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244 Pa. Super. 388

368 A.2d 776

Commonwealth v. Kaminski

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Decided December 15, 1976

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1976-12-15

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently July 1983

13 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Order of Probation” The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of an order of probation: (1) The criminal conduct of the defendant neither caused nor threatened serious harm; (2) The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm; (3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation; (4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the criminal conduct of the defendant, though failing to establish a defense; (5) The victim of the criminal conduct of the defendant induced or facilitated its commission; (6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained; (7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime; (8) The criminal conduct of the defendant was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; (9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime; (10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment; (11) The confinement of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents; (12) Such other grounds as indicate the desirability of probation.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 276 Pa. Super. 494 - Commonwealth v. Kostka

Relies on Commonwealth v. Person · Commonwealth v. Cox · Commonwealth v. Williams

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1976-12-15

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

JACOBS, Judge:

¶1This is an appeal from judgments of sentence imposed on appellant Grace Ellen Kaminski following her pleas of guilty to two counts of theft by unlawful taking or *390disposition 1 and to one count each of theft by deception,2 forgery,3 and bad checks.4 The offenses occurred over a ten-month period and involved $923.05. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of three to twelve months on the theft charges and three to twenty-three months on the forgery-bad checks charges. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm.

¶2On this appeal appellant does not challenge the legality of the sentences nor the propriety of the procedure whereby they were imposed. Her sole complaint is that the sentences were too severe under the totality of the circumstances. In support of this claim, she lists the following reasons why the sentences are too severe :

“1) The criminal conduct of the.Defendant neither caused nor threatened serious bodily harm.
“2) The Defendant did not contemplate that her conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.
“3) The Defendant made full restitution.
“4) The Defendant was never in trouble before.
“5) The confinement of the Defendant would entail excessive hardship for her two children, Cindy, age 8, and Jackie, age 6, who are dependent on Defendant for their support.
“6) Defendant is currently employed.”

¶3We first note that appellant does not claim that the trial court did not consider the above factors. Rather, her claim is that, in view of those factors, the sentences are excessive. Secondly, we note that appellant does not *391claim that the sentences exceed the maximum permissible under the law.

¶4 It is well-settled that the sentence imposed upon a convicted defendant is within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge, whose discretion in sentencing is very broad, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550, 317 A.2d 250 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cox, 441 Pa. 64, 270 A.2d 207 (1970); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 229 Pa.Super. 449, 323 A.2d 396 (1974). Additionally, we should not find an abuse of discretion in sentencing, provided that the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, unless the sentence imposed is so manifestly excessive as to inflict too severe a punishment. E. g., Commonwealth v. Person, 450 Pa. 1, 297 A.2d 460 (1972); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 235 Pa.Super. 185, 340 A.2d 515, allocatur refused, 235 Pa.Super. xxvii (1975).

¶5Although we might have imposed different sentences on these facts, we are unable to conclude that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. And since our review reveals no abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the sentences which the trial court saw fit to impose.

¶6Judgments of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which HOFFMAN, J., joins.

¶7. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921 (1973).

¶8. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922 (1973).

¶9. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101 (1973).

¶10. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4105 (1973).

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