246 N.J. Super. 608 - State v. Colon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We do not overlook the State’s argument that fairness to the prosecution requires that since defendant was permitted to introduce that part of [the co-defendant’s] statement which favored the defense, the incriminating portion should also be received in order to convey the complete meaning of what the declarant was saying. The argument, while superficially attractive, misses the evidential princi pie that marks the distinction between the two facets of what [co-defendant] said. On the one hand, we have a statement admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule because of its guarantee of testimonial trustworthiness as a declaration against interest. The theory of trustworthiness which supports the exception is that the statement so far subjects the declarant to criminal liability “that a reasonable man [woman] in his [her] position would not have made the statement unless he [she] believed it to be true____” [Former] N.J.R. Evid. 63(10). The statement inculpating defendant, on the other hand, carries no such guarantee and, in fact, because of its self-serving nature, is presumed to be unreliable, something which is aggravated by the absence of any opportunity for cross-examination. We therefore see no lack of fairness to the State in precluding it from countering a presumably trustworthy statement with one that is presumably untrustworthy. [Colon, 246 N.J.Super. at 613 , 588 A.2d 440 (alterations in original).]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Bowser

2. “The facts, however, were the converse of those here, where the question addresses the admissibility against defendant of the part of a codefendant’s confession that is inculpatory as to the defendant where defendant had introduced the portion of codefendant’s confession that may exculpate him. The rationale underlying Powers and Abrams does not lie in the mere fact that the self-incriminatory and the exculpatory statements were made side-by-side. It lies in the fact that the latter was intrinsic to the former. In Abrams , the declarant codefendant, Smith, admitted selling cocaine to an undercover detective but denied that she had obtained the contraband from defendant Abrams. As the Appellate Division said, that exculpatory declaration formed part of the declaration against interest because “it intensifies her personal criminal responsibility for the transaction.” [Id. at 612, 588 A.2d 440 (quoting Abrams, supra, 140 N.J.Super. at 235 , 356 A.2d 26 ).]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Bowser

3. “A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary, proprietary, or social interest, or so far tended to subject declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid declarant’s claim against another, that a reasonable person in declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. Such a statement is admissible against an accused in a criminal action only if the accused was the declarant [Ibid, (emphasis added).]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Bowser