¶1dissenting. I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court because it does not appear from the trial court’s order that a finding was made on the facts involved here. The trial court’s order is as follows:
“. . . Now, upon this 29th day of October, 1966, upon reviewing the record herein, and a careful consideration of the briefs filed by the parties in the above matter, the 'Court is of the following opinion:
(1) The defendant’s Answer, being Section 2 of the Motion to 'Strike Amended Complaint, was only a general denial and there were no pleadings as to an affirmative defense of the defendant being as innocent purchaser for value.
(2) (a) No title passed from plaintiff to Joe Crowder as title was conditional upon payment of the check tendered for the purchase price.
(2) (b) Defendant was not an innocent purchaser for value. . .”
¶2The Uniform Commercial Code in effect in both Arkansas and Missouri with respect to the acquisition of goods here involved provides as follows:
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-403 (Add. 1961)—
“ (1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer ... A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though” (Emphasis supplied.)
# * #
“(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or”
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-1-201 (Add. 1961)—
“General definitions. — ”
…
“(19) ‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”
# # #
“(44) ‘Value’. Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections ... a person gives ‘value’ for rights if he acquires them”
“(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.”
¶3In referring to the order above set out, I agree with the majority opinion that appellant raised the issue of good faith purchaser for value. Item 2(a) is an incorrect statement of the law, for the reason that under the Uniform Commercial Code the court has to determine only whether the transferor, Joe Crowder, received voidable title from appellee, Don F. Chamberlin d/b/a Don’s Discount House. It appears to me that in Item 2(b) the court, as a matter of law, concluded that appellant was not an innocent purchaser for value because of its erroneous interpretation of the lavr with respect to Items 1 and 2(a).
¶4I am persuaded that this is so because in the trial of the case appellee objected to any evidence showing that appellant was a bona fide purchaser of the trailer, and at that time the trial court indicated that appellant had not pleaded such, but permitted the testimony to be admitted, reserving his ruling thereon with the statement that “it may be this is strictly a matter of law.” Under these circumstances, I think appellant was entitled to have the fact issue of his good faith, as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code, determined by the trial court.
¶5Therefore I respectfully dissent.