Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain’s Empirical Analysis
1966
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 6 district · 64 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 73 later decisions — most recently August 2014 · most notably Menish v. Polinger Company (1976), Schroyer v. McNeal (1991)
3 federal appellate · 6 district · 64 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Rose v. Melody Lane · Smith v. Bernfeld · 29 Ill. App. 2d 306 - Fitzsimons v. National Tea Co. · Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co. · Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““(a) he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the condition, (b) he should expect that invitees will not discover the danger or will fail to protect themselves against it, (c) he invites entry upon the land without (1) making the condition safe, or (2) giving a warning.””
9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The only evidence that Mrs. Cain had knowledge of the dangerous condition is that she ‘splashed her stocking’ while proceeding from the parked car to the shopping area, and that the parking area generally was well-illuminated. On the other hand, there was evidence that Mrs. Cain did not recall precisely where this wet area was, and that she walked back to the car by a different route from the one she had first taken. On returning, she encountered no ice whatsoever until she fell. On these facts, we cannot say that she was charged with knowledge that patches of ice had formed, or were likely to form, on a particular part of the lot surface. * * * “We see no basis for the defendant’s suggestion that Mrs. Cain was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. She had no reason to know of the danger to which she was exposed. Moreover, the jury could find that her exposure to the danger was unintentional and completely reasonable under the circumstances. Mrs. Cain, following her daughter-in-law, returned to the car by zigzagging between other parked vehicles. This route was no doubt less brightly lit than the wider traffic lanes on the lot but the route was a reasonable one for the plaintiff to have followed.” 244 Md. at 599-600 , 224 A. 2d at 438 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““We hold, however, that knowing of this drainage pattern, and knowing that on cold February evenings water is likely to freeze, the defendant properly could be held to have acted unreasonably and negligently in permitting its snow removal service to pile snow at the end of the parking lot diagonally opposite from the drains.. .. Secondly, having knowledge of the dangerous condition it had created, the defendant could have been held to have been also negligent in not sanding or salting the wet area formed by the melting snow. . . .” 244 Md. at 596-97 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.