¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion.
¶3Evidence that the accused has committed another wholly independent crime is irrelevant and inadmissible unless there is shown some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other. Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 (71 SE2d 615) (1952). I see no relevancy whatsoever in the bare fact that the appellant might have killed another person, in this case, some eight years before, especially absent a showing of some similarity in the scheme or modus operandi. This is true even though the prior act was of “the same sort” as the one for which the defendant was on trial. Bacon v. State, supra. Proof of the prior criminal act in this case simply does not meet the “logical connection” test. See French v. State, 237 Ga. 620 (229 SE2d 410) (1976).
¶4There can be no doubt that evidence of a prior, independent and distinct crime with no logical connection or relevance to the issues at trial was harmful and prejudicial to the appellant in this case, such prejudice being, in my opinion, insurmountable.
¶5Because I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a retrial, I respectfully dissent.
¶6I am authorized to state that Justice Hill joins in this dissent.