Erickson v. Erickson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]f, after the making of a will, the testator marries or is divorced or his marriage annulled or dissolved . . . and no provision has been made in such will for such contingency, such marriage, divorce, annulment, dissolution, birth or adoption of a minor child shall operate as a revocation of such will, provided such divorce, annulment or dissolution shall not operate as a revocation of such will if the spouse of the testator was not a beneficiary under such will.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 766 - Smith v. Efthimiou, No. Cv96 033 19 01s (Jan. 18, 2000) · 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 14406 - Erickson v. Estate of Erickson, No. Cv 96-0387780s (Nov. 4, 1999)

2. “[t]his conclusion, does not, however, end our inquiry in this case. In Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital, 188 Conn. 1 , 2 , 448 A.2d 190 (1982), this court considered the issue of `whether extrinsic evidence of a mistake by a scrivener of a testamentary instrument is admissible in a proceeding to determine the validity of the testamentary instrument.' In a three to two decision, this court held that such evidence is not admissible. . . . Upon further consideration, we now conclude that the reasons given by the dissent in that case are persuasive and apply to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, overrule Connecticut Junior Republic, and hold that if a scrivener's error has misled the testator into executing a will on the belief that it will be valid notwithstanding the testator's subsequent marriage. Furthermore, if those two facts, namely, the scrivener's error and its effect on the testator's intent, are established by clear and convincing evidence, they will be sufficient to establish that `provision has been made in such will for such contingency,' within the meaning of § 45a-257 (a).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 14406 - Erickson v. Estate of Erickson, No. Cv 96-0387780s (Nov. 4, 1999)

3. “the will, in and of itself, did not provide for the contingency of the subsequent marriage of the decedent and, therefore, under existing case law, properly would have been revoked by that marriage pursuant to § 45a-257 (a). . . . On the basis of existing case law, the question of whether a will provides for the contingency of a subsequent marriage must be determined: (1) from the language of the will itself; and (2) CT Page 14409 without resort to extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent. . . . Applying this standard, we conclude that the trial court would not have admitted the will because, notwithstanding the inferences that the trial court drew from the dates of the marriage license and the will, and from the identity of certain of the named beneficiaries in the will, there was no language in the will providing for the contingency of the subsequent marriage of the decedent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 14406 - Erickson v. Estate of Erickson, No. Cv 96-0387780s (Nov. 4, 1999)