Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

307 federal appellate · 82 district · 189 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 753 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The rule of evidence is commonly applied in criminal cases, but is of general operation; indeed, it originated in the law of partnership. It depends upon the principle that when any number of persons associate themselves together in the prosecution of a common plan or enterprise, lawful or unlawful, from the very act of association there arises a kind of partnership, each member being constituted the agent of all, so that the act or declaration of one, in furtherance of the common object, is the act of all, and is admissible as primary and original evidence against them.””

   17 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fuentes v. United States · Reyes v. United States

2. ““In any aspect of the matter, it cannot be said that defendants were pursuing their object by lawful means. The question of their intentions — of their bona fides- — cannot be ignored. It enters in to the question of malice. As Bowen, L. J., justly said, in the Mogul Steamship Case, 23 Q. B. Div. 613: ‘Intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person’s property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.’ And the intentional infliction of such damage upon another, without justification or excuse, is malicious in law. Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 205 , 223 [ 28 Sup. Ct. 91 , 52 L. Ed. 171 , 12 Ann. Cas. 693]; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. Law, 729 et seq. [ 65 Atl. 165 , 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 254 , 118 Am. St. Rep. 727 , 9 Ann. Cas. 698], and cases cited. Of course, in a court of equity, when passing upon the right of injunction, damage threatened, irremediable by action at law, is equivalent to damage done. And we cannot deem the proffered excuse to be a ‘just cause or excuse,’ where it is based, as in this case, upon an assertion of conflicting rights that are sought to be attained by unfair methods, and for the very purpose of interfering with plaintiff’s rights, of which defendants have full notice. “Another fundamental error in defendants’ position consists in the assumption that all measures that may be resorted to are lawf”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. · 99 N.J. Eq. 770 - Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers' Club

3. ““It is said that the bill does not show an employment for a term, and that under an employment at will the complainant could be discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason, the motive of the employer being immaterial. The conclusion, however, that is sought to be drawn, is too broad. The fact that the employment is at the will of the parties, respectively, does not make it one at the will of others. The employee has manifest interest in the freedom of the employer to exercise his judgment without illegal interference or compulsion, and, by the weight of authority, the unjustified interference of third persons is actionable although the employment is at will.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Canuel v. Oskoian