¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur completely with the majority and write only as the author of Williams v. State, 233 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1) (503 SE2d 324) (1998), to emphasize why the facts of this case are drastically different from Williams. First, in Williams, the stop was not under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968), as a reasonable articulable suspicion of DUI or other impairment, but the violation of a traffic law in the officer’s presence. See Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) (443 SE2d 474) (1994). Second, the delay in completing the Williamsstop arose from the delay in completing the computer traffic check caused by a common name, regarding the traffic offense. Then, there was further delay from the presence of a pistol in the vehicle, requiring further delay while a computer check was made of the gun. At no time was Williams asked to leave the vehicle prior to the consensual search.
¶3In this case, a Terrystop, as soon as the deputy smelled Hanson’s breath and observed him after examining his driver’s license and insurance card, further questions were outside the scope of the Terrystop, unless a new reasonable articulable suspicion had arisen, which *542had not occurred prior to the search. At that point Hanson should have been allowed to leave and any request to search should have been made. However, the driver and the passenger were separately questioned, and the driver was removed from the vehicle while the deputy held his driver’s license questioning him and stalling by making out a bogus warning. Further, the deputy told him that he could leave but ordered him to stop.
¶4concurring specially.
¶5Because I agree that under the totality of the circumstances the search was unreasonable under the Constitutions of both the United States and Georgia, I concur in the judgment.
¶6I write separately to emphasize that the husband’s consent to search the car did not, and could not, extend to the search of the wife’s purse that was in her possession and control at the time he consented to the search of her car. A purse is no mere container found in an automobile; it is a uniquely private item containing a person’s most confidential possessions. Further, it is an item that is universally recognized as one in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In this case, the wife’s consent to the search of her purse was not sought even though she was present and available to be asked.
¶7When the State attempts:
to justify a warrantless search on grounds of consent, it has the burden of proving the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Silence in the face of a request for permission to search may sometimes be interpreted as acquiescence, but such acquiescence cannot substitute for free consent. While [Huddleston’s] conduct may well have signaled acquiescence [since she did not object], it did not show consent. [Huddleston] was not informed of her right to refuse to consent to a search of her purse [,] and [she] did not give any express consent.
¶8(Citations omitted.) State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 529 (2) (b) (ii) (513 SE2d 1) (1999). Therefore, I also would find that the deputy was not authorized to search Huddleston’s purse based upon the consent to search the car given by Hanson. Id.
¶9On Motion for Reconsideration.
¶10On motion for reconsideration, the State erroneously contends that the opinion is in error at page 539, when it states:
[a]s a justification for stopping Hanson’s departure after his release by Deputy Sutton, prosecutor Presswood argued that *543the driver’s license inquiry had not come back at that time. This is clearly untrue as Hanson did not leave until after Deputy Sutton returned his driver’s license, handed him the warning, and told Hanson he was free to leave.
¶11State’s motion for reconsideration April 6, 2000.
¶12The transcript of the hearing reveals the following:
Mr. Presswood: Your Honor, we expect the evidence to show that the report back from the 911 center as to whether the license was valid or not did not come until after the consent was obtained to search the vehicle. And so, therefore. . . .
Mr. Radish: Excuse .me, Your Honor. That’s an incorrect statement. . . .
The Court: I thought it had all come back. I thought —
Mr. Radish: He even had let them go.
The Court: He’d given the man his license and he had let the man go.
Mr. Radish: Of course. He was — they had gotten the license report back and he told him to go to his car.
The Court: And he put his hand on the car. That’s true. He put his — you’re right. You’re absolutely right. He put his hand on the car. He was getting in the car to leave before he asked him, then, to search. He was on the way out. To me, that was caput. That was the end of it.
Mr. Radish: Correct.
The Court: Nothing else should have ever happened. . . .
Mr. Presswood, why would he continue? . . . You’re going to let him drive. He’s going to drive. He hasn’t violated any laws. There’s no showing of any illegal violations. You give him his license back, you tell him to leave and then you stop him again? For what reason?
Mr. Presswood: Your Honor, I would also expect the evidence to show that Sergeant Sutton has been trained in this technique, or even come up with this technique, under the impression that once you let a person go off a traffic stop and you ask them, “Do you mind if I ask you a few questions?” that then you’re in a consensual situation.
¶13(Emphasis supplied.) May 13, 1999 hearing transcript, pp. 74-76. Motion for reconsideration denied.