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245 A.D. 355

Morek v. Smolak

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · decided 1935-10-02

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[t]he words 'residence' and 'resident' and 'reside' in statutes have not a uniform meaning. They are to be construed in light of the context with consideration of the purpose of the statutory enactment.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Itc Entertainment Limited v. Nelson Film Partners

Relies on Barney v. Oelrichs · General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Barnett

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1935-10-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently July 2002

1 state decisions

3019351940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Sears, P. J.

¶1The order before us on this appeal vacated a previous order granted ex parte requiring plaintiff to give security for costs as “ a person residing without the state.” (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1522.)

¶2The provisions requiring the giving of security by a person residing without the State like the provisions authorizing an attachment against a non-resident, are based upon the probable difficulty or impracticability of enforcing judicial mandates against persons not dwelling within the jurisdiction of the courts. This underlying reason for the provision as to security for costs must be considered in construing the words “ residing without the State ” in the statute. The words “ residence ” and “ resident ” and “ reside ” in statutes have not a uniform meaning. They are to be construed in the light of the context with consideration of the purpose of the statutory enactment. (Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 9, and notes thereto; Keenan on Residence and Domicile, § 10 et seq.; Id. §§ 19, 481, 504; Zenatello v. Pons, 235 App. Div. 221; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Barnett, 142 Misc. 192.)

¶3Our opinion is that the purpose of the statute (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1522) is best subserved by holding the words “ residing without the state ” to relate to actual dwelling rather than to a technical legal domicile such as may be involved when citizenship or immigration acts or statutes as to voting are construed and applied. (Lyon v. Lyon, 30 Hun, 455; Bennett v. Watson, 21 App. Div. 409; Flaherty v. Cary, 25 id. 195; Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U. S. 529, at p. 532; United States ex rel. Patton v. Tod, 297 Fed. 385; Gabriel v. Johnson, 29 F. [2d] 347.)

¶4Even though the plaintiff on the record before us be assumed ineligible to acquire a technical domicile in this country sufficient to satisfy the Federal statutes by reason of his violation of the *357Immigration Law when entering the country years ago, still he is living in this State with his wife and children — he having married in this country and his children having been born here — and occupying a house on a farm in this State owned by him, with intention to remain here. Only the Federal government can remove the plaintiff from this country, and we find nothing in the record to establish that the plaintiff has anything more than a possible nationality right “ without this State.”

¶5We have not overlooked the case of Monteiro v. St. Just Steamship Co., Ltd. (211 App. Div. 867) and regret to have reached a conclusion apparently in conflict with the view there expressed.

¶6The order, therefore, should be affirmed with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

¶7All concur. Present — Sears, P. J., Taylor, Thompson, Crosby and Lewis, JJ.

¶8Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

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