Keyt v. Keyt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision unless the distribution lack's proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in-a far better position than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial court’s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)), The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are .accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Alexander Stratienko v. Lisa Stratienko · Bunch v. Bunch

2. “(1)(A) [A]ll real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce.... (B) [I]ncome from, and any increase in value during the marriage of, property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation, and the value of vested and unvested pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued during the period of the marriage.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Bunch v. Bunch · Summer v. Summer

3. “[Ijncreases in the value of separate property during a marriage will not be considered marital property unless both parties “substantially contributed” to the appreciation in the value of the property. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B); Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tenn.1995). While these contributions may be either “direct” or “indirect,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(l)(D), they must satisfy two requirements. McFarland v. McFarland, No. M2005-01260-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2254576 , at (Tenn. Ct.App. Aug.6, 2007). First, the contributions must be “real and significant.” Id.; Brown [v. Brown], 913 S.W.2d [163, 167 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994) ]. “Second, there must be some link between the spouses’ contributions and the appreciation in the value of the separate property.” McFarland, 2007 WL 2254576 , at ; Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d at 746 . Whether a spouse made a “substantial contribution” to the preservation and appreciation of separate property is a question of fact. Sherrill v. Sherrill, 831 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Summer v. Summer