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← 245 F.2d 416 - United States v. Apuzzo

United States v. Apuzzo’s Empirical Analysis

245 F.2d 416 · 1957

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
1
states following
November 1971
most recently cited

37 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently November 1971 · most notably United States v. Agueci (1962), United States v. Stromberg (1959)

37 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

240195719601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 371 · 28 U.S.C. § 2111

Relies on Kotteakos v. United States · Krulewitch v. United States · Lutwak v. United States · Michelson v. United States · Bruno v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[H]ad the prosecution, on redirect, asked for the full conversation — to avoid prejudice to the government from having suggested a black mark it could not support — it would have been proper, indeed almost necessary, that the judge admit the testimony. This is the familiar doctrine of ‘Verbal Completeness,’ * * * and is designed to prevent limitation of evidence to warp the truth and confuse the jury. Where the testimony necessary to complete the story is hearsay or other excludable matter the trial judge has discretion in deciding whether or not to permit completion. 245 F.2d at 422 . 6”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““It is inconceivable that defense counsel experienced in criminal cases would have indulged in all the extended cross-examination of the government agents without appreciation of the risk involved. His hope of finding some inconsistencies in the evidence must have been tempered by knowledge of the risk of turning up something he would not like. But in any event the sound general principle that a litigant cannot object to, or secure a mistrial for, evidence he himself produces cannot be controlled by the degree of na'iveté or sophistication of counsel. So far as the prosecution is concerned, there is nothing remotely to suggest impropriety on the part of the United States Attorney or indeed on the part of the witness unless answering responsively to a direct question can be so termed. But further, the implication that somehow the testimony should be geared to the defendant’s objections is surely a dangerous one. It is hard to see how reversal here can be had without the implication that testimony should be manipulated, the last thing this court should even suggest.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““It is now commonplace that the rules of evidence have tended ever more freely in the direction of admission of all relevant testimony in the light of modern experience that the truth is more often found by full revelation than by concealment. Hence we have the modern principle, stated in the Model Code of Evidence, and now embodied in Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 7: ‘General Abolition of * * * Exclusionary Rules. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules * * * (f) all relevant evidence is admissible.’ And we have often admonished our trial judges to err, if at all, on the side of the admission, rather than the exclusion, of evidence.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.