Lipp v. State, No. 181, September Term, 2019, Opinion by Graeff, J.
CRIMINAL LAW – HATE CRIMES – DEFACEMENT OF PROPERTY
Md. Code (2012 Repl. Vol., Supp. 2019) § 10-305 of the Criminal Law Article
(“CR”) prohibits the defacement, damage, or destruction of property when “there is
evidence that exhibits animosity against a person or group, because of the race, color,
religious beliefs, sexual orientation, gender, disability, or national origin of that person or
group[.]” Appellant challenged his conviction under CR § 10-305 on the grounds that it
violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The plain language of the statute,
however, makes clear that a conviction may not be based solely on speech. Rather, the
statute permissibly regulates harmful conduct, not the content of the speech. Accordingly,
CR § 10-305 does not violate the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
Appellant may have had a First Amendment right to spray paint on his own property
the offensive words and symbols used here. Once he combined that action with a criminal
act, however, in this case defacing property of another, his criminal activity was not
protected by the First Amendment.
Circuit Court for Howard County
Case No. C-13-CR-18-000211
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 181
September Term, 2019
______________________________________
MATTHEW J. LIPP
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Graeff,
Nazarian,
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Graeff, J.
______________________________________
Filed: April 30, 2020
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document
is authentic.
Suzanne Johnson
2020-04-30 13:09-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
Matthew Lipp, appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County of
defacing property where there is evidence exhibiting animosity against groups because of
race, color, religious beliefs, or sexual orientation, in violation of Md. Code (2012 Repl.
Vol.), § 10-305 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”). Appellant contends that the circuit
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, arguing that CR § 10-305 is unconstitutional
because it violates the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.
For the reasons set forth below, we disagree, and therefore, we shall affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on May 23, 2018, appellant and three other individuals
went to Glenelg High School and spray-painted graffiti on the school building, sidewalks,
and trash receptacles. The graffiti included swastikas, anti-LGBTQ phrases, and other
offensive writings, including “KKK,” “n****rs,” and “fuck jews.” In addition, there was
graffiti on a sidewalk that stated: “Burton is a n****r,” referring to the school principal,
who is African-American. The suspects subsequently were identified as four students
attending the school, including 18-year-old appellant. The students ultimately confessed
to the incident.
On July 12, 2018, appellant was indicted on seven criminal charges: two counts of
defacing real and personal property where there is evidence exhibiting animosity against
groups because of their race, color, religious beliefs, or sexual orientation in violation of
1
The transcript of the plea proceeding was not included in the record. Accordingly,
the facts, which are not in dispute, are taken from the parties’ briefs.
CR § 10-305(2); one count of conspiracy to commit a violation of CR § 10-305(2); one
count of malicious destruction of property over $1,000; one count of conspiracy to commit
malicious destruction of property over $1,000; one count of school trespass and damage;
and one count of conspiracy to commit school trespass and damage.
On December 3, 2018, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges involving CR
§ 10-305(2), which provides that
[a] person may not deface, damage, or destroy . . . the real or personal
property connected to a building that is publicly or privately owned, leased,
or used, including a . . . school . . . if there is evidence that exhibits animosity
against a person or group, because of the race, color, religious beliefs, sexual
orientation, gender, disability, or national origin of that person or group or
because that person or group is homeless.
He argued that the statute violated the First Amendment because it impermissibly regulated
protected speech, similar to the city ordinance struck down by the United States Supreme
Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
On December 18, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on appellant’s motion to
dismiss.2 Appellant’s attorney argued that, pursuant to CR § 10-305, it was permissible to
use graffiti and refer to someone as a thief, but if that person used an offensive epithet, that
would be illegal. Therefore, counsel asserted that CR § 10-305 regulated content-based
speech and was unconstitutional under R.A.V. Counsel distinguished Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), noting that the Wisconsin statute provided for enhanced
2
An attorney for one of the other defendants charged in the incident also appeared
at the motions hearing, but the cases were not otherwise consolidated.
2
penalties for a person who committed a violent crime with a particular motive, whereas CR
§ 10-305 criminalizes specific speech.
The State argued that the court should deny the motion to dismiss, asserting that CR
§ 10-305 targets conduct, not speech. It asserted that the statute “takes what is already
criminal conduct,” i.e., defacement of property, and “merely adds a sentence
enhancement.” As a result, the State argued that Mitchell is “directly on point to
Maryland’s hate-crime statute.” The State also argued that it made no difference that CR
§ 10-305 is a separate criminal penalty, as opposed to a sentencing enhancement
accompanying an existing criminal statute, stating that the General Assembly is permitted
to establish penalties by either method.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss. It
explained:
I find that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508-US-476, that the First Amendment does not protect biased-motivated
speech when it is coupled with non-verbal conduct otherwise proscribed. In
this particular case, malicious destruction of property, trespass on the school
grounds, damaging school property.
The court found “that the Maryland hate-crime statute is essentially a sentence
enhancement statute,” and it is constitutional under Mitchell and “Maryland’s Ayers case.”
On February 6, 2019, appellant was convicted of one count of violating CR § 10-
305(2).3 The State nolle prossed the other charges. The court then sentenced appellant to
3
The State asserts in its brief that appellant was found guilty after entering a plea of
not guilty pursuant to an agreed statement of facts. Appellant, in contrast, states that he
“entered into a conditional guilty plea to one count preserving his right to appeal.” As
3
three years’ incarceration, all but 48 days suspended, to be served over 15 consecutive
weekends, with supervised probation for three years, 250 hours of community service, and
fines and court costs.4
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he standard of review of the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is whether
the trial court was legally correct.” Howard v. Crumlin, 239 Md. App. 515, 521 (2018)
(quoting Blackstone v. Sharma,
461 Md. 87, 110 (2018)), cert. denied,
463 Md. 153 (2019).
Therefore, we review the dismissal of a motion to dismiss de novo. D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt
Health Sys., Inc.,
465 Md. 339, 350 (2019).
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss, asserting that CR § 10-305 is unconstitutional because it “penalizes a viewpoint,”
and therefore, it violates the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. He contends
indicated, the transcript of the plea proceeding was not included in the record, but
regardless of the procedural posture, there is no dispute that appellant was convicted as
stated.
4
On May 9, 2019, appellant filed a Motion for Modification requesting that the
matter be held sub curia pending a requested hearing to reconsider the guilty finding and
grant a probation before judgment. On May 13, 2019, the circuit court issued an order
stating: “ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Modification of Sentence is held sub
curia and shall be set for a hearing upon Defendant’s request.” No further action has been
taken in this regard.
4
that “nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not
because of the ideas it expresses.” 5
The State contends that the circuit court properly denied appellant’s motion to
dismiss because CR § 10-305 is constitutional. It asserts that, pursuant to “Supreme Court
precedent, states may not punish pure expression, but they may [punish] criminal conduct
that is motivated by bias.” It argues that CR § 10-305 does not violate the First
Amendment because it targets conduct, not speech.
I.
Free Speech Rights and Hate Crime Statutes
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits Congress from making any law “abridging
the freedom of speech.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). Content-based
regulation of speech is presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. R.A.V.,
505 U.S.
at 382. And the First Amendment “affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct
as well as to actual speech.” Black,
538 U.S. at 358. See Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974) (Flag-burning as a form of protest is protected speech under the First
Amendment.).
The right to freedom of speech, however, is “not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); Black,
538 U.S.
at 359. “The First Amendment permits ‘restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
5
Appellant bases his argument solely on the First Amendment. He makes no claim
based on Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
5
limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”’” Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83). Examples
include obscenity, defamation, and “‘fighting words,’ i.e., ‘conduct that itself inflicts injury
or tends to incite immediate violence.’” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting In re Welfare of
R.A.V.,
464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)). “[T]he First Amendment also permits a State
to ban a ‘true threat,’” i.e., a statement meant to “communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular” person. Black,
538 U.S. at
359.
In assessing the constitutionality of CR § 10-305, the parties rely extensively on
R.A.V and Mitchell. In these cases, “the Supreme Court staked out the boundary between
a state’s unconstitutional regulation of unpopular beliefs in the marketplace of ideas and
the permissible regulation of conduct motivated by those beliefs.” People v. Rokicki, 718
N.E.2d 333, 336–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). We begin our analysis with a discussion of these
cases.
A.
R.A.V. and Mitchell
In R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379, a juvenile and several other teenagers burned a cross on
the yard of an African-American family. The defendant was convicted under St. Paul’s
hate crime ordinance, which provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
6
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment. Id. It found that the modifying phrase “arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others” limited the ordinance to “fighting words,” and therefore, it reached only
expression “that the first amendment does not protect[.]” Id. at 380–81 (quoting In re
Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, even if “all of the expression reached
was proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine,” the ordinance was facially
unconstitutional because it was a content-based and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.
Id. at 381, 391. The Court noted that the ordinance was not a prohibition “of fighting words
that are directed at certain persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it met the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause),” but rather, the ordinance prohibited only
fighting words containing “messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred and in particular, as
applied to this case, messages ‘based on virulent notions of racial supremacy.’” Id. at 392
(quoting R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 508, 511).
The Court explained:
[T]he only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of
displaying the city council’s special hostility towards the particular biases
thus singled out. That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The
politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility—but not through
the means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who (however
benightedly) disagree.
Id. at 396 (footnote omitted).
7
One year later, in Mitchell, the Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment
challenge to a Wisconsin statute that provided for an enhanced sentence if the defendant
committed a crime and intentionally selected the person against whom the crime was
committed or the property which was damaged “because of the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or
occupant of that property.” 508 U.S. at 479, 480 n.1 (quoting
Wis. Stat. § 939.645 (1989)).
In that case, a group of African-American men and boys severely beat a young white boy
based on his race.
Id. at 479–80. Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery.
Id. at 480.
This offense ordinarily had a maximum sentence of two years, but because Mitchell
intentionally selected his victim because of the victim’s race, he received an enhanced
sentence pursuant to § 939.645. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected Mitchell’s argument that, because the statute enhanced
the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory motive or point of view,
the statute violated the First Amendment by punishing the offender’s bigoted beliefs. Id.
at 485, 490. It found no constitutional violation because the statute was “aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 487–88, 490. The Court noted that “a physical
assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment.” Id. at 484. Nor are “other types of potentially expressive activities that
produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact” entitled to constitutional
protection. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).
In reaching its conclusion that the enhanced punishment based on a defendant’s
discriminatory motive for acting did not render the statute unconstitutional, the Court noted
8
that motive for committing an offense has long been an acceptable consideration during
sentencing. Id. at 485. Although “a defendant’s abstract belief, however obnoxious to
most people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge[,]” the
“Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s
beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are
protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 485–86 (quoting Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S.
159, 165 (1992)). Moreover, the Court noted that “motive plays the same role under the
Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws,” which
prevents discrimination based on an employee’s race, religion, sex, or national origin, and
which the Court had upheld as a “permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct.” Id.
at 487.
The Court then addressed the distinction between the Wisconsin statute and the
ordinance involved in R.A.V.:
That case involved a First Amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the use of “‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’” [R.A.V.,] 505 U.S., at
391, 112 S. Ct., at 2547 (quoting St. Paul Bias–Motivated Crime Ordinance,
St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). Because the ordinance only
proscribed a class of “fighting words” deemed particularly offensive by the
city—i.e., those “that contain . . . messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred,” 505
U.S., at 392, 112 S. Ct., at 2547[,] we held that it violated the rule against
content-based discrimination. See id., at 392–394, 112 S. Ct., at 2547–2548.
But whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at
expression (i.e., “speech” or “messages”), id., at 392, 112 S. Ct., at 2547, the
statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 487.
9
The Court noted that the “Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-
inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal
harm[,]” i.e., it was believed to be “more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct
emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest.” Id. at 487–88. “The
State’s desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its
penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs
or biases.” Id. at 488. Accordingly, the Court held that application of the Wisconsin
penalty-enhancement statute did not violate Mitchell’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 490.
B.
Other Jurisdictions
Although the Maryland appellate courts have not explicitly addressed the
constitutionality of CR § 10-305, other state and federal jurisdictions have addressed their
hate crime statutes using the constitutional framework established in R.A.V. and Mitchell.6
These are instructive to our analysis of CR § 10-305.
6
A hate crime is defined as “[a] felony or misdemeanor motivated by the
perpetrator's prejudice, [usually] an intense bigotry, on the basis of the victim's race, color,
national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability, or sexual
orientation.” Blacks Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation hate crime statistics, there were 7,120 hate crime incidents reported in 2018
throughout the country. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting, 2018
Hate Crime Statistics, Table 1 (2018) https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018/topicpages/incidents-and-offenses, available at https://perma.cc/PXY6-U56W (last visited
March 27, 2020). Today, almost every state, except for Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina,
and Wyoming, prohibits the commission of hate crimes in some form. United States
Department of Justice, Hate Crimes, Laws and Policies,
https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/laws-and-policies, available at
https://perma.cc/U47C-34P7 (last visited March 27, 2020).
10
In State v. McKnight, 511 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Iowa), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1113
(1994), the Supreme Court of Iowa addressed the constitutionality of an Iowa hate crime
statute in the context of an assault motivated by racism. McKnight was convicted of
infringement of individual rights pursuant to the following statute:
A person who maliciously and intentionally intimidates or interferes with
another person because of that person's race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability
and while doing so commits any of the following acts, is guilty of an
aggravated misdemeanor:
a. Commits an assault, as defined in section 708.1, upon that person or a third
person.
b. Commits an act of criminal mischief, as defined in section 716.1, upon
that person or a third person.
Id. at 390–91 (quoting Iowa Code § 729.5(3) (1991)).
Noting the striking resemblance of the Iowa statute to the Wisconsin statute upheld
in Mitchell, the court held that the law was constitutional because “bias motivated speech,
coupled with assaultive or other nonverbal, proscribed conduct, is not protected by the First
Amendment.” Id. at 395–96. It explained:
Had McKnight limited his attack on [the victim] to mere words, the First
Amendment would have protected his right to do so. He lost that protection
when his racial bias toward blacks drove him to couple those words with
assaultive conduct toward [the victim], who is black. In these circumstances,
the words and the assault are inextricably intertwined for First Amendment
purposes.
Id. at 395.
The court was not persuaded that the Iowa statute was different from the Wisconsin
statute in the way they were structured. Id. at 396. The court explained:
11
Both are directed at nonverbal, proscribed conduct—for example, assault—
motivated by bias. Both proscribe such conduct in other criminal statutes.
Both increase punishment for the proscribed conduct. In the case of section
729.5(3), the enhancement is from a misdemeanor to an aggravated
misdemeanor; in the case of the Wisconsin statute, the penalties are simply
increased. In each instance, the legislatures had good reason for the
enhancement provisions. Because of these similarities, Mitchell II controls
our decision. Like the Wisconsin statute, section 729.5(3) is, we hold, aimed
at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. We therefore conclude
section 729.5(3) does not violate McKnight’s First Amendment right of free
speech.
Id.
Appellant argues that this case, similar to Mitchell, is distinguishable from his case
because they involved a physical assault on a person, which did not occur here. Other
courts, however, have made clear that the analysis of Mitchell is not limited to bias-
motivated assaults. In Rokicki, 718 N.E.2d at 336, the defendant was convicted of a hate
crime based on the predicate offense of disorderly conduct at a restaurant, where he
directed epithets at the victim based on sexual orientation. Illinois’ hate crime statute read
as follows:
A person commits hate crime when, by reason of the actual or perceived race,
color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental
disability, or national origin of another individual or group of individuals,
[she or] he commits assault, battery, aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft,
criminal trespass to residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property,
criminal trespass to vehicle, criminal trespass to real property, mob action or
disorderly conduct. . . . 720 ILCS 5/12–7.1(a) (West 1994).
Id. at 336.
Rokicki argued that the statue was unconstitutional because it violated his free
speech rights. Id. After a thorough review of R.A.V. and Mitchell, the court determined
that the “statute requires conduct beyond mere expression.”
Id. at 337–39. It explained:
12
[D]efendant is not being punished merely because he holds an unpopular
view on homosexuality or because he expressed those views loudly or in a
passionate manner. Defendant was charged with hate crime because he
allowed those beliefs to motivate unreasonable conduct. Defendant remains
free to believe what he will regarding people who are homosexual, but he
may not force his opinions on others by shouting, pounding on a counter, and
disrupting a lawful business. Defendant's conduct exceeded the bounds of
spirited debate, and the first amendment does not give him the right to harass
or terrorize anyone.
Id. at 339. Accordingly, the court held that the statute “constitutionally regulates conduct
without infringing upon free speech.”
Id.
In a California case with similar facts to those here, the defendant was convicted for
a hate crime after he wrote racial slurs on the classroom door of the only African-American
teacher at a school and on a music building where multiple African-American students sat
in the morning after getting off the bus. In Re Michael M., 86 Cal. App. 4th 718, 721–22
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). The defendant confessed to the crime and was convicted under the
following statute:
No person . . . shall knowingly deface, damage, or destroy the real or personal
property of any other person for the purpose of intimidating or interfering
with the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to the
other person by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, because of the other person’s race[.]
Id. at 722–23 (quoting
Cal. Penal Code § 422.6(b) (1998)).
Michael M. argued that the court’s finding that he violated the statute was overbroad
because the words he wrote were not a credible threat of violence, and therefore, his actions
were protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 727. The court upheld the statute because
it was “directed at regulating conduct that is unprotected by the First Amendment.”
Id. at
13
729–30. It stated that vandalism is not protected by the First Amendment “merely because
those engaged in such conduct intend thereby to express an idea.” Id. at 729.7
In State v. Nye, 943 P.2d 96, 98–99 (Mont. 1997), the defendant was convicted of
malicious intimidation or harassment relating to civil or human rights after placing bumper
stickers conveying religious views around the community. The statute provided, in
pertinent part, as follows:
A person commits the offense of malicious intimidation or harassment
when, because of another person’s . . . religion . . . , he purposely or
knowingly, with the intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy,
or offend . . . damages, destroys, or defaces any property of another or
any public property.
Id. at 99 (quoting
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-221 (1989)).
The Supreme Court of Montana rejected Nye’s argument that this statute violated
his First Amendment rights, stating that the purpose of the statute was “not to suppress the
content of the communication,” but rather, “to prohibit conduct that violates other criminal
laws . . . and that are committed against another person because of that person’s race,
religion or national origin with the intent to intimidate, harass or annoy that person.” Id.
at 100–01. The court stated that the First Amendment protected Nye’s right to put the
bumper stickers on his property, but he “lost his First Amendment protection when he
7
The court also addressed, based on the statutory scheme involved, whether the
words written constituted a credible threat of violence. In re Michael M., 86 Cal. App. 4th
718, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Although a threat of violence is not an element of the
offense under Maryland’s statute, we note that the California court held that writing the
word n****r on the door of the only African-American teacher “carried with it a violent
connotation.”
Id.
14
coupled the message on the bumper sticker with the defacement of the property of others.”
Id. at 101.
Federal courts similarly have upheld against First Amendment challenges statutes
providing enhanced punishment for criminal conduct that is motivated by bias towards a
protected group. For example, in Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1244, 1249–50 (10th Cir.
2005), the court held that a hate crime statute that “increased punishment for persons
committing certain enumerated offenses, including disorderly conduct, with the intent to
‘intimidate or terrorize’” was constitutional because it required “the commission of a
primary, conduct-based offense prior to its application,” and therefore, the statute was
aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.
II.
CR § 10-305
With this background in mind, we address appellant’s claim that CR § 10-305 is
unconstitutional. This statute, one of Maryland’s hate crimes statutes, provided at the time
of appellant’s actions:
A person may not deface, damage, or destroy, attempt to deface, damage, or
destroy, burn or attempt to burn an object on, or damage the real or personal
property connected to a building that is publicly or privately owned, leased,
or used, including a cemetery, library, meeting hall, recreation center, or
school:
(1) because a person or group of a particular race, color, religious belief,
sexual orientation, gender, disability, or national origin, or because a person
or group that is homeless, has contacts or is associated with the building; or
(2) if there is evidence that exhibits animosity against a person or group,
because of the race, color, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, gender,
15
disability, or national origin of that person or group or because that person or
group is homeless.[8]
The plain language of the statute makes clear that a conviction may not be based
solely on speech. Rather, the statute regulates harmful conduct, not the content of the
speech. And the harmful conduct is proscribed in other criminal statutes. See e.g., CR §
6-301 (“A person may not willfully and maliciously destroy, injure, or deface, real or
personal property of another.”).
The Supreme Court in Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484–86, held that bias-motivated
speech, coupled with non-verbal, proscribed conduct, is not protected by the First
Amendment. An enhanced punishment for bias-inspired conduct is permissible because
this conduct inflicts greater individual and societal harm than the same conduct absent the
special animus involved with hate crimes. Id. at 487–88.9
Appellant argues that, even if CR § 10-305 is analogous to Mitchell because it
proscribes conduct, Mitchell nonetheless is distinguishable. He notes that, in Mitchell, the
statute enhanced the penalty for a crime based on the selection of the victim, whereas CR
8
Effective October 1, 2019, the words “or threaten” were added to the statute. It
now provides that “[a] person may not deface, damage, or destroy, attempt or threaten to
deface, damage, or destroy, burn or attempt or threaten to burn an object on, or damage the
real or personal property connected to a building . . . .”
9
A conviction under CR § 10-305 is a misdemeanor with a penalty of not more than
three years’ incarceration and/or a $5,000 fine. The penalty for malicious destruction of
property is not more than three years’ incarceration and/or a $2,500 fine if the damage is
more than $1,000 and 60 days and/or a fine not exceeding $500 if the damage is less than
$1,000. CR § 6-301(b)&(c).
16
§ 10-305 was drafted as a separate criminal offense. Although appellant is correct that
Mitchell is distinguishable in that regard, it is a distinction without a difference.
The Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument in Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,
629 n.6 (1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1130 (1995).10 In that case, Ayers brought a First
Amendment challenge to the predecessor to CR § 10-305. Id. at 608. The Court held that,
because Ayers was not convicted under the provision of the statute that he challenged, he
did not have standing to challenge the statute. Id. at 629. The Court noted in a footnote,
however, that the constitutional analysis did not change based on whether the statute
creates a separate criminal offense rather than an enhancement of the penalty for the
underlying offense. Id. at 629 n.6. The Court noted the statement in Mitchell that “the
legislature has the primary responsibility for fixing criminal penalties. It may choose to do
so by enacting a separate criminal offense statute rather than a penalty enhancement
provision.” Id. As the Court explained, “[u]nder either approach, the penalty for the
underlying crime is enhanced.” Id. We agree. The analysis in Mitchell applies here.
Appellant may have had a First Amendment right to spray paint on his own property
the offensive words and symbols used here. Once he combined that action with a criminal
act, however, in this case defacing property of another, his criminal activity was not
protected by the First Amendment. The circuit court properly denied appellant’s motion
to dismiss.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
10
Ayers was abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jones, 466 Md. 142 (2019).
17
