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← 242 Pa. Super. 435 - Kohn v. Kohn

242 Pa. Super. 435 - Kohn v. Kohn’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
2
states following
September 2013
most recently cited

35 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions — most recently September 2013 · most notably 326 Pa. Super. 14 - Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp. (1984), 327 Pa. Super. 377 - Metzger v. Clifford Realty Corp. (1984)

35 state decisions

19019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 71

Relies on Commissioner v. Lester · Easton v. Washington County Insurance · Unit Vending Corp. v. Lacas · Huffman v. Huffman · Wiegand v. Wiegand

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It very often happens that when two parties are trying to integrate their agreement in a writing they omit to state some fundamental assumption on the basis of which, as both of them well know, the agreement is being made. The mere existence of the writing should never be held to exclude testimony of such an unstated fundamental assumption. The truth of this assumption — the existence of the fact that is assumed — is a condition of the obligation of the written promise; ... Justice requires the courts, with the advantage of hindsight, to fill some of these gaps. Evidence of the facts tending to show that such a fundamental assumption was made, though not expressed in the writing, should never be excluded by any ‘parole evidence rule.’ ” 3 Corbin on Contracts Sec. 590 (1960).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In general the court must adopt the construction which gives effect to the parties’ reasonable and probable intent, in view of the surrounding circumstances and the purposes of the contract, (cites omitted) And, although a word is generally used for its ordinary meaning, the context of the instrument may indicate it was used in a different sense, (cites omitted) If the meaning of a term is not clear, aprol (sic) evidence is admissible to resolve the ambiguity, but not to alter the terms of the contract ---- the Restatement of Contracts, Second, § 240 provides: “Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish ... the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated____” Although there is Pennsylvania law stating that “parol evidence” may not be introduced unless the language of the written agreement is ambiguous on its face, this principle is substantially undercut by a competing proposition that extrinsic facts and circumstances may be proved to show that language apparently clear and unambiguous on its face is, in fact, latently ambiguous ...”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “court must adopt the construction which gives effect to the parties reasonable and probable intent in view of the surrounding circumstances and the purposes of the contract.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.