Mason v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
244 U.S. 362 · 1917
Citation profile
279 federal appellate · 15 district · 147 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 579 later decisions (49 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2025 · most notably Malloy v. Hogan (1964), Kastigar v. United States (1972)
279 federal appellate · 15 district · 147 state decisions — followed in 30 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Brown v. Walker · Heike v. United States · Ex parte Irvine · Strother v. Christy
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 579 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The constitutional protection against self-incrimination ‘is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law.’ Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 , 144 [ 33 S.Ct. 226 , 57 L.Ed. 450 ]; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 , 599, 600 [ 16 S.Ct. 644 ].””
10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““ ‘ * * * We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of the law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to obstruct the administration of justice. The object of the law is to afford to a party, called upon to give evidence in a proceeding inter alios, protection against being brought by means of his own evidence within the penalties of the law. But it would be to convert a salutary protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger, however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential to the ends of justice.’ ” ****** “ * * * Ordinarily, he [the trial judge] is in much better position to appreciate the essential facts than an appellate court can hold and he must be permitted to exercise some discretion, fructified by common sense, when dealing with this necessarily difficult subject. Unless there has been a distinct denial of a right guaranteed, we ought not to interfere.””
9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The general rule under which the trial judge must determine each claim according to its own particular circumstances, we think, is indicated with adequate certainty in the above-cited opinions. Ordinarily, he is in much better position to appreciate-the essential facts than an appellate-court can hold and he must be permitted to exercise some discretion, fructified by common sense, when-dealing with this necessarily difficult subject. Unless there has been a distinct denial of a right guaranteed, we ought not to interfere. “In the present case the witnesses, certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. * * * ” 244 U.S. at pages 366-367, 37 S.Ct. at page-623. 9”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.