Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 246 Miss. 214 - Funches v. State

Funches v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1963

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
2
states following
December 1998
most recently cited

17 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently December 1998

17 state decisions

501963197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Shields v. State · Johnson v. State · Quick v. State · Gee v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “is rebuttable, and is more properly classified as an inference, even if available in a particular case. It should not be projected in an instruction which fails to disclose its susceptibility to rebuttal, and intimates to the jury that the state has thereby made out its case. Inferences may be drawn properly by the jury from the facts before it, without the trial court invading the jury's province with a direction as to”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““In view of the limited issue, we think the granting of this instruction was reversible error. Shields v. State, 244 Miss. 543 , 144 So.2d 786 (Miss.1962), recently reviewed the cases discussing this type of instruction. It was there observed that, where the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing have been disclosed, malice should be left for consideration of the jury, and such direction should not be granted to the state as an aid to bolster its evidence. * * * “The quoted language may well have been understood by the jury as intimating that defendant intentionally used the deadly weapon, which fact was the pivotal issue. With such understanding, the jury would necessarily conclude that malice aforethought could be presumed. * * * Instructions of this type may be so misleading to the jury, as here, and may constitute such a useless reference to a ‘presumption’ or inference, that they should be used, if at all, with considerable caution. * * *” (246 Miss. at 216-217, 148 So.2d at 711 )”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““* * * 'The court instructs the jury for the state that malice aforethought mentioned in the indictment may be presumed from the unlawful and deliberate use of a deadly weapon.’ ” (246 Miss. at 216, 148 So.2d at 711 )”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.