State v. MacOmber’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]t is the usual practice to question the juror involved in complaints alleging misconduct,”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Longoria · 45 Kan. App. 2d 592 - State v. Mitchell

2. ““Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. “In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) 395 U.S. at 725-26 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Heywood

3. ““It is the usual practice to question the juror involved in complaints alleging misconduct. [Citations omitted.] . . . “However, the determination of a witness’ credibility in such circumstances is within the trial court’s discretion. The court believed Poe’s testimony and, as an experienced observer of the circumstances surrounding the case, did not believe impropriety occurred. Macomber had the opportunity to obtain the testimony of the juror in support of his motion for a new trial. This he failed to do. We conclude Macomber failed to sustain the burden of provina: juror misconduct.” 244 Kan. at 407-08 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Hobbs