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← 243 F.2d 725 - I. T. Cohen v. The Pullman Company

I. T. Cohen v. The Pullman Company’s Empirical Analysis

243 F.2d 725 · 1957

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
2
states following
September 2014
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently September 2014

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

201957196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Yates v. Ball · Dung v. . Parker · 65 So. 2d 849 - Canell v. Arcola Housing Corp. · Schleifer v. Worcester North Savings Institution · Coral Gables Corp. v. Hamilton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““A careful consideration of the principles which lie back of and give force and meaning to the Statutes of Frauds of the several states, in the light of the authorities cited by both sides and discovered by us, leads us to the firm conclusion: that plaintiff’s pleading and admission in this case brings it well within the mischief which the Georgia Statute of Frauds was designed to meet; and that if we were to hold, as appellant asks us to do, that an action for damages could be based on the mere allegation that an oral promise to sell land was made without an intention to perform it, we would thereby thwart its basic purpose of preventing the subjection of real property to the jeopardy and hazard of oral agreements and would defeat and bring to naught the remedy for the very mischief the statute was enacted to provide against . . . “. . . [N]o sound reason . . . can, we think, be put forward for holding that a naked claim, as here, upon an oral promise to sel real estate, can be saved from the prohibitions of the statute by the simple device of merely aleging that the promise was made without the intention to perform it. The whole purpose of the statute is to prevent persons from being enmeshed in and harassed by claimed oral promises made in the course of negotiations not ending in contracts reduced to writing as required by these statutes.” (pp. 728, 729.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “The statute should be strictly construed to prevent the fraud it was designed to correct, and so long as it can be made to effectuate this purpose, courts should be reluctant to take cases from its protection.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “to prevent persons from being enmeshed in and harassed by claimed oral promises made in the course of negotiations not ending in contracts reduced to writing.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.