Francis v. Ferguson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The judgment below proceeds upon a misconception of the effect of the final clause of the lease. It expresses merely what the law presumes in the absence of such a clause. ‘It is a presumption of law, in the absence of express words, that the parties to a contract intend to bind not only themselves, but their personal representatives.’ (Kernochan v. Murray, 111 N. Y. 306, 308 .) “An ordinary covenant against assignment does not bind the executors of the tenant and is not broken by a transfer of the leased premises by operation of law. (Squire v. Learned, 196 Mass. 134 ; Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U. S. 41 .) The covenant may, however, be so drawn as expressly to prohibit such a transfer. To accomplish such a prohibition in case of a devolution to executors, its language must be ‘very special.’ (Seers v. Hind, 1 Ves. Jr. 294.) Such covenants are construed ‘with the utmost jealousy.’ (Riggs v. Pursell, 66 N. Y. 193, 201 .) The use of general language, not specially related to the covenant against assignment — language which the law would imply as a term of the lease — is not the ‘very special’ prohibition which the cases require. In Roe v. Harrison (2 Term Rep. 425) the covenant was that neither the tenant nor his executors or administrators shall let. The restriction was explicit and no doubt could arise as to the meaning of the parties. “On the death of the tenant, his property was transferred to the executors of his will by operation of law. They had capacity to take and to di”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Berman's Estate