Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 244 F.3d 533 - Coleman v. Mitchell

Coleman v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis

244 F.3d 533 · 2001

Citation profile

103
cited by 103 later decisions
5
states following
December 2020
most recently cited

43 federal appellate · 9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 103 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably Coleman v. Mitchell (2001), Buell v. Mitchell (2001)

43 federal appellate · 9 state decisions

780200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Coleman v. Thompson · Wainwright v. Sykes · Grupo Mexicano Desarrollos v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 103 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Our system requires that the prosecution prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is illogical to find that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, yet then doubt the certainty of the guilty verdict by recommending mercy in case a mistake has occurred. Residual doubt casts a shadow over the reliability and credibility of our legal system in that it allows the jury to second-guess its verdict of guilt in the separate penalty phase of a murder trial.... Residual doubt is not an acceptable mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.0f(B), since it is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “When a habeas petitioner has failed to show cause for not asserting his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim properly in the Ohio courts, a federal court may not reach the merits of the habeas claim unless the petitioner can show that refusal to consider his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception requires a showing that “in light of the new evi dence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 , 329, 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Coleman admits that he did not cooperate with counsel regarding the investigation and identification of mitigating evidence; imposed restrictions upon counsel; and refused to submit to further psychological or psychiatric testing. After presenting Coleman with his options, counsel proceeded with the residual doubt theory only at Coleman’s direction. Coleman was competent to stand trial and competent to assist his lawyer with strategic choices.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.