Volume 246 — South Western Reporter

<p>1. Chattel mortgages <©^>177(1, 4) — -That property alleged converted was mortgaged to another did not defeat recovery nor affect measure of damages.</p> <p>In action for conversion of a sawmill against judgment creditor of plaintiff’s assign- or, sheriff and purchaser at execution sale, it was no defense that it was mortgaged by plaintiff’s assignor to a third person, and plaintiff, being entitled to the possession, could recover its full value, and not merely the value of the equity.</p> <p>2. Trial <⅜=>350 (8) — Refusal to add to questions submitted as to inducement for transfer of-property to plaintiff not error in view of finding of bona tides of transfer.</p> <p>Where the undisputed evidence in action for conversion showed that plaintiff’s assignor transferred the sawmill to her in consideration of $1,500, $500 of which she paid him in cash and $1,000 by credit on an account against him, and where questions submitted to the jury were whether the property was transferred with intent to hinder or defraud creditors and transferred to plaintiff for the purpose of paying or being credited on a debt assignor owed plaintiff, refusal of defendant’s request to add whether assignor was induced to make the transfer by the $500 cash paid him by plaintiff was not error in view of the finding that the transfer was not made to defraud.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Bexar County ; Robt. W. B. Terrell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Aurelanio Urrutia against the State National Bank. Erom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

W. B. Terrell, Judge. Application for writ of injunction by the City of San Antonio against Henry Sehutte and others to restrain defendants from violating certain ordinances. From an order refusing the injunction, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from District Court, Gillespie County; J. H. McLean, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Walter Allmand against the Central Texas Telephone Company, Inc. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Weights-and measures <Sfc=>8 — Public weigher can remove deputy at will.</p> <p>Under the law governing public weighers and their deputies (Yernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1922, arts. 7S28-7833o, inclusive), and particularly articles 7833b, 7833g, relating to bonds of the weighers and their deputies, and 7833f, requiring the weigher to take the oath of office, but not requiring an oath from the deputy, which act nowhere fixes the tenure of office of the deputy, the power of the weigher to appoint his deputy impliedly gives him the power to remove the deputy at will, and that power is not defeated by article 7833m, providing for the removal-of public weighers and their deputies by the commissioners’ court after charges preferred against them.</p> <p>2. Weights and measures <§==>8 — Deputy public weigher has term coextensive with weigh-er.</p> <p>Since the law provides for no particular duration of the term of a deputy public weigher, an appointment of a deputy is for a term coextensive with the tenure of office of the weigh-er who appointed him, unless the appointment is revoked or otherwise nullified.</p>

Terrell, Judge. Suit by the K. M. Van Zandt Land Company and others against Tom Smith and another. From an order granting á temporary writ of injunction, defendants appeal.

<p>(..Venue <&wkey;l7 — Venue agreement not a part of cause of action.</p> <p>A venue agreement is not a part of the cause of action, but merely controls the venue of the case, so that it was permissible for plaintiff to urge such agreement in defense of plea of privilege, though action‘was based on an open account.</p> <p>2. Municipal corporations &wkey;>1024 — Actions against must be brought in county where it is situated.</p> <p>Any action against a municipal corporation is of an inherently local nature and must be brought in the county in which it is situated.</p> <p>3. Municipal corporations &wkey;>247 — Agreement fixing venue of action against it in another county ultra vires.</p> <p>An, agreement of a municipal corporation, stipulating that any items of merchandise bought, as well as those to be sold on future 'orders, should be paid for in another county, was ultra vires and insufficient to form the basis of venue of an action in the district court of the other county.</p>

Hosey, Judge. Suit by the First State Bank of Handley against C. M. Sparkman and A. D. Dickinson. Judgment for plaintiff against both defendants for foreclosure of the lien of the chattel mortgage, and in favor of the defendant Dickinson over against defendant Sparkman for such amount as defendant Dickinson should have to pay, and defendant Spark-man appeals.

<p>Appeal from District Court, Taylor County;. W. R. Ely, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Shreve Chair Company against B. W. McCarty and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

A. Work, Judge. Action by J. E. Dickinson against L. L. Carter and others. From an order sustaining defendants’ pleas of privilege and that cause be transferred to county of their residence, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded for trial on merits in county where instituted.

<p>Appeal from Dallas County Court at Law; T. A. Work, Judge.</p> <p>Action by D. T. Newberg against the Dallas Hotel Company Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

P. Dohoney, Judge. Action by B. P. Looney against A. H. Belo & Oo. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. This was a suit by appellee against appellant, a corporation, for damages, which the former claimed he had suffered because of the publication by the latter in its newspapers, the Galveston Daily News and the Dallas Morning News, of certain matter of and concerning acts of his as Attorney General of Texas, which, he alleged, was libelous.

<p>Injunction ®=>26(9) — Forcible entry and de-tainer pending on appeal in county court cannot be enjoined.</p> <p>The district court cannot, in a suit to cancel a deed for fraud, restrain forcible entry and detainer proceedings instituted by one of the defendants to recover possession of the land, in which judgment for the possession had been awarded to that defendant by a justice of the peace, and an appeal therefrom taken to the county court.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Orange County; J. B. Forse, Special Judge.</p> <p>Suit by William Moore against the City of Orange. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p> <p>Reformed and affirmed.</p>

<p>Dismissal and nonsuit <©= 19(1)— Dismissal as to one defendant held not to necessitate peremptory instruction as to the others in sequestration.</p> <p>Where plaintiff in lawful possession of realty under a lease executed by a tenant in common-of defendant D. sued in trespass to try title, joining D., S. who claimed a right to possession by agreement with plaintiff, .and R., who took possession under S., plaintiff, after sequestration proceedings reacquiring possession by giving a replevy bond, that plaintiff dismissed as to D., who made no claim, did not necessitate an instructed verdict for all the defendants, under Rev. St. arts. 7110, 7111, plaintiff not having dismissed his suit in its entirety, and the property seized under the writ not being taken from D.’s possession, but from that of R.</p>