Lands. — Withdrawal—Rights oe Occupants.</p> <p>Such company was not required to make any unusual or extraordinary effort, to obtain water, hut only such as was reasonable under the circumstances confronting it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 2.]</p> <p>4. Mines and Minerals &wkey;>2 — -Public Lands — Withdrawal—Rights oe Oc-cu PANTS.</p> <p>Under the Pickett Act, where an oil company was in diligent prosecution of work leading to discovery of oil at the date the land was. withdrawn from entry, and. never abandoned or intended to abandon the property, but remained in possession, proceeding with the work of development in good faith, with more or less diligence, until the actual discovery of oil, it was too late for tile government, after discoveries had been made at a largo expense, to question its rights on the ground that at some time during the progress of the work, subsequent to the withdrawal and prior to discovery, it was not as diligent as it could have been.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 2.J</p> <p>5. Minks and Minerals &wkey;>2 —Public Lands- — Withdrawal—Rights oe Occupants.</p> <p>The Pickett Act, providing that the rights of a liona iide occupant of oil or gas lands, who at the date of any withdrawal order is in diligent prosecution of work leading to discovery of oil or gas, stall not be affected or impaired by such order so long as such occupant or claimant stall continue in diligent prosecution of suet work, does not mean ttat tte occupant’s rights stall no longer continue after a discovery is made and tte work leading to discovery ceases, but means ttat tte occupant stalt tave a rigtt to continue tis work to a discovery, and tte benefits of tte discovery as if tte land tad not been withdrawn.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For otter cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 2.]</p> <p>6. Statutes <&wkey;183 — Construction—Spirit or Letter op Law.</p> <p>It is tte duty of tte court to search out tte true meaning of a law, and to permit the spirit and reason to prevail over tte letter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For otter eases, see Statutes, Cfent. Dig. § 261.]</p>

<p>1. Mines and Minebals &wkey;>36 — Peace» Mines — Withdbawal Obdebs.</p> <p>In 1909, wlien oil lands were withdrawn by presidential order, there was no law for the entry and patenting of public lands containing mineral oils, except the provisions relating to placer mines, and under Rev. St. §§ 2329, 2330 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 4628, 4629), no location of placer claims, valid against the government, could be made until the discovery of mineral. Pickett Act June 25, 1910, c. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (Comp. St. 1916, §{f 4523-4525), enacted after the withdrawal, declares that the rights of any person who at the date of any withdrawal order is a bona fide occupant or claimant of oil or gas bearing lands, and who at such date is in diligent prosecution of work leading to discovery, shall not be affected or impaired by withdrawal orders, so long as such occupant or claimant shall continue in diligent prosecution of such work. Hold that, if the occupant or claimant was in diligent prosecution of the work at the date of the withdrawal order, and continued until discovery, his rights would not be affected or impaired by the withdrawal, and he would be entitled to the same rights in the land under the mining laws as if it had never been withdrawn.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 87.]</p> <p>2. Mines and Minebals <&wkey;36 — Place» Mines — Withdbawal Obdebs.</p> <p>Whether an occupant or claimant of oil or gas bearing land was, at the date it was withdrawn by jiresidential order, engaged in diligent prosecution of work leading to discovery, within the Pickett Act, is a question of fact, dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 87.]</p> <p>3. Mines and Minebals <&wkey;36 — Claims—Opeeation oe Claims.</p> <p>Under the Pickett Act, protecting the rights of an occupant or claimant under a location on oil-bearing lands, engaged in diligent prosecution of work leading to the discovery at the date of withdrawal by presidential order, it is not necessary that the work being performed at the time of the withdrawal was on the particular claim in question; but, before it can be deemed work leading to discovery thereon, it must have been such as would reasonably tend to that end, and hence the mere drilling of a well on an adjacent claim is not sufficient, for, while it might disclose the probability of the presence of oil, it in no way would amount to discovery.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 87.]</p> <p>4. Mines and Minebals <&wkey;36 — Oil and Gas Claims — Locations.</p> <p>While in 1909, when oil-bearing public lands were withdrawn by presidential order, there was no law, state or national, which authorized or required the marking of boundaries of locations, yet the practice of marking had grown up in oil districts, and gave the locators a preference right to possession as against all persons except the United States, which the Pickott Act was designed to protect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. JDig. § 87.]</p> <p>5. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;>3f> — Mining Claims — Discovery.</p> <p>Group development or assessment work, authorized by Rev. St. §§ 2824, 2325 (Comp. St. .1916, §§i 4620, 4622), in the case of mining claims, is permissible only after discovery; and discovery work, the diligent prosecution of! which was necessary to protect the rights of a claimant or occupant of oil or gas locations under the Pickett Act after withdrawal, cannot be by group.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 87.]</p> <p>6. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;>30 — Mining Claims — Discovery.</p> <p>Under the Pickett Act, extraterritorial work, such as the building of roads, etc., for thp benefit of an oil or gas location, or several locations, may constitute the prosecution of work of discovery necessary to protect the rights of claimants and locators after withdrawal of the land by the President, where such work tended to facilitate discovery.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 87.J</p> <p>7. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;>38(4) — Mining Oil and Gas Claims — Injunction.</p> <p>In a suit to enjoin occupants and claimants under an oil and gas claim, who had no title, from continuing to trespass and to extract oil, marketing companies, to whom the products were sold, are not proper parties.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 88.]</p>

<p>Petition by Henry Nannanga for naturalization.</p>

<p>Application by Rudolph Haas for naturalization.</p>

In Equity. In the matter of the application for naturalization of Stanislao Di Giovine. On motion to set aside and cancel a certificate of citizenship.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the United States against the Utah Eight & Railway Company. Decree for the United States.</p>

<p>COPYBTGnTS &wkey;>40 — ABANDONMENT OF RIGHTS.</p> <p>Where a structure to represent an elk was erected over a city street as the chief attraction at a celebration to which the public was invited, assuming that the structure was a statue within the copyright law, a copyright attempted to be secured thereon was invalid, since, where a production is intended for and bound to be given free and unrestricted public exhibition, and is so displayed, there is a publication of the thing and dedication to the public, defeating copyright.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Copyrights, Cent. Dig. § 35.]</p>

<p>1. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;38(2) — Suits to Establish Rights in Oil Lands.</p> <p>WJiere a final certificate lias been issued to a claimant of oil lands, and the matter is pending in the General Land Office on application for a patent, the final certificate and proceedings in the Land Office cannot be disregarded, and the same questions pending in such office litigated in a suit by the United States to enjoin the claimant from removing oil and to require an accounting for oil already taken.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 87%.]</p> <p>2. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;89 — Final Certificate — Effect.</p> <p>While a final certificate issued to a claimant of oil lands is subject to cancellation by the land department, or to be set aside for fraud by the courts, until canceled, it vests the entryman with an equitable title to the land and the prima facie right to a patent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 114.]</p> <p>3. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;2 — Public Lands Subject to Disposition.</p> <p>The Pickett Act (Act June 25, 1910, c. 421, 36 Stat. 847 [Comp. St. 1916, §§ 4523-4525]), providing that the rights of any bona fid'e occupant or claimant of oil lánds, who, at the date of a withdrawal of such lands from location, sale, or entry, is in the diligent prosecution of work leading to tiie discovery of oil or gas, shall not he alteetcd or impaired by such order so long as lie shall continue in diligent prosecution of the worlc, relieves all land included within its provisions from the operation of 1he withdrawal order, and leaves it subject to the disposition of the Land Department.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 2.]</p>

<p>Patrick J. O’Hara and another were indicted for offenses. On demurrers to the indictment.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>Abbott Bros. Company, a corporation, was convicted of violation of the Pure Food and Drugs Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8717-8728), and it brings error.</p>

In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Schmick Handle & Lumber Company. The claim of the Hollingsworth & Whitney Company to a fund in possession of Frank F. Boston and others, trustees, was denied (233 Fed. 446), and the claimant appeals and petitions to revise.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Alma M. Ruge against the Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Petitions to Revise Orders of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio; John E. Safer, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the estate of the Kinnane Company, bankrupt. On petition by the bankrupt to revise an order affirming an order of the referee denying an allowance of counsel fees, and on petition by Fred Butterfield & Co., Incorporated, and others, to revise an order affirming an order denying an allowance to it.</p>

Boyd, Judge. Petition by Ira R. Humphreys, trustee of the estate of Robert Harris & Bro., bankrupts, for the sale of certain stock claimed to be subject to alien in favor of the Citizens’ Bank of Reidsville, N. C. From a decree confirming the report of a special master, W. R. Dhlton, receiver, appeals.

Johnson, Judge. Petition by Iredell Jones, Jr., trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of the Blair-Frazier Company, bankrupt, against Elizabeth M. Blair and others, bankrupts. From a decree for defendants, petitioner appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Philippi; Alston G. Dayton, Judge.</p> <p>Eugene L. Younge was convicted of an offense, and he brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northeastern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee; Edward T. Sanford, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Isaac S. Cousins against B. Peter Stultz and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Page Morris, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company against the Great Northern Railway Company. Decree for complainant, from which both parties appeal.</p>

Campbell, Judge. Action by Armor Bell, administratrix of the estate of John Bell, deceased, against the Midland Valley Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United1 States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; John H. Clarke, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Virginia C. Mining, Milling & Smelting Company and another against James W. Corrigan. Erom a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

Dyer, Judge. Suit by Rloyd England, receiver for the State National Bank of Little Rock, Ark., against Murray Phillips and another, who inter-pleaded the Commercial Bank of New Madrid, Mo. From a decree in favor of the Commercial Bank, and from an order allowing an attorney’s fee, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of South Dakota; James D. Elliott, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the United States against Nathan R. Fletcher and others. From a decree (231 Fed. 326) for defendants, the United States appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.</p> <p>Suit by John M. Jones, as trustee in bankruptcy of William P. Burke and another, copartners as Burke & Hunt, and William P. Burke, individually, against the Hake View State Bank. From a decree in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p> <p>From the decree setting aside the bill of sale dated November 16, 1914, executed by William P. Burke, to J. J. Connors, for the benefit of appellant, and setting aside a certain chattel mortgage bearing the date of November 20, 1914, executed by William P. Burke and Eva May Burke to appellant, this appeal is taken.</p> <p>The copartnership, organized June, 1914, dissolved in December, 1914, was adjudged a bankrupt in December upon a petition, filed the 3d of the month. Without capitel from the beginning, the company’s financial condition grew steadily worse. At its demise, the liabilities were approximately $33,000, and its assets, including disputed accounts, only $16,000. It operated quarries in Wisconsin, and early and continuously and in ever-increasing amounts borrowed money from appellant. Certain of its accounts were from time to time assigned to the bank for security. Early in their dealings there was “talk” of giving security for their loans, but the “talk” never approached the dignity of an agreement.</p> <p>On November 12th, when bankrupts’ indebtedness to the bank was $11,-289.02, a further loan of $7,750 was sought. It was over the appellant’s loan of $7,750 thereafter made and the security subsequently taken that the issues involved in this suit arose. After first refusing, and only when bankrupts had vainly sought a loan elsewhere, appellant advanced $4,000 on November 13th. and certain open accounts were then and there assigned as security for thift loan. On the 16th, after a hurried trip to Wisconsin, Burke returned for more rtfoney and secured $3,750. A bill of sale was given to secure this last loan, covering nearly all of bankrupts’ property, and the hank claims it was given pursuant to an agreement made on November 13th when the $4,00b was advanced.</p> <p>Immediately thereafter appellant sent its representative to Wisconsin to examine conditions and report Upon the return of this representative, an attorney was consulted, and discovering the legal effect of the bill of sale, and learning also that the property at one quarry had been omitted therefrom, appellant sent its attorney to Wisconsin. He obtained a chattel mortgage covering all the bankrupts’ property, and given to .secure all of the bankrupts’ indebtedness to the bank, and reciting among other things the following: “For the purpose of confirming a certain bill of sale in the nature of a mortgage to J. J. Connors, dated November 16, 1914,” etc. The chattel mortgage was promptly and properly filed and directions given to foreclose at once. This bill of sale was never “filed.”</p> <p>Burke, to whom the partnership liad transferred its assets and business, having learned that a foreclosure was imminent, left Wisconsin to seek a loan with which to pay this mortgage. While Burke was thus absent, appellant seized bankrupts’ property under its chattel mortgage and advertised the sale thereof for December 7th. In the meantime, but after the seizure under the chattel mortgage, proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted and the sale was stayed.</p> <p>Upon all the evidence the court made findings of fact as follows: “As above indicated, I do not think the proofs sufficient to avoid the assignment of accounts made on November 12th and 33th. I therefore find with respect to these two instruments (speaking of the two in controversy): (1) That the bankrupt gave them as conveyances of his property, while insolvent, and within four months of bankruptcy, and that their giving operated at the time as a preference. (2) That their effect was to enable the defendant to get a larger percentage of its debt than any other creditor of the same class. (3) That the defendant, at the time of receiving such transfers, knew of the insolvent condition of the bankrupt, and that at the same time it had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give it a preference, and that their enforcement would give a preference. (4) That the allegations of matter of fact contained in the complaint essential to avoid the mortgage are proven and true.”</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western' District of Virginia, at Lynchburg, in Bankruptcy; Henry Clay McDowell, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Piedmont Manganese Company, a corporation. Petition by A. C. Hume and another, opposed by D. W. Myers, F. W. Whitaker, trustee in bankruptcy, and others. From a judgment denying the petition, petitioners appeal.</p>

Dayton, Judge. Action by E. A. Holsberry and H. L. Ewing, copartners trading as the Upshur Supply Company, against H. E. Clark. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina, at Greensboro-; James E. Boyd, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the British American Cotton Company against Charles E. Orvis and others, copartners as Orvis Bros. & Co. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; John H. Clarke, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by the United States against Woo Vey. Defendant was found by the commissioner to be a Chinese person unlawfully in the United States, and ordered deported, and on trial de novo in the District Court the commissioner’s decision was sustained, and defendant ordered deported. From that judgment, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Master and Servant &wkey;>278(5) — Actions fob Injuries — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In an employe’s action for injuries, there was testimony to show that a pneumatic drill or chisel operated by him, and which, when in proper order, would operate only when a spring or lever was pressed, and would cease operating when such pressure was withdrawn, was defective, in that it would not respond properly to the lever mechanism, but would start when it should stop, and stop when it should start, that, when an attempt was made to stop it, it continued to operate, with the result that the chisel stuck and the blade brote, a portion of it striking plaintiff in the eye, and that the employer was informed Of this defect in the apparatus. Held, that these facts, if true, were sufficient proof of the employer’s negligence in failing to provide a safe and suitable instrument with which to wort, to support the action, and the case was not one in which an attempt was made to deduce negligence from the happening of the accident.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Gent. Dig. § 961.]</p> <p>2 Master and Servant <&wkey;189(7) — Fellow Servants — Foreman.</p> <p>Where there was testimony that an employé in the conduct of his wort was wholly subject to a foreman’s orders and that the foreman, though not having the power of final discharge, hád the power to select men for discharge, and that discharges were made by another upon his recommendation, the court properly refused to hold the foreman a fellow servant of the employé, without power to speat for the employer in directing the employé in his work.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Gent. Dig. § 448.]</p> <p>3. Master and Servant <&wkey;289(8) — Actions for Injuries — Question for Jury.</p> <p>Reasonable reliance by a servant on a master’s promise to repair, and continued use of a defective instrument for a reasonable period pending performance, is not contributory negligence as a matter of law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1097.]</p> <p>4. Master and Servant <&wkey;289(8) — Actions fob Injuries — Questions for Jury.</p> <p>■ In an employé’s action for injuries, there was evidence that a pneumatic drill or chisel, intended to operate only when a spring or lever was pressed, did not respond properly to pressure, in that it would start when it should stop, and stop when it should start, that the employé operating it told his foreman that it was no good, that the foreman after examining it and trying it for himself, said it was all right, and for the employe to go to work, and that he would fix it when he got a chance, that the em-ployé continued to work with it for about three hours, and. that he was then injured by its failure to work properly. There was no evidence to show that, after the promise to repair, there was any change in the defective operation, or anything to indicate that the danger was greater or more imminent after the promise than before. Held, that the court properly refused to hold as a matter of law that plaintiff relied upon the promise for an unreasonable period, and imprudently continued in the employment in the face of obvious and imminent danger, and was therefore guilty of contributory negligence, as what is a reasonable period to continue in the employment, in reliance on a promise of repair, is ordinarily a question for the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases,'see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1097.]</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty for collision by Eliza A. Eernald and Jennie T. Gerting, owners of the steam tug Leader, against the steamer Mohawk, the New England.Steamship Company, claimant, and the tug Transfer No. 20, the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, claimant, impleaded, with cross-libel by the owner of the Transfer. Decree against both the Mohawk and the Transfer, and the latter claimant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada.</p> <p>Action by William O’Brien against the Das Vegas & Tonopah Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. CONTRACTS <3=284(4)-BUILDING CONTRACTS — CONSI'RUCTION.</p> <p>A contract between a general contractor and the subcontractor declared that, should any of the work done or materials provided by the subcontractor be unsatisfactory to the architects, then such subcontractor should immediately remove such unsatisfactory work or materials and supply the jilace thereof with other work and materials satisfactory to the architects or general contractor. The contract further declared that should any question arise during the progress of the work, it should be referred to the architect, whose decision should be binding on both parties. The specifications contained a test for concrete doors to be made after they had been in place for 45 days, but the architect, before the laying of floors, disapproved floor joists constructed by the subcontractor. Held, that such disapproval by tko architect was binding on the subcontractor, though the architect rejected the joists without waiting for the construction of the floors, as they would have been rejected if constructed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Bor other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 1330.]</p> <p>2. Contracts <3=284(4) — Building Contracts — Construction.</p> <p>Where the general contractor and subcontractor agreed that the work of the subcontractor should be satisfactory to the architect, his judgment made in good faith is conclusive.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1330, 1331.]</p> <p>3. Contracts <3=303(5)- — Performance—Defenses.</p> <p>Where a subcontractor in turn sublet the manufacture of some of the materials which were to be installed in a building, such subcontractor cannot excuse his own nonperformance by reason of the default of Ms chosen agency.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1434-1439%.]</p> <p>4. Interest <@=>12 — Filing op Lien — Damages.</p> <p>A subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien against a building, and the owner withheld a large balance due the general contractor. Rev. St Mo. 1909, § 8233, authorized the owner to withhold such sunr. The subcontractor’s claim for lien was disallowed, but there was no showing that it acted maliciously or without probable cause. Held, that, as the subcontractor was ndt required to give bond on the filing of its lien claim, and as there was no showing that it acted maliciously, etc., the general contractor is not entitled to recover from the subcontractor the value of the use of the balance withheld by the owner during the period of withholding.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Interest, Cent. Dig. § 23.]</p>

Suit in admiralty by Max Herman and others against the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique. Decree for libelants, and respondent appeals. The action is in personam against the owners of the steamship Caroline, upon which vessel as a common carrier libelants (or their consignors) shipped certain goods at Havre, Franco, for transportation to New York. The goods in question consisted of 23 eases of millinery, 131 bales of rags, and 30 cases of woolen goods.

Wolverton, Judge. Petition by Ballou & Wright, a corporation, against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, a corporation, and others. There was a judgment for petitioner, and defendants bring error. Action to recover damages sustained by reason of the exaction and collection of excessive freight rates upon certain carload shipments of motorcycles from Armory, Mass., to defendant in error, at Portland, Or. Judgment for petitioner. Respondents allege error.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California; Maurice T. Dooling, Judge.</p> <p>Habeas corpus by Mah Shee, by Chung Leong, against Edward White, as Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of San Francisco, Cal. From an order denying the writ, the petitioner appeals.</p>

<p>Appear asi) Error <@=»239, 719(10) — Reservation ok Grounds ok Review— Assignments ok Error.</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals will not consider a question as to tlie costs which may be charged by the clerk of the District Court for certifying a record on appeal, where no costs were taxed in the District Court, there was no request to tax them, and no motion or decision is disclosed, and there is no assignment of error raising the question, which is presented only by an informal oral complaint at the bar.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, sea Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2979, 2982, 3490.]</p>

<p>1. Public Lands <§=>120 — Patents—Mineral Lands — Avoidance.</p> <p>While, under Rev. St. §§ 2302, 2318, 2319, 2347, 2351 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 4591, 4613, 4614, 4659, 4663), lands known at the time of their purchase from the United States to be valuable for minerals are not subject to acquisition under the Homestead Law (Act May 20, 1862, c. 75, 12 Stat. 392), a patent under the Homestead Law for land as agricultural may not' be avoided by a suit in equity on the ground that the land was mineral land, unless the conditions were such at the time of the entry and purchase as to then make plain to the entryman and others familiar with the land that it contained mineral deposits of such quality and value and in such quantity as to render the extraction profitable, for the subsequent discovery of minerals on the land will not warrant avoidance of the patent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 332-335.]</p> <p>2. Public Lands <@=>114(6) — Patents—Construction.</p> <p>A patent of the United States is an adjudication by the Land Department, a quasi judicial tribunal, and raises a presumption of right and regularity in all the proceedings antedating it, and of perfect title in. the grantee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. § 322.]</p> <p>3. Public Lands <§=>114(1) — Patents—Construction.</p> <p>Where, under the Homestead Law, land is patented as agricultural, such patent is an adjudication of the Land Department that the land is not then known to contain minerals in paying quantities, and of every other fact essential to the validity of the patent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 314, 316.]</p> <p>4. Public Lands <5=117 — Patents -Collateral Attack.</p> <p>A patent to land, being a decision of the Land Department, is impervious to collateral attack, and raises a strong presumption that the decision is right.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. § 324.]</p> <p>5. Public Lands <§=120 — •Patents—'Vacation.</p> <p>While the government may avoid a patent by a suit in equity for false and deceitful representations, the burden is on the government to establish the fraud by evidence producing a conviction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 332-335.1</p> <p>6. Public Lands <§=120 — Patents—Construction.</p> <p>Where, in a suit to set aside a patent to lands on which coal was discovered, on the ground that the patent issued under the Homestead Law was obtained through fraud, the decree must be for the defendant, where the evidence was only sufficient to raise an uncertainty as to whether persons familiar with the land knew at the time it was patented that it was valuable for coal.</p> <p>[Ed. Nota — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. g§ 332-335. [</p> <p>7. Evidence <§=96’(1) — Burden ob Proof.</p> <p>Where complainant established a matter as to which defendant had the burden of proof, defendant is relieved of establishing such fact.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 119, 121.]</p> <p>8. Vendos and Purchaser <§=220 — Bona Fide Purchasers — 'Wiro Are.</p> <p>No one is bound to assume, and hunt for wrong in the acts of those who have dealt in the title to land he is buying, when that title is fair on its face, in order to secure himself the rights of a bona fide purchaser.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 4(»l-4«5, 720.]</p> <p>9. Vendor and Purchaser @=5229(3} — Bona Fide Purchasers — Evidence.</p> <p>Defendant, which purchased land valuable for coal deposits, which had been patented some years under the Homestead Law, as agricultural land, field, a bona fide purchaser.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 481.]</p> <p>10. Public Lands <§=120 — Bona Fide Purchasers — Patents.</p> <p>Where lands containing valuable minerals were patented under the Homestead Law as agricultural, a subsequent purchaser from the grantee of the patentee, who took in good faith without notice of any possible fraud on the part of the patentee in obtaining the patent, has an equity superior to that of the government, and the patent cannot be vacated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 332-835.]</p>

<p>In Error to' the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Bank of Brinkley against Louis Houck and wife. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>Petition to Superintend and Revise, in Matter of Raw, Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern 'District of South Carolina, at Charleston, in Bankruptcy; Henry A. Middleton Smith, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of J. A. Watson and another, bankrupts. On petition by S. W. Norwood, trustee, to superintend and revise an order in favor .of the bankrupts.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Three libels, by the Toxaway Tanning Company, Hans Rees’ Sons, and the J. H. Eadew Company against Sulzberger & Sons Company and others. From decrees for libelants, defendants Barber & Co., Incorporated, and another appeal.

Cotteral, Judge. Earl Hale was convicted of having a counterfeit national bank note in possession, with knowledge of its spurious character and with intent to pass the same, and he brings error.

<p>1. GotjRts <&wkey;371(6) — Federal Courts — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A state statute, providing that the amount of any tax paid erroneously shall be refunded, entitles a taxpayer to maintain an action at law therefor in the federal courts, if the elements of federal jurisdiction, such as diverse citizenship, be present.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 976.]</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;905(l) — Inheritance Tax — Injunction—Adequate Remedy at Law.</p> <p>Inheritance Tax Law Neb. § 10 (Rev. St. 1913, § 6631), under which a tax was assessed and levied, declares that, when the amount of the tax shall have been paid erroneously to the state treasurer, it shall be lawful for him, on satisfactory proof, to refund and pay to the executor, administrator, or trustee, or person who has paid such tax, the amount thereof, provided that all applications for repayment shall- be made within two years after the date of payment. Plaintiff filed suit in federal courts to enjoin collection of such taxes. Held, that as plaintiff had a complete and adequate remedy at law, which was available In the federal courts, equity would afford no relief.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1728, 1729. J</p>

<p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1159(2) — Appeal—Concltjsiveness of Yebbic.t.</p> <p>A verdict, finding one member of a bankrupt firm guilty of conspiring with the other member to conceal their assets, cannot be disturbed, when supported by submissible evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3075.]</p> <p>2. Cbimixal Law &wkey;>510 — Testimony of Accomplice — Necessity of Coreo i¡ORATION.</p> <p>The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice will sustain a conviction, if believed by the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, sec Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1121-1126.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;274 — Plea of Guilty — Withdrawal.</p> <p>Where B., jointly indicted with defendant, pleaded guilty, and on defendant’s appeal the court pointed out that the judgment against B., as well as that against defendant, was a nullity for want of jurisdiction, and on defendant’s subsequent trial under a new indictment objection was made to B.’s competency as a witness, on the ground that he was a convicted felon, it was not error for the court to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty, and substitute a plea of not guilty, as this was merely a form, and was either superfluous or a proper amendment of the record.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Gent. Dig. §§ 632, 633.1</p> <p>4. Conspiracy <&wkey;27 — Criminal Law <&wkey;113 — Overt Act — Jurisdiction of Prosecution.</p> <p>The filing of a petition in bankruptcy was a sufficient overt act to support a conviction for conspiracy by the bankrupt to conceal Ms property from the trustee, and gave jurisdiction to the District Court for the district in which the petition was filed, though the concealment took place in a different district.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Conspiracy, Cent. Dig. §§ 38, 39; Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 190, 232.]</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Cora Scruggs against Jacob M. Dickinson and others, receivers of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>COURTS <&wkey;?>66(7) — FEDERAL COURTS-DECISIONS OR STATE COURTS AS AUTHORITY.</p> <p>Where an insolvent corporation was under administration in a state court, and in a suit against a former stockholder to enforce his double liability under the Constitution and statutes of the state the state court held that extensions of the indebtedness after he transferred his stock, with knowledge oE the transfer and without his consent released him from liability, such holding would be followed by a federal court in a suit against another former stockholder.</p>

<p>1. WITNESSES <&wkey;78 — CONVICTION OF FELONY — PARDON—EVIDENCE.</p> <p>Where, on objection to tho competency of a witness on the ground that he had been convicted of a felony, the United States attorney presented to the judge a telegram, which he stated pardoned the witness and restored him to citizenship, whereupon defendant’s counsel stated that they could not question the telegram, hut objected to its receipt as evidence until the pardon itself was produced, defendant’s rights were not violated by the court’s ruling that the witness was competent to testify; tho telegram having contained matter which was accepted by the court as notice that the witness was pardoned.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- -For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 195-200.1</p> <p>2. Cbiminai, Law <&wkey;400(ll) — Best and Secondary Evidence — Labels.</p> <p>On a trial for introducing liquor into an Indian reservation, a reservation policeman, who had followed the movements of a party, of which defendant was one, testified that he picked up parts of bottles and could tell that there were labels on them. Defendant objected, on the ground that the witness could not testify to the labels. The objection was overruled, and the witness testified that the bottle was a flask, and had a label on it which had not been broken off; that he did not notice what make it was, but that it was a whisky bottle, and that “whisky” was written on the label. Held, that there was no error, as this testimony was a part: of the general description of the bottles and pieces found, especially where another witness testified without objection as to the labels on the pieces of broken bottles.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 879-886.)</p> <p>8. Criminal Law <&wkey;1170]4(l) — Witnesses <i&wkey;888(10) — Impeachment—Laying Foundation — Certainty—Prejudice.</p> <p>Where a witness testified that he saw defendant about the 5th or 6th of September, or somewhere along there, the admission of his testimony as to his conversation with defendant, over tho objection that it was not proper impeachment, was within the discretion of the trial court, and not erroneous, in the absence of prejudice.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3129; Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1242.]</p>

<p>1. Ckiminal Law <&wkey;97(8) — Jurisdiction of Prosecutions — Offenses on the High Seas.</p> <p>Under Judicial Code Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 41, 36 Stat. 1100 (Comp. St. 1916, § 1023), providing that the trial of all offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district shall be in the district where the offender is found or into which he is first brought, where defendants were taken into custody on the high seas for taking fish from a pound off the coast of New Jersey, and were immediately brought ashore within that state, the District Court for that state was the proper tribunal to try the offense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — TTor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 183-188.1</p> <p>2. Larceny <&wkey;5 — Property Subject of Lahoeny — Fish.</p> <p>Fish in a pound used in catching fish, and from which the fish rarely escaped, were so far reduced to the possession of the company erecting the pound as to be the subject of larceny, though fish could escape from the pound, and in occasional instances probably did escape.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 11-I7.J</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;97(8) — Jurisdiction of Prosecutions — Offenses on the High Seas.</p> <p>The stealing of fish from a pound on the high seas off the coast of New Jersey, which fish have been reduced to the possession of the American citizens erecting the pound, is an offense punishable under the laws Of the United States, as the character of the act is not changed by the fact that the theft is committed on the high seas.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 183-188.]</p>

Suit by John E. Conron, as trustee in bankruptcy of Frederic A. Cauchois, bankrupt, against Frederic A. Cauchois, individually and as executor of Lillian Cauchois, deceased, and others. From a decree for. complainant, defendants appeal.

Action by José Marcelino Esterás, by his mother, Claudina Morales, against José Esterás Maldonado and others, by their mother, Paula Maldonado. Judgment for complainant, and defendants appeal and bring error.

<p>Telegraphs and Telephones &wkey;>32 — Regulation—Free Messages — Contract with Railroad.</p> <p>In 1887 a railroad company and a telegraph company entered into a contract, whereby the railroad company should transport men and material and furnish labor to the telegraph company without limit for the erection and maintenance of a telegraph system on the railroad company’s property, the telegraph company in turn agreeing to transmit orders and intelligence along the railroad company’s property without limit, so far as the maintenance and traffic management of the railroad was concerned ; each company agreeing further to serve the other with regard to that other’s business in respect to matters not directly connected with the line of railroad ^.long which the telegraph lines were extended. The . two kinds of work were known as “on line business” and “oft line business”; there being stated periods for accounting for the off line business, at which time balances were discharged at a rate of settlement or exchange fixed at one-half of the ordinary rate of each party. Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1S87, c. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, as amended by Act June IS, 1910, c. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 546, so as to apply to telegraph companies, declares that nothing shall be construed to prevent telephone, telegraph, and cable companies from entering into contracts with common carriers for the exchange of services. Held' that, in the absence of fraud, the agreement was not objectionable under the Interstate Commerce Act; each company having the right to fix the value of the services of each to the other.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Telegraphs and Telephones, Cent. Dig. § IS.]</p>

Action by Daisy M. Einkous, administratrix of J. M. Einkous, deceased, against the Virginian Railway Company. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict, and plaintiff brings error.

Proceeding in admiralty by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, as owner of the steamship Princess Victoria, for limitation of liability. Prom a portion of decree the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, damage claimant, appeals.

Suit by the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, as trustee,, against the International Steam Bump Company, in which William I. Lewis, as receiver of the International Steam Pump Company, intervened.- From an order fixing and allowing the complainant's disbursements, the intervener appeals. Plaintiff brought suit to foreclose a mortgage made by the International1 Steam Pump Company.

<p>Collision <&wkey;95(2) — Meeting Tows — Fault.</p> <p>A collision between the tows of two meeting tugs in East River held duo solely to the fault of the upbound tug in attempting to pass through the narrow space between two descending tugs, instead of passing on the port side of both.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. §§ 200-202.]</p>

Action by Mary Carson Kidd against Thomas A. Edison, Incorporated. Judgment for plaintiff (239 Fed. 405), and defendant brings error. This is a writ of error by the defendant below to review a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff for $6,-885.45. The parties will be referred to hereafter as they appeared in the District Court, viz., as plaintiff and defendant.

<p>Appeal and Error <&wkey;1221 — Modification op Opinion.</p> <p>Where, in a suit hy the government to recover public lands unlawfully appropriated by a power and light company without compliance with the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, the Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the damages sustained by the government were measured by the charges imposed by such regulations, and in a similar case the Supreme Court subsequently held that the scale of charges imposed by such regulations was not binding, and that the government was ■entitled to the reasonable value of the occupancy and use, the Circuit Court of Appeals will modify its opinion to conform to that of the Supreme Court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4722.li</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Archie C. Harris against Jacob M. Dickinson and others, receivers of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty for collision by the Eclipse Lighterage & Transportation Company, owner of the barge Amherst, against the Cornell Steamboat Company, owner of the tug Williams. Decree for libelant for part damages, and it appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Wilbur F. Booth, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the B. V. D. Company against the Golden Rule, Incorporated. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Collision <&wkey;95(2) — Meeting Tugsj — Change oe Course.</p> <p>A collision in East River between a schooner in tow of a tug passing down and a carfloat on the side of a meeting tug held,, on conflicting evidence, due solely to the fault of the down-bound tug in changing course to starboard after a signal agreement to pass starboard to star-hoard.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. §§ 200-202.]</p>

<p>Aliens <&wkey;68 — Review—Decisions Reviewable.</p> <p>Appellate review is not a matter of right, and must rest on a constitutional and legislative provision; hence a decision denying an application for naturalization cannot he reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on writ of error or on appeal, there being no provisions for such review.</p> <p>[Ed.- Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 138-145.]</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Corrugated Bar Company against the Trussed Concrete Steel Company and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals.</p>

Suit in equity by the National Binding Machine Company against the Harper Paper Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. The following is the opinion of / tgustus N. Hand, District Judge, on final hearing: This is a suit to enjoiD the infringement of letters patent No. 868,977. The patent relates to a device for supplying strips of paper gummed on one side and moistening the gummed side of the paper, so that it may be used for binding packages.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.</p> <p>Suit by the Elliott Company against the Roto Company and another. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Domestic Vacuum Cleaner Company against the Bissell Carpet Sweeper Company for infringement of claim 4 of reissued letters patent No. 13,508, for a vacuum sweeper, granted to Quist and Blanch January 7, 1913. On final hearing. Decree for complainant.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the National Sweeper Company against the Bissell Carpet Sweeper Company for infringement of letters patent No. 1,138,437, for a pneumatic sweeper, issued to Baender May 4, 1915. On final hearing. Decree for defendant.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the M. S. Wright Company against the Bissell Carpet Sweeper Company for infringement of letters patent No. 996,-810, for a pneumatic carpet cleaner, issued to Harold M. Sturgeon July 4, 1911. On final hearing.- Decree for defendant.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Hiram Royal Mallinson and Eugene Irving Hanson, copartners doing business as H. R. Mallinson & Co., against Matthew W. Ryan, trading as Wm. II. Brown & Co. On motion to dismiss bill.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Erik Sandberg and others against the British ship Talus. Decree for certain libelants, and against others.</p>

In Admiralty. Suit for collision by the Port of Portland, owner of the steam tug Ocklahama, against the steam schooner Temple E. Dorr, the Hicks-Hauptman Navigation Company, claimant, with cross-libel. Decree for libelant.

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of August H. Vocke, bankrupt. On review of an order of the referee.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by C. Bergher and others against the General Petroleum Company and others. Decree for libelants.</p>

<p>In the matter of certain petitions for naturalization filed by subjects of Germany.</p>

In Bankruptcy, In the matter of the bankruptcy of B. A. Collins. Petition by the H. M. Plobbie Grocery Company for review of an order of the referee denying reclamation of certain merchandise sold the bankrupt.

<p>At Law. Action by the United States against the Alpha Portland Cement Company. On rule for judgment for want of sufficient affidavit of defense.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by Minnie E. Madden against the Northern Pacific Railway Company. On demurrer to the complaint.</p>

Habeas corpus by the United States, on relation of Harry J. Lazarus, against Lieut. Col. Millard D. Brown, Commander of the First Regiment of the National Guard of Pennsylvania, now in the service of the United States Army, and another. On hearing upon petition and return of writ.

<p>At Law. Bill by the Port of Seattle against the Oregon & Washington Railroad Company and another. The action was removed to the federal court on petition of the first-named defendant. On motion to remand.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the City of Seattle against the Beer’s Building Company and the Guardian Casualty & Guaranty Company. On motion to remand to state court.</p>

<p>Petition by Charles Margiasso, alleged bankrupt, for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Murphy Boot & Shoe Company, bankrupt. On petition by Asa P. French for allowance of counsel fees.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Pickering' Land & Timber Company against William Wisby, Sr., and others for an injunction. On question of jurisdiction. Plaintiff, alleging that defendants had conspired together to intimidate and run off the negro labor employed at its sawmill, filed petition praying for writs of injunction.

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Pan-American Match Company, bankrupt. On review of certain rulings of the referee.</p>

<p>Application by Chin Own and another for bail.</p>

<p>Proceeding by the United States against One Certain Six-Passenger, Six-Cylinder, Forty-Eight Horse Power Eocomobile. On petition for return of the automobile.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of O. L. Ward & Co., a copartnership, and O. L. Ward, a member of such partnership, individually, bankrupts. On petition to review an order of the referee.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <@=^415(4) — Discharge op Bankrupt — Opposition by Trustee.</p> <p>After entry of an order discharging a bankrupt without objection, except by the trustee, who was not shown to have been authorized by the creditors to oppose the discharge, a rehearing will not be granted, to permit the trustee to produce evidence of his authority, which he had full opportunity to do on the hearing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 72(5.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Raymond Hubbell and others against the Royal Pastime Amusement Company. On motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus ©=>45(5) — Federal Courts — Persons in Custody or State Authorities — 'Remedy by Writ of Error.</p> <p>Except in cases of great urgency, a federal court will not. on habeas corpus, discharge a person in the custody of the state authorities, charged with a crime under the laws of the state, on the ground that his constitutional rights have been violated, but will leave him to his remedy by writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, after presenting his contention to the highest court of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 38-44 ; Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 804, 805, 990.]</p>

<p>At Raw. Action by Frey & Son, Incorporated, against the Welch Grape Juice Company. On exceptions to the clerk’s taxation of costs.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <©=3314(6) — Claims Provable — Taxes.</p> <p>Where a tax was valid under the laws of the state, and under the rule in that state deductions for debts could not be made, the tax could not be disallowed as a claim against the estate of a bankrupt corporation, on the ground that it was unjust or unlawful.</p> <p>[Ed. Nolo. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 486.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <©=3314(6) — Claims'—Taxes—Revision.</p> <p>The federal courts have power to revise state taxes presented as claims against the estates of bankrupts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 486.']</p>

<p>Aliens @=»61 — Naturalization—Alien Enemies — “Time of Application.”</p> <p>Under Rev. St. § 2171 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4362), providing that no alien, who is a native, citizen, subject, or denizen of any country with which the United States are at war at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen, the “time of his application” is the tim’e when he presents himself in open court to be admitted, and not the time of filing the petition giving notice of the application, and hence a citizen of Germany cannot be admitted to citizenship, where his application in open court was m'ade after a state of war existed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 119-122.]</p>