IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-53
Filed: 20 October 2015
Union County, No. 12CRS055887
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TAE KWON HAMMONDS, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 2 July 2014 by Judge
Tanya T. Wallace in Superior Court, Union County. Heard in the Court of Appeals
on 13 August 2015.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper III, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph E.
Elder, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender
Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
Tae Kwon Hammonds (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered after a
jury found him guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant argues that
the trial court erred in (1) denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements made
to police officers while he was involuntarily committed; and (2) ordering that
defendant pay $50 in restitution. We find no error in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
I. Background
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
The following evidence was presented by the State at trial: At approximately
8:30 p.m. on 10 December 2012, Stephanie Gaddy was walking to her car in a Wal-
Mart parking lot in Monroe when she noticed three men and a woman leaning against
a vehicle about ten parking spaces away. She was about to get into her vehicle when
she was approached from behind by a man who said “give me the money” and
demanded her purse. Ms. Gaddy noticed that the man was carrying a handgun and
realized she was being robbed. The man took her purse and cellphone. At trial, she
described the perpetrator as an African-American male with a deep voice but did not
identify defendant or any other individual as the perpetrator.
The next day, on 11 December 2012, defendant attempted suicide by taking an
overdose of “white pills” and was brought to Carolinas Medical Center Union Hospital
(“CMC Union”). At 3:50 p.m., while defendant was being treated at the hospital, a
Union County magistrate ordered that defendant be involuntarily committed.
Defendant was placed under 24-hour watch, during which a “sitter” was required to
continuously observe him and accompany him when he left his room. That night,
defendant became agitated and attempted to leave the hospital but was escorted back
to his room by hospital security.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. the next day, on 12 December 2012, Detective
Jonathan Williams and Lieutenant T.J. Goforth arrived at the hospital to speak with
defendant about the robbery of Ms. Gaddy. The police asked Nurse Jan Kinsella,
-2-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
defendant’s attending nurse at the time, if they could speak with defendant, which
she allowed. The police officers interviewed defendant in his hospital room for
approximately one and a half hours and did not inform defendant of his Miranda
rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). During the
interview, defendant confessed to the robbery, though he denied using a gun.
On or about 4 February 2013, a grand jury indicted defendant for robbery with
a dangerous weapon. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87 (2011). On or about 30 June 2014,
defendant moved to suppress the statements he made during the police interview on
the grounds that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without having been
given Miranda warnings, and that his confession was involuntary. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion to suppress and admitted an audio recording of the
interview at trial. The trial court later memorialized its findings of fact and
conclusions of law in a written order. On 2 July 2014, the jury found defendant guilty
of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to 60 to 84
months’ imprisonment and ordered that defendant pay $50 in restitution. Defendant
gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Motion to Suppress
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because (1) he was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda and did not receive the
Miranda warnings; and (2) his confession was involuntary.
-3-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in determining whether a
trial court properly denied a motion to suppress is whether
the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by the
evidence and whether its conclusions of law are, in turn,
supported by those findings of fact. The trial court’s
findings are conclusive on appeal if supported by
competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. The
determination of whether a defendant’s statements are
voluntary and admissible is a question of law and is fully
reviewable on appeal.
State v. Cortes-Serrano, 195 N.C. App. 644, 654-55,
673 S.E.2d 756, 762-63 (citations
and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied,
363 N.C. 376,
679 S.E.2d 138
(2009). “Additionally, the trial court’s determination of whether an interrogation is
conducted while a person is in custody involves reaching a conclusion of law, which
is fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Buchanan,
353 N.C. 332, 336,
543 S.E.2d 823,
826 (2001).
B. Findings of Fact
Defendant’s brief recounts much of the evidence from the hearing on the
motion to suppress and notes some findings that the trial court could have made but
did not. But our standard of review as to the findings of fact does not allow us to
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; the trial court determines the
weight and credibility of the evidence. And this order includes full and detailed
findings of fact, so we need not speculate about the basis for the trial court’s ruling.
Defendant ultimately challenges only small portions of three of the trial court’s
-4-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
Findings of Fact 2, 6, and 13 as unsupported or at least partially unsupported by the
evidence.
Finding of Fact 2 states as follows:
That on December 11th, 2012, at approximately 3:50
p.m., Magistrate Sherry Crowder, a Union County
Magistrate, issued a custody order for the involuntary
commitment of [defendant], and directed the Union County
Sheriff’s Department to deliver [defendant] to a facility for
examination and treatment. That the paper writing
introduced into evidence showed that the magistrate found
that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous to
himself or others; and the Sheriff’s Department was
directed to serve such paper writing on the defendant and
transport the defendant.
Defendant argues that Finding of Fact 2 was “partially unsupported by the
evidence, as the court found that the involuntary commitment order directed the
Union County Sheriff’s Department to deliver [defendant] to a facility [for]
treatment.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant is correct that the involuntary
commitment order, issued in Union County, directs “any law enforcement officer” to
“take [defendant] into custody within 24 hours after this order is signed and transport
[defendant] directly to a 24-hour facility designated by the State for the custody and
treatment of involuntary clients and present [defendant] for custody, examination
and treatment pending a district court hearing.” (Emphasis added and portion of
original in all caps.) The evidence also showed that a law enforcement officer from
the Union County Sheriff’s Office executed this order. The exact wording of Finding
-5-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
of Fact 2 is not strictly supported by the record, but defendant has not demonstrated
how the wording of the finding is prejudicial to him, and the substance of the facts is
supported by the record. This argument is without merit.
Defendant also argues that Finding of Fact 13, “that nurses were in and out of
the room during the interview and that [defendant] ‘was never isolated without the
ability to contact others,’ was unsupported by the evidence.” (Quoting Finding of Fact
13.) Finding of Fact 13 in its entirety is as follows:
The defendant was interviewed by Detective
Williams of the Monroe Police Department and Detective
T.J. Goforth at approximately five p.m. on December the
12th. They spoke with the defendant for approximately one
and [a] half hours. No Miranda Rights were given to the
defendant. On at least three occasions, however, the
defendant was told that, “there were no arrest warrants
with the officers,” and that they were not here to “lock you
up.” Indeed the defendant was not arrested and there were
no warrants present at the time they spoke with the
defendant. It is clear from the conversation that the
officers had with the defendant that they knew that he was
hospitalized as a result of an overdose, whether accidental
or intentional, and had been involuntarily committed, and
would be going for further evaluation and treatment. But
although the defendant’s words seem to be muttered,
especially initially, they were appropriate responses to the
statements or questions from the officers. The defendant
answered the questions or statements coherently and
appropriately. Throughout the conversation the defendant
never asked the officers to leave or to stop talking. There
was actually a sitter watching the interview, and nurses
were in and out. The defendant was never isolated without
the ability to contact others. The tone was conversational
between the officers and the defendant, although the
officers would confront the defendant when they believed
-6-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
that he was being less than truthful. The officers did not
tell the defendant he was being taped. There is no
indication that there had been any previous relationship
between the defendant and the officers. The nurse was not
an agent of the state [or] government. The defendant was
not arrested and no warrant issued at the time. The
defendant was unable to leave the hospital. He was not
actually at a police station and was not told that he could
not stop the conversation or request that the officers leave.
He was never threatened, voices were never raised. The
only promises made were such that the officers would tell
the [district attorney] about his cooperation, and that he
would be in a superior position to others if he told, before
others did, as to the facts of the circumstances of the
incident at Wal-Mart.
(Emphasis added.)
As noted above, only the underlined portion of this finding is challenged by
defendant as unsupported by the evidence. Defendant’s argument relies heavily upon
the hospital records and notations of times that nurses recorded activities in
defendant’s room, stressing periods of time when a nurse was not physically present
in the room. Yet we also note that defendant has not challenged Finding of Fact 8,
which states:
During the defendant’s stay in the hospital and
before he spoke with Monroe Police Department, he visited
with representatives of DayMark, who apparently was the
provider for his inpatient or outpatient follow-up from the
hospital. He also had others around, specifically his
mother, at times during his time in the hospital.
The trial court’s characterization of the nurses as being “in and out” of the room
is fully supported by the medical records, Nurse Kinsella’s testimony, and the
-7-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
transcript of the audio recording of the police interview. The trial court did not need
to prepare a detailed log of every moment that each person who visited or treated
defendant was in the room. There is no indication in the evidence that defendant was
ever isolated or prevented from contacting others, and Finding of Fact 8, which is
unchallenged, also addresses his contact with others. This argument is also without
merit.
Defendant also challenges Finding of Fact 6, specifically that defendant was
“normal.” Defendant asserts that the trial court found that he was normal simply
because “he scored a 15 on the Glascow Coma Scale, as the scale does not assess a
patient’s psychiatric or mental state. An alert and conscious patient who says, ‘I want
to walk now to London, England,’ scores 15 on the Glascow Coma Scale.” (Citation
omitted.) Defendant’s argument takes the word “normal” entirely out of context. In
context, the relevant portion of Finding of Fact 6 addresses Nurse Kinsella’s
testimony and states that
according to her review, a Glascow-Coma Scale was
administered when the defendant had arrived at the
[emergency room], which is a quick and objective way to
determine a patient’s physical and mental state. It
includes such criteria as the ability of keeping eyes open,
whether oriented and can converse, obey commands,
vocalize pain. That the defendant registered a fifteen on
the Glascow-Coma Scale, (even on admission) and that is
termed “normal”.
-8-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
This finding is fully supported by the evidence, and it is not, as defendant
implies, a finding that defendant’s mental state upon his admission to the emergency
room after a suicide attempt and involuntary commitment was entirely “normal.”
The trial court was addressing defendant’s state of consciousness upon arrival at the
emergency room, and in other findings the trial court addresses defendant’s mental
and emotional state, both upon arrival and after treatment, in detail. Defendant does
not challenge those findings as unsupported by the evidence.
The trial court’s findings of fact which were not challenged on appeal are
binding on this court on appeal, and the challenged findings were supported by the
record, so all of the trial court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal. See State v.
Phillips, 151 N.C. App. 185, 190-91,
565 S.E.2d 697, 701 (2002); State v. Jackson,
308
N.C. 549, 581,
304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983).
C. Custody
i. Automatic Custody
Defendant’s argument suggests that a defendant who has been involuntarily
committed in the hospital is automatically “in custody” for purposes of Miranda
warnings. The briefs from both defendant and the State focus on cases which have
addressed interrogations in hospital settings where a defendant was voluntarily
seeking medical care, while defendant here was in the hospital due to involuntary
commitment. The dissent also distinguishes the cases dealing with hospitalized
-9-
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
defendants because they deal with persons voluntarily in the hospital for treatment
and would require the trial court to apply a new and different analysis to the
questioning of an involuntarily committed person. We agree that involuntary
commitment is different from a voluntary hospitalization, as there is no doubt that
involuntary commitment places a person in custody and his freedom of movement
may be restricted by law enforcement officers. But we believe that cases dealing with
incarcerated defendants who have been questioned regarding other crimes unrelated
to their current imprisonment are instructive on this issue, and our courts have
simply not considered the fact that the defendant is incarcerated as determinative.
Since involuntary commitment is arguably less restrictive than incarceration, and
certainly not more restrictive, we do not adopt a more restrictive rule for involuntary
commitment than for incarceration.
In determining whether defendant was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda,
this situation is closely analogous to cases which address interviews of a prisoner who
has been incarcerated for another crime, when law enforcement officers attempt to
speak with him about another entirely separate crime. In State v. Fisher, this Court
held that an inmate is not “automatically in custody for the purposes of Miranda[,]”
and our Supreme Court affirmed this ruling per curiam. 158 N.C. App. 133, 145,
580
S.E.2d 405, 415 (2003), aff’d per curiam,
358 N.C. 215,
593 S.E.2d 583 (2004). There,
we noted:
- 10 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
It is well established that Miranda warnings are
required only when a defendant is subjected to custodial
interrogation. Because the determination of whether a
defendant was in custody is a question of law, it is fully
reviewable here.
A person is in custody, for purposes of
Miranda, when he is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way, and an inmate who is
subject to a custodial interrogation is entitled
to Miranda warnings. An inmate, however, is
not, because of his incarceration,
automatically in custody for the purposes of
Miranda; rather, whether an inmate is in
custody must be determined by considering
his freedom to depart from the place of his
interrogation.
Factors which bear on the determination of whether
an inmate is in custody for purposes of Miranda include:
(1) whether the inmate was free to refuse to go to the place
of the interrogation; (2) whether the inmate was told that
participation in the interrogation was voluntary and that
he was free to leave at any time; (3) whether the inmate
was physically restrained from leaving the place of
interrogation; and (4) whether the inmate was free to
refuse to answer questions.
Id., 580 S.E.2d 415 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
This Court has followed this rule in State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 129,
526 S.E.2d 678, 680-81 (2000), and State v. Wright,
184 N.C. App. 464, 470-71,
646
S.E.2d 625, 629 (2007), cert. denied,
362 N.C. 372,
662 S.E.2d 393 (2008). In addition,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees:
[Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1,
20 L. Ed. 2d 381
(1968),] clearly holds that the fact that a defendant is
imprisoned on an unrelated matter does not necessarily
- 11 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
remove the necessity for Miranda warnings. Nothing in
that opinion, however, suggests that an inmate is
automatically “in custody” and therefore entitled to
Miranda warnings, merely by virtue of his prisoner status.
...
We also decline to read Mathis as compelling the use
of Miranda warnings prior to all prisoner interrogations
and hold that a prison inmate is not automatically always
in “custody” within the meaning of Miranda. [The
defendant’s] view of the Mathis decision would seriously
disrupt prison administration by requiring, as a prudential
measure, formal warnings prior to many of the myriad
informal conversations between inmates and prison guards
which may touch on past or future criminal activity and
which may yield potentially incriminating statements
useful at trial. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, this
approach would “torture [Miranda] to the illogical position
of providing greater protection to a prisoner than to his
nonimprisoned counterpart.” [Cervantes v. Walker, 589
F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978).] Such a result would be
directly at odds with established constitutional doctrine
that while persons in government-imposed confinement
retain various rights secured by the Bill of Rights, they
retain them in forms qualified by the exigencies of prison
administration and the special governmental interests that
result. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539,
94 S. Ct.
2963,
41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) (qualified sixth amendment
rights of inmates in prison disciplinary proceedings); Bell
v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520,
99 S. Ct. 1861,
60 L. Ed. 2d 447
(1979) (qualified fifth amendment liberty interest of pretrial detainee); Hudson v. Palmer, [
468 U.S. 517],
104 S.
Ct. 3194,
82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984) (qualified fourth
amendment right of inmates).
....
Prisoner interrogation simply does not lend itself
easily to analysis under the traditional formulations of the
Miranda rule. A rational inmate will always accurately
perceive that his ultimate freedom of movement is
absolutely restrained and that he is never at liberty to
leave an interview conducted by prison or other
- 12 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
government officials. Evaluation of prisoner interrogations
in traditional freedom-to-depart terms would be
tantamount to a per se finding of “custody,” a result we
refuse to read into the Mathis decision.
United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S.
830,
93 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1986) (third alteration in original).
A person who has been involuntarily committed is certainly a “person[] in
government-imposed confinement[,]” just as an incarcerated defendant, and the
exigencies of the administration of hospitals and inpatient facilities which treat
patients with psychiatric conditions are quite similar to those of prisons. See id. at
973. For example, if every involuntarily committed person held in an emergency
room, hospital, or other mental health treatment facility is automatically “in custody”
for purposes of Miranda, a law enforcement officer who simply needs to ask a patient
for information about an altercation or theft which had occurred in the facility would
have to first notify the person of his Miranda rights, regardless of the other
circumstances of the interview. Such a result is “directly at odds with established
constitutional doctrine that while persons in government-imposed confinement retain
various rights secured by the Bill of Rights, they retain them in forms qualified by
the exigencies of prison administration and the special governmental interests that
result.” See id. For these reasons, we hold that defendant was not automatically “in
custody” for purposes of Miranda based simply upon his involuntary commitment and
- 13 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
instead we consider the circumstances of defendant’s statements in the same manner
as courts have considered interviews of incarcerated defendants.
ii. Totality of the Circumstances
In light of the above discussion, we must address whether the trial court’s
findings of fact support its conclusion of law that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. Generally,
“the appropriate inquiry in determining whether a defendant is ‘in custody’ for
purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was
a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339,
543 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added and
quotation marks omitted). In the context of a hospitalized defendant, this Court
examines “(1) whether the defendant was free to go at his pleasure; (2) whether the
defendant was coherent in thought and speech, and not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol; and (3) whether officers intended to arrest the defendant.” State v. Allen,
200 N.C. App. 709, 714,
684 S.E.2d 526, 530 (2009). “This Court has also made a
distinction between questioning that is accusatory and that which is investigatory.”
Id.,684 S.E.2d at 530. In Allen, this Court held that the defendant was not “in
custody” and noted that “[a]ny restraint in movement [the] defendant may have
experienced at the hospital was due to his medical treatment and not the actions of
the police officers.”
Id. at 715,
684 S.E.2d at 531.
- 14 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
In United States v. Jamison, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also stressed
this distinction:
Analysis of whether [the defendant] was in custody
. . . depends on whether a reasonable person would have
felt free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter[.] In dissecting the perceptions of
such a reasonable person, however, we must be careful to
separate the restrictions on his freedom arising from police
interrogation and those incident to his background
circumstances. That is, to the extent [the defendant] felt
constrained by his injuries, the medical exigencies they
created (e.g., the donning of a hospital gown and the
insertion of an I.V. line), or the routine police investigation
they initiated, such limitations on his freedom should not
factor into our reasonable-person analysis. It is this careful
differentiation between police-imposed restraint and
circumstantial restraint that leads us to conclude that [the
defendant] was not in custody[.]
U.S. v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted).
In the context of a prison inmate, this Court examines “(1) whether the inmate
was free to refuse to go to the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the inmate was
told that participation in the interrogation was voluntary and that he was free to
leave at any time; (3) whether the inmate was physically restrained from leaving the
place of interrogation; and (4) whether the inmate was free to refuse to answer
questions.” Fisher, 158 N.C. App. at 145,
580 S.E.2d at 415 (quotation marks
omitted). In Conley, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in determining whether a
prison inmate was “in custody,” examined the “circumstances of the interrogation to
- 15 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
determine whether the inmate was subject to more than the usual restraint on a
prisoner’s liberty to depart.” Conley, 779 F.2d at 973 (emphasis added).
In addressing the issue of custody, we apply an objective test:
Throughout the years, the United States Supreme
Court has stressed that the initial determination of custody
depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by
either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned. Unless they are communicated or otherwise
manifested to the person being questioned, an officer’s
evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the
objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview,
and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry. Nor
can an officer’s knowledge or beliefs bear upon the custody
issue unless they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the
individual being questioned. A policeman’s unarticulated
plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was
in custody at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is
how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
understood his situation.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 341-42,
543 S.E.2d at 829 (emphasis added and citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court made Finding of Fact 13, as quoted above. During the
interview, the police officers told defendant that he was not being arrested and in fact
did not arrest him. The officers never told defendant that he could not stop the
conversation or that he could not request that they leave, and the officers never
threatened defendant or raised their voices. Defendant was “never isolated without
the ability to contact others[,]” a sitter watched the interview, and nurses were “in
- 16 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
and out” during the interview. Given that the factors in Allen or Fisher do not
squarely apply to the context of an involuntarily committed defendant, we focus on
“how a reasonable man in [defendant’s] position would have understood his
situation.” See Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 341-42,
543 S.E.2d at 829. While the dissent
is correct that defendant was not free to leave the hospital, “we must be careful to
separate the restrictions on his freedom arising from police interrogation and those
incident to his background circumstances.” See Jamison,
509 F.3d at 629. In other
words, we must analyze how a reasonable person, in defendant’s position, would have
perceived the purpose of the restriction on his movement, whether it be for police
interrogation or for medical treatment.
On 11 December 2012, the night before the police approached defendant,
defendant “tried to leave the room, but was escorted back by security.” Given the fact
that defendant’s attempt to escape took place before the police interview, coupled with
the attendant circumstances of the interview, as discussed above, we hold that a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would understand that the restriction on
his movement was due to his involuntary commitment to receive medical treatment,
not police interrogation. See Allen, 200 N.C. App. at 715,
684 S.E.2d at 531 (holding
that the defendant was not “in custody” and noting that “[a]ny restraint in movement
[the] defendant may have experienced at the hospital was due to his medical
treatment and not the actions of the police officers”). Additionally, the test in Conley
- 17 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
accords with this result, as defendant was not subject to “more than the usual
restraint[.]” See Conley, 779 F.2d at 973.
The dissent correctly cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-205(a), for the proposition
that if an involuntarily committed patient of a 24-hour facility escapes, the
responsible professional shall immediately notify law enforcement. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 122C-205(a) (2011). But a prison inmate who attempts to escape prison would
also be met with police resistance, and yet as discussed above, numerous courts have
held that a prison inmate is not automatically “in custody” for purposes of Miranda.
We hold that the purpose behind a defendant’s restraint is much more relevant than
the force that can potentially be summoned to thwart a breach of that restraint. In
light of Buchanan, Allen, Conley, and Jamison, we agree with the trial court that
defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. The trial court properly
considered all of the factors to determine if defendant was in custody and did not err
in its conclusion of law that based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant was
not in custody at the time he was interviewed.
D. Voluntariness
Defendant next challenges the trial court’s conclusion of law that his
statements during the police interview were voluntary. Under the United States
Constitution, the question is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
that the statement was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
- 18 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
by its maker[.]” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602,
6 L. Ed. 2d 1037, 1057
(1961); see also State v. Bordeaux,
207 N.C. App. 645, 647,
701 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2010).
In considering whether a statement was voluntary, the court must assess “the totality
of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 226,
36 L. Ed.
2d 854, 862 (1973). We consider the following factors:
whether defendant was in custody, whether he was
deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored,
whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the
interrogation, whether there were physical threats or
shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain
the confession, the familiarity of the declarant with the
criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the
declarant.
Cortes-Serrano, 195 N.C. App. at 655,
673 S.E.2d at 763. “Admonitions by officers to
a suspect to tell the truth, standing alone, do not render a confession inadmissible. .
. . [To be improper, an] inducement of hope must promise relief from the criminal
charge to which the confession relates.” State v. McCullers,
341 N.C. 19, 27,
460
S.E.2d 163, 168 (1995). In State v. Smith, a police officer testified that he told the
defendant during an interrogation: “I couldn’t tell him what would happened [sic],
but it will be better for him when he came to court that he would tell—that we would
tell the [district attorney] and the judge that he told the truth about it.”
328 N.C. 99,
115,
400 S.E.2d 712, 720-21 (1991) (first alteration in original and brackets omitted).
Our Supreme Court held that this statement did not constitute an improper promise
- 19 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
and that the defendant’s confession was voluntary. Id. at 115, 118,
400 S.E.2d 721-
22.
As relevant to defendant’s argument regarding voluntariness, the trial court
found as follows:
9. That Nurse [Kinsella] checked the defendant for
fall risk, that he was alert; he was not confused, he was
oriented, he had a quick “get up and go”, and he could
respond quickly to moving out of the bed, and had no
medications to make him confused at the time that she saw
him.
10. That he was actually discharged from the care
of the emergency room at 21:00 hours on 12-12. That he
had to be medically stable for such to occur. That he
actually clothed himself to leave before he actually left.
11. That when the nurse went off duty, she noted
that the defendant’s vital signs were within normal limits,
his behavior was calm, he had proper emotional support;
she had gone over the coping skills with him, and they were
effective. She had discussed his concerns and suicide
precautions were still in place. Nurse [Kinsella] had been
on duty approximately two hours when two detectives
arrived from the Monroe Police Department. They checked
with her before they went to the defendant’s room, and she
told them that he was alert, oriented, and they were
welcome to talk with him. She did not ask the defendant if
he wished to speak with them, and did not tell the officers
why the defendant was there, although it is clear from the
conversation that they were aware that he was actually
involuntarily committed at that time.
....
13. The defendant was interviewed by Detective
Williams of the Monroe Police Department and Detective
T.J. Goforth at approximately five p.m. on December the
12th. They spoke with the defendant for approximately one
and [a] half hours. No Miranda Rights were given to the
defendant. On at least three occasions, however, the
- 20 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
defendant was told that, “there were no arrest warrants
with the officers,” and that they were not here to “lock you
up.” Indeed the defendant was not arrested and there were
no warrants present at the time they spoke with the
defendant. It is clear from the conversation that the
officers had with the defendant that they knew that he was
hospitalized as a result of an overdose, whether accidental
or intentional, and had been involuntarily committed, and
would be going for further evaluation and treatment. But
although the defendant’s words seem to be muttered,
especially initially, they were appropriate responses to the
statements or questions from the officers. The defendant
answered the questions or statements coherently and
appropriately. Throughout the conversation the defendant
never asked the officers to leave or to stop talking. There
was actually a sitter watching the interview, and nurses
were in and out. The defendant was never isolated without
the ability to contact others. The tone was conversational
between the officers and the defendant, although the
officers would confront the defendant when they believed
that he was being less than truthful. The officers did not
tell the defendant he was being taped. There is no
indication that there had been any previous relationship
between the defendant and the officers. The nurse was not
an agent of the state [or] government. The defendant was
not arrested and no warrant issued at the time. The
defendant was unable to leave the hospital. He was not
actually at a police station and was not told that he could
not stop the conversation or request that the officers leave.
He was never threatened, voices were never raised. The
only promises made were such that the officers would tell
the [district attorney] about his cooperation, and that he
would be in a superior position to others if he told, before
others did, as to the facts of the circumstances of the
incident at Wal-Mart.
14. At the time of the interview the defendant had
had no drugs administered by the hospital in more than
fourteen hours. The Court has had a chance to review the
witnesses and listen to the tape, and finds the defendant to
be at all times coherent and understanding of the
- 21 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
questions, and appropriately responsive in his answers.
There appears nothing from the Court listening to the tape
that indicates the defendant was under the influence of any
medication, and certainly not under the influence of
medications that would cause him to be incapable of
understanding the context or words that were coming to
him and issued by him. The defendant was coherent in
thought and speech and not under the influence of drugs or
alcohol at the time the statement was made.
The trial court concluded: “Based on the totality of the circumstances, the
Court finds the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and understanding statement
to the officers[.]”
The trial court’s findings of fact addressed the obvious concerns raised by the
evidence in this case. Defendant had been involuntarily committed and had
attempted a drug overdose. The trial court’s extensive findings of fact, only a portion
of which are quoted above, demonstrate that the court carefully considered all of the
circumstances and defendant’s mental and emotional state. In addition, there was
an audio recording of the interview, which the trial court reviewed and was able to
hear both the officers’ questions and defendant’s responses and demeanor. A trial
court, and this Court, should exercise a high degree of care to ensure that the rights
of a person in defendant’s condition, who has been involuntarily committed and may
suffer from an impairing mental or emotional condition, are protected. But the trial
court did exactly that in this case.
- 22 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant also contends that his confession was not voluntary because the
police officers made threats, promises, and accusations of lying. But we are bound by
the findings the trial court actually made, as they are either unchallenged or
supported by the evidence. See Phillips, 151 N.C. App. at 190-91,
565 S.E.2d at 701;
Jackson,
308 N.C. at 581,
304 S.E.2d at 152. The trial court found that “the officers
would confront the defendant when they believed that he was being less than
truthful.” The trial court also found that the police officers never threatened
defendant and promised only that they “would tell the [district attorney] about his
cooperation, and that he would be in a superior position to others if he told, before
others did, as to the facts of the circumstances of the incident at Wal-Mart.” The
police officers’ exhortations that defendant tell the truth did not render defendant’s
confession involuntary. See McCullers,
341 N.C. at 27,
460 S.E.2d at 168.
Additionally, the police officers’ promise that they would tell the district attorney
about defendant’s cooperation and that he would be in a “superior position to others”
was not improper and did not vitiate the voluntariness of defendant’s confession. See
id.,460 S.E.2d at 168; Smith,
328 N.C. at 115, 118,
400 S.E.2d at 721-22; State v.
Richardson,
316 N.C. 594, 603-04,
342 S.E.2d 823, 830-31 (1986) (holding that a
detective’s statement to the defendant that “the district attorney usually responds
favorably when a defendant cooperates” did not render the defendant’s confession
involuntary).
- 23 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant’s reliance on State v. Pruitt, where our Supreme Court held that the
defendant’s confession was involuntary, is misplaced. See 286 N.C. 442, 458,
212
S.E.2d 92, 102-03 (1975). There,
the interrogation of defendant by three police officers took
place in a police-dominated atmosphere. Against this
background the officers repeatedly told defendant that
they knew that he had committed the crime and that his
story had too many holes in it; that he was “lying” and that
they did not want to “fool around.” Under these
circumstances one can infer that the language used by the
officers tended to provoke fright. This language was then
tempered by statements that the officers considered
defendant the type of person “that such a thing would prey
heavily upon” and that he would be “relieved to get it off
his chest.” This somewhat flattering language was capped
by the statement that “it would simply be harder on him if
he didn’t go ahead and cooperate.” Certainly the latter
statement would imply a suggestion of hope that things
would be better for defendant if he would cooperate, i.e.,
confess.
Id.,212 S.E.2d at 102. In contrast, here, the “tone was conversational between the
officers and the defendant, although the officers would confront the defendant when
they believed that he was being less than truthful.” Accordingly, we distinguish
Pruitt.
Defendant’s reliance on State v. Flood, where this Court held that a police
officer made an improper promise, is similarly misplaced. See ___ N.C. App. ___, ____,
765 S.E.2d 65, 72 (2014), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___,
768 S.E.2d 854 (2015).
There,
- 24 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
[d]uring the interview, Agent Oaks suggested she would
work with and help Defendant if he confessed and that she
“would recommend that defendant get treatment” instead
of jail time. She also asserted that Detective Schwab “can
ask for, you know, leniency, give you this, do this. He can
ask the District Attorney’s Office for certain things. It’s
totally up to them what they do with that but they’re going
to look for recommendations.” Agent Oaks further
suggested to Defendant that
if you admit to what happened here Detective
Schwab is going to probably talk to the
District Attorney and say, “hey, this is my
recommendation. Hey, this guy was honest
with us. This guy has done everything we’ve
asked him to do. What can we do?” and talk
about it.
At one point, Agent Oaks asked Defendant directly: “Do
you want my help?” Agent Oaks also threatened that any
possibility of help from her or Detective Schwab would
cease after their conversation with Defendant ended, once
even after Defendant asked to speak to his mother on the
phone.
Id. at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 72 (brackets and ellipses omitted). In contrast, here, the
police officers never threatened defendant and promised only that they “would tell
the [district attorney] about his cooperation, and that he would be in a superior
position to others if he told, before others did, as to the facts of the circumstances of
the incident at Wal-Mart.” Accordingly, we also distinguish Flood and hold that the
trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion of law that defendant’s confession
was voluntary.1
1 We also note that this Court in Flood held that the defendant’s confession was voluntary
despite its conclusion that Agent Oaks made an improper promise. Id. at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 74.
- 25 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
III. Restitution
Defendant’s last argument is that the trial court erred in ordering defendant
to pay $50 in restitution because Ms. Gaddy did not testify regarding the value of her
identity card or medications, which defendant had stolen and had not been returned
to her. The State agrees with defendant but argues that the appropriate remedy is
to remand the case to the trial court for further consideration.
A. Standard of Review
Although defendant failed to object to this issue, we hold that this issue is
preserved for appellate review. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(18) (2013); State v.
Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 402-03,
699 S.E.2d 911, 917 (2010). “[W]e review de novo
whether the restitution order was supported by evidence adduced at trial or at
sentencing.” State v. Wright,
212 N.C. App. 640, 645,
711 S.E.2d 797, 801 (quotation
marks omitted), disc. review denied,
365 N.C. 351,
717 S.E.2d 743 (2011).
B. Analysis
[T]he amount of restitution recommended by the trial court
must be supported by evidence adduced at trial or at
sentencing. . . .
Prior case law reveals two general approaches: (1) when
there is no evidence, documentary or testimonial, to
support the award, the award will be vacated, and (2) when
there is specific testimony or documentation to support the
award, the award will not be disturbed.
State v. Moore, 365 N.C. 283, 285,
715 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2011). In Moore, our Supreme
Court articulated a third approach for cases that fall in the middle ground.
Id. at
- 26 -
STATE V. HAMMONDS
Opinion of the Court
285-86, 715 S.E.2d at 849-50. The Court held that “some evidence” supported an
award of restitution but that the evidence was not specific enough to support the
amount of the award.
Id. at 286,
715 S.E.2d at 849. The Court remanded the case to
the trial court for a new hearing to determine the appropriate amount of restitution.
Id.,715 S.E.2d at 849-50. Because there is some evidence to support an award of
restitution but the evidence is not specific enough to support the amount of the award,
we vacate the restitution order and remand for a new hearing to determine the
appropriate amount of restitution. See
id.,715 S.E.2d at 849-50.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons noted above, we hold that the trial court committed no error
during the guilt-innocence phase, vacate the restitution order, and remand the case
for a new hearing to determine the appropriate amount of restitution.
NO ERROR IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Judge MCCULLOUGH concurs.
Judge INMAN dissents.
- 27 -
No. COA15-53 – State v. Hammonds
INMAN, Judge, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision that defendant’s
statement to police was noncustodial because, in my view, the circumstances of a
person who has been involuntarily committed require inquiry and analysis beyond
that performed by the trial court here.
The issue of whether and in what circumstances police questioning of an
involuntarily committed person is custodial is one of first impression in North
Carolina. While I agree with the majority that the nature of involuntary commitment
does not render police questioning custodial per se, the analysis employed by North
Carolina’s appellate courts in other settings does not address the circumstances of a
person who has been placed in custody involuntarily, who has not been charged with
any crime, and whose mental condition merits inpatient treatment. It is incumbent
upon trial courts in such cases to apply the factors identified by this Court and the
North Carolina Supreme Court in other settings and to consider additional factors
that are not at issue in other settings and have not previously been addressed by
these courts. The additional factors include whether the involuntarily committed
person expressly consented to the police interview and whether the person was told
he was free to exit the interview area or to ask the officers to leave his presence.
I acknowledge that the trial court’s findings of fact with regard to a motion to
suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence, and I
agree that defendant has not managed to refute the few findings he challenged based
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
on this standard of review. I disagree, however, with the majority’s review of the trial
court’s determination of whether defendant was in custody when he was questioned,
a conclusion of law fully reviewable on appeal. In my view, the trial court erred by
applying a legal analysis inconsistent with this Court’s precedent in other settings
and by failing to weigh other factors necessary to determine whether police
questioning of an involuntarily committed person was custodial.
The facts here – many of them found by the trial court – demonstrate the
shortcomings in the analysis and conclusion that defendant was not in custody when
questioned. Defendant was confronted without warning by two police detectives in
the room where he was confined against his will. Neither the detectives nor any
medical provider asked defendant to consent to an interview. The detectives did not
introduce themselves to defendant at the beginning of the interview. Detective
Williams simply began questioning defendant about his condition and the
circumstances leading to his hospitalization. It appears from the evidence that
defendant had no place to retreat to if he wished to avoid questioning, although the
trial court made no finding in this regard. It is also unclear whether defendant was
free to leave his bed during police questioning; at the end of the interview Detective
Goforth offered to swap out an old tray of food from defendant’s bedside with a tray
elsewhere in the room, “and put the fresh one where you can reach it.” The trial court
made no finding in this regard.
2
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
The circumstances of an involuntarily committed person are not the same as
those of a typical hospital patient. In the hospital cases cited by the majority, the
defendant was in a medical facility on his own volition, not legally restrained in any
way. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 200 N.C. App. 709, 715,
684 S.E.2d 526, 531 (2009) (the
defendant was not in custody where his restraint of movement was due to medical
treatment for a cut); United States v. Jamison,
509 F.3d 623, 633 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“Absent police-imposed restraint, there is no custody.”).
I also disagree with the majority that cases addressing questioning of prison
and jail inmates are so closely analogous as to obviate the need for additional inquiry
where the person subject to questioning has been involuntarily committed. Unlike
prison and jail inmates, who necessarily have been advised of their Miranda rights
in the course of their prior arrests, and who often have had the benefit of counsel in
the course of their criminal cases, involuntarily committed patients may have had no
prior occasion to be so advised or even to think about their rights if approached by
police.
Involuntary commitment, as set out in our General Statutes, is a physical
detention executed by government actors against the will of an individual. The
General Assembly unequivocally describes involuntary commitment as the taking of
a person into “custody.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-252 (2013) (describing facilities
to be utilized for “the custody and treatment of involuntary clients”); N.C. Gen. Stat.
3
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
§ 122C-261 (2013) (specifying that the purpose of an involuntary commitment order
is “to take the respondent into custody for examination by a physician or eligible
psychologist”). Indeed, the order by which the Union County magistrate committed
defendant was titled “Custody Order.”
The Custody Order served on defendant in this case specified that, after taking
defendant into custody, the law enforcement officer was required to inform him that
he “[was] not under arrest and has not committed a crime, but is being transported
to receive treatment and for his or her own safety and that of others.” The required
disclaimer belies the similarity between a formal arrest and the taking of an
individual into custody for the purposes of involuntary commitment, a comparison
this Court has recognized before. In In re Zollicoffer, we reasoned that:
[T]he requirements for a custody order under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 122C-261 are analogous to those where a criminal
suspect is subject to loss of liberty through the issuance of
a warrant for arrest. In both instances a magistrate or
other approved official must find probable cause (though
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-261 the synonymous term
reasonable grounds is used) supporting the issuance of the
order or warrant. In both cases the magistrate has the
power to deprive a person of his liberty pending a more
thorough and demanding determination of the evidence
against him.
165 N.C. App. 462, 466,
598 S.E.2d 696, 699 (2004); see also In re Moore, __ N.C. App.
__,
758 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2014) (“We have drawn [a comparison between involuntary
commitment and arrest] because a custody order deprives a person of their liberty
4
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
and therefore is analogous to a criminal proceeding, like the issuance of an arrest
warrant, where a defendant is deprived of his liberty.”).
The General Assembly also has recognized that both a formal arrest and
involuntary commitment feature substantial loss of liberty, because indigent persons
subject to either are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-451(a)(1),(6) (2013); see also McBride v. McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 126,
431
S.E.2d 14, 16 (1993) (“[I]n determining whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel for an indigent litigant in a particular proceeding, a court must first focus
on the potential curtailment of the indigent’s personal liberty[.]”).
Many of the findings entered by the trial court in this case reflect the similarity
between a formal arrest and an involuntary commitment custody order. The trial
court noted that Custody Order directed “any law enforcement officer” to take
defendant into custody and transport him to a 24-hour health facility. When
defendant tried to leave the hospital on the night of 11 December, he was escorted
back to his room by a uniformed security officer. The trial court found as an
uncontested fact that “[defendant] was unable to leave the hospital.” Any 24-hour
facility that accepts involuntarily committed clients is required to immediately notify
the appropriate law enforcement agency if any such patient leaves the premises, and
that law enforcement agency is in turn required to take the client into custody and
remit him to the 24-hour facility from which he “escaped.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-
5
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
205(a) (2013).
Assuming arguendo that the cases involving police questioning of inmates,
relied upon by the majority, were sufficient to apply in this case, they do not support
the trial court’s conclusion in this case. This Court in State v. Fisher held that
“whether an inmate is in custody must be determined by considering his freedom to
depart from the place of his interrogation.” 158 N.C. App. 133, 145,
580 S.E.2d 405,
415 (2003) aff'd,
358 N.C. 215,
593 S.E.2d 583 (2004). In contrast, defendant was not
free to leave his hospital room.
Fisher’s further holding, which is quoted by the majority and bears repeating,
requires the trial court to consider the following specific factors: “(1) whether the
[involuntarily committed person] was free to refuse to go to the place of the
interrogation; (2) whether the [person] was told that participation in the
interrogation was voluntary and that he was free to leave at any time; (3) whether
the [person] was physically restrained from leaving the place of interrogation; and (4)
whether the [person] was free to refuse to answer questions.” Id. (citations and
quotation marks omitted). The first two factors, applied to the trial court’s findings
in this case, suggest that defendant was in custody: he was not free to refuse to go to
the place of the interrogation and he was not told that his participation was voluntary
or that he was free to leave. The trial court’s findings do not reflect consideration of
the third and fourth factors.
6
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
Although the trial court found that defendant “was not told that he could not
stop the conversation or request that the officers leave,” the double negative reveals
an attenuated approach to the facts and misstates the second factor provided in
Fisher. It appears undisputed that the police detectives did not tell defendant that
he could stop the conversation or that he could ask the officers to leave.
After entering defendant’s room and asking about his health condition,
detectives first asked defendant about thefts from lockers at his workplace, unrelated
to the charges and convictions on appeal here. After defendant denied any
involvement, the detectives told him that they were being “lenient” by coming to him
without an arrest warrant and that “unless you tell us the truth, then we have to do
what we have to do. . . . Because we already know. It’s just that we want to hear it
from you.” After demonstrating to defendant that he could not avoid culpability by
his denials because of their superior knowledge, police detectives then questioned
defendant about the robbery of Ms. Gaddy underlying the charges and convictions at
issue in this appeal. Detective Goforth repeated her forecast of the consequences
without his cooperation: “But the thing is is that, like I said, I mean, that man right
there [Detective Williams] needs a warrant. He’s already got everything he needs.
It’s a done deal.” The nature of the police detectives’ statements to defendant, no
matter how softly spoken or conversational in tone, and notwithstanding their
assurances that he would not be arrested there on the spot, would seem to suggest to
7
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
any reasonable person that police already had enough information to bring charges
but were giving him a chance to cooperate in hopes of mitigating his exposure. In my
view, a reasonable person in defendant’s position presented with this information
from two police officers at his bedside would hardly consider the conversation an
informal one. The trial court’s findings of fact did not address these circumstances.
Unlike the defendant in Fisher, defendant expressed no consent to speak with
police officers and in fact had no warning that they were coming to question him. The
officers simply asked the nurse monitoring defendant for permission to enter the
room, which she granted without seeking defendant’s consent. While the issue has
not previously been addressed in North Carolina, courts in other jurisdictions
considering police questioning involuntarily committed patients have noted such
factors as central to the custody analysis. Compare United States v. Hallford, No.
13–0335(RJL), 2015 WL 2128680, at *3 (D.D.C. May 6, 2015) (where defendant, who
was questioned in his hospital gown, was not asked if he would submit to an interview
and was never told he could refuse to answer questions or suspend the interview at
any time, “any reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
or terminate the interview”) with State v. Rogers,
848 N.W.2d 257, 263-64 (N.D. 2014)
(“The medical staff did not permit the detectives to speak with Rogers until the staff
had his permission. Hospital staff also selected the room where the interview was
conducted [outside of the defendant’s hospital room].”).
8
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
Nor were the circumstances of defendant’s statements to police analogous to
the statements at issue in Fisher and decisions following its holding. The defendant
in Fisher was not sought out by police; he asked to leave his prison cell and met with
a guard to confess he had committed a murder years earlier because “he realized he
was getting away with murder and it started eating him up inside[.]” 158 N.C. App.
at 138,
580 S.E.2d at 410 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The defendant in
State v. Briggs was exiting an interview room when he stopped at the open door,
closed the door, returned to sit with the officer and confessed to a crime.
137 N.C.
App. 125, 127,
526 S.E.2d 678, 679 (2000). The defendant in State v. Wright
unexpectedly told officers that he had participated in a fatal shooting, even though
one officer had expressly told defendant that the purpose of their meeting was not to
interrogate him, was only to advise him of the status of the case, and that “‘if I do ask
a question, do not answer.’”
184 N.C. App. 464, 471,
646 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2007).
Defendant’s circumstances in this case – like those of most involuntarily
committed mental patients – also differed from the prison environment cited by the
majority, supra, in which federal courts have reasoned that requiring Miranda
warnings in all prisoner interrogations “would seriously disrupt prison
administration by requiring, as a prudential measure, formal warnings prior to many
of the myriad informal conversations between inmates and prison guards.” United
States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985). A mental patient’s constitutional
9
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
rights should not be “qualified by the exigencies of prison administration and the
special governmental interests that result.” Id.
The trial court made no finding regarding whether there was a formal arrest
or restraint on defendant’s freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest. Nor did the trial court make a finding regarding whether a reasonable
person in defendant’s circumstances would not have felt free to terminate the
interview or to ask the officers to leave his room.
The fact noted by the majority that defendant was involuntarily committed
based on actions bearing no relation to the criminal activity that officers questioned
him about did not, in my view, diminish his constitutional rights with regard to
interrogation. Such an approach would leave involuntarily committed patients
vulnerable to visits from law enforcement officers seeking information they would be
less likely to obtain in another setting. Courts must not place such risk on a
population which by definition is comprised of people suspected of not being able to
care for themselves.
It is important to note that the trial court may not have been presented with
the case law cited or the legal analysis included in this dissent. The extensive
findings of fact reflect that the trial court indeed exercised a high degree of care in its
decision. Nonetheless, in my view the decision was in error.
In light of the additional factors which I believe must be weighed – whether
10
STATE V. HAMMONDS
INMAN, J., dissenting.
defendant expressly consented to speak with police and whether defendant was told
that he could ask officers to leave his presence – along with other factors previously
delineated by this Court as necessary to determining whether a statement is
custodial, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to
suppress and remand this case for reconsideration of the motion and the entry of
findings and conclusions based upon all pertinent factors. Because one factor to be
considered in determining whether a statement was voluntary is whether defendant
was in custody when questioned, the trial court’s conclusion regarding custody also
could require it to reconsider the issue of whether defendant’s statement was
voluntary.
11
