In Re: Jerald E. Brucher’s Empirical Analysis
2001
Citation profile
16
cited by 16 later decisions
2
states following
December 2009
most recently cited
2 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Carmichael v. Osherow · Dubroff v. First National Bank · In Re Moss · Robert McKown
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“§ 522(d)(10)(E)(iii) specifically denies exemption to those “similar plans or contracts” that fail to qualify under § 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision dealing exclusively with IRAs. This express Code-section reference to IRAs in the exception makes inescapable the conclusion that at least some— if not all — IRAs were intended to be included in the phrase “similar plan or contract.” Were that not so, there would be no exempt § 408 plans or contracts from which non § 408 plans or contracts could be exceptions.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) to the extent the plan or contract is described in section 401(a), 403, 408, or 457 of the Internal Revenue . Code of 1986, as amended, or payments under the plan or contract are or will be rolled over as provided in section 402(a)(5), 403(b)(8), or 408(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or (2) to the extent of the debtor’s aggregate interest under all plans and contracts up to a present value of $30,000 and additional amounts under all the plans and contracts to the extent reason ably necessary for the support of the debtor and any spouse or dependent of the debtor.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Clark v. Lindquist“(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(2) of this section: H« s>« H* # ‡ (11) The debtor’s right to receive, or property that is traceable to— $ $ ‡ ‡ ‡ i’fi (D) a payment, not to exceed $18,450, on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent; or”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. In Re Sanchez
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.